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Update
from AIJAC
The Case
for Action against Iran's Nukes/ Syria revisited
September
14, 2004
Number 09/04 #06
The International
Atomic Energy Agency is meeting today to discuss the ongoing stalemate
with Iran over it's nuclear program. Iran
is defiantly saying it will resume enriching Uranium, a crucial step
in bomb-making but something you can bypass easily through imports if
you only want to generate power, as Iran says it does, but almost no one
believes. There are reports that the main
European advocates of diplomacy with Iran are now moving to the
US position of bringing the problem to the UN Security Council (though
they will not agree at today's meeting), while intelligence
experts and exile groups says Iran is simply using its dialogue with the
Europeans to stall for time.
Below are
several argument for tougher action against Iran.
First, the
generally dovish Israel daily Ha'aretz editorialises that the Europeans
have to make absolutely clear to Iran that the only choice is to agree
to genuinely give up any attempt to build nuclear arms, or face military
action. The paper say regional stability is at stake. For this argument,
CLICK HERE.
Next is a
long symposium incorporating a policy specialist, an intelligence specialist,
and an Iranian dissident leader, all of whom argue that a failure to stop
Iran's nuclear program would be extremely dangerous. They have slightly
different takes about what is to be done, however. For their varying views,
CLICK HERE.
Finally,
the French-Iranian Middle East commentator Amir Taheri follows up on last
week's UN resolution on Syria's control over Lebanon, pointing out that
multilateralism and diplomatic sensitivity are an utter failure in this
case, and argues the same conclusions apply to Iraq. For his important
argument, CLICK HERE.
Editorial: How to handle Iran's nukes
Ha'aretz,
14/09/2004
The International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors, which convened
yesterday to discuss Iran's nuclear program, carries a heavy responsibility.
It can impact the global community's handling of efforts by the fanatic
Islamic regime in Tehran to procure nuclear weapons. This determination
faces no less formidable determination on the part of the U.S. administration,
the Israeli government and possibly other governments. Everyone prefers
to handle the Iranian nuclear issue through diplomacy, to clarify to Iran
that the price for nuclear armament is greater than its potential use, and
that the world, through IAEA, the UN and countries willing to impose sanctions,
will not leave Iran alone until it gives up its quest for weapons-grade
uranium.
If the diplomatic route is blocked, the U.S. and Israel will be forced to
resort to force to disrupt, delay and thwart Iran's nuclear arms race. The
Bush administration included Iran in its three-way "Axis of Evil", along
with Iraq, which was conquered before it could arm itself with nukes, and
North Korea, which can boast certain nuclear capabilities. The Israeli government
has announced numerous times that it will not accept nuclear arms in the
hands of an enemy Arab or Muslim state. Use of force will be a last resort,
but anyone who blocks diplomacy will force use of force even on those who
abhor it.
Iran is not the first country with the clear aim of acquiring nuclear weapons.
The Iranians can claim they don't lag behind neighbors India and Pakistan,
or for that matter France and Britain, which have joined Germany recently
in trying to convince Iran not to play with nuclear fire. The Iranians claim
Israel has nuclear weapons too. Israeli experts on Iran believe the struggle
for nuclear weapons is a national goal the existed before the reign of the
ayatollahs, and will outlast them.
But what hangs in the balance is not abstract justice, but peace in the
region and the world. India and Pakistan really might drag the world into
nuclear conflict, and perpetual external intervention there is necessary.
Greater North Korean nuclear power could push South Korea and Japan into
outfitting. Iran's special threat lies in the connection between a fanatic
regime, whose declared aim is spreading the Islamic revolution and destroying
Israel, and its ability to implement its doctrine. Even critics of Israel's
nuclear ambiguity policy admit that no Israeli government has ever used
it even as a threat, but simply for deterrence.
Iran must follow in the footsteps of the four countries that have reversed
nuclear policy: Kazakhstan, Belarus, South Africa and in the past year Libya.
Russia, Europe and the international institutions must make it clear to
Iran that this path isn't negotiable, and the question is only what means
will be used against it: diplomatic conflict or military conflict. The choice
is Iran's.
Back
to Top
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Symposium:
Atomic Ayatollahs
By Jamie
Glazov
FrontPageMagazine.com, September 6, 2004
Does Iran already have nuclear weapons? Is it on the verge of acquiring them?
Will the U.S. have to initiate regime change unilaterally?
To discuss these and other questions with us today, Frontpage Symposium
has assembled a distinguished panel:
Jed Babbin ,the former deputy undersecretary of defense in the
administration of President George H. W. Bush. A contributing editor of
The American Spectator Magazine and a contributor to National Review
Online , he is the author of the new book Inside the Asylum: Why the United
Nations and Old Europe Are Worse Than You Think ;
John Loftus , a former Justice Department prosecutor with code
word clearances whose 1982 expose of Nazis working for western intelligence
won the Emmy Award for Mike Wallace. He is the author of several books
on the Middle East and the director of INTELCON.US, the upcoming National
Intelligence Conference and Exposition. At 10:30 every weeknight,
the Loftus Report is a featured segment of ABC national radio, and Fox
Television's "Inside Scoop with John Loftus" airs at 11 am Sundays.
His website is John-Loftus.com;
and
Reza Bayegan , a commentator on Iranian politics who was born in
Iran and currently works for the British Council in Paris . His weekly
columns appear on many publications including Iran va Jahan website. He
is a regular guest on exile Iranian radio shows.
FP: Jed Babbin, John Loftus and Reza Bayegan, welcome to Frontpage
Symposium.
Mr. Bayegan let me begin with you. What exactly is the threat we face?
Does Iran already have WMDs? Or is it on the verge of having them? What
is the threat here?
Bayegan: The Islamic Republic already has stockpiles of chemical
weapons and has told the EU three ( Britain ,Germany and France )
'that it could possess nuclear weapons within three years. The real time
limit the mullahs need to obtain a nuclear bomb however is less than 11
months.
The danger we face from the regime in Tehran acquiring the nuclear bomb
cannot be exaggerated. Our democratic values and the very survival of
Western civilization are at stake. In particular such an eventuality would
be the worst nightmare scenario for the state of Israel and an unprecedented
blow to peace and liberty throughout the world.
Since September 11, we have seen how terrorists are able to strike anywhere
they choose and hijack Western democratic processes by intimidating the
public as they did during the recent Spanish election. With a nuclear
bomb at their disposal they can do this without risking their own lives
and by pushing -- or just threatening to push -- a button.
With or without WMDs, the danger the clerical regime poses is far greater
than the other members of the 'axis of evil' i.e. Iraq during Saddam
Hussein and North Korea . This danger is rooted in a ruthless anti-Western
ideology that manipulates the religious belief of the masses and justifies
any means for reaching its deadly objectives. If the mullahs get their
hands on a nuclear bomb we might as well assume that Hamas and other terrorist
organizations have access to it also.
On August 15 2004 , the military chief of the Islamic Republic declared
that the entire Zionist territory 'is within the range of Iran 's new
advanced ballistic missiles'. The mullahs are counting the days until
they can arm these missiles with nuclear or biological warheads. Experts
believe that although due to their inherent inaccuracy the Iranian Shahb-3
and the planned for Shahab-4 missiles make no military sense if armed
with conventional warheads, they can become immensely effective as terror
weapons against civilian targets.
In other words, the dictators in Tehran gaining weapons of mass destruction
would impose the same or worse state of terror on the rest of the world
as they have imposed on the Iranian people for the last quarter of a century.
FP: Mr. Babbin, what Mr. Bayegan is describing here is terrifying.
Do you agree that the danger the clerical regime poses is far greater
than the other members of the Axis of Evil?What is your view of this threat?
Are we going to have to pursue regime change asap?
Babbin: I agree that Iran is, by far, the most dangerous terrorist
nation. Their nuclear ambitions and their unarguable involvement
in global terrorism make them our number one problem. The threat
from Iran is threefold:
[1] they are supporters of the conventional terrorists such as Hizballah,
al-Queda and many others that have American blood on their hands.
[2] they are funding, supplying and operating the al-Sadr insurgents in
Iraq . The Iranian regime has decided to make a stand against democracy
in Iraq , and we must find a way to end their interference or Iraq will
never be free or stable.
[3] their nuclear ambitions are close to being achieved. If they
are, the whole Middle East and even parts of Europe will be threatened,
as will American interests everywhere.
We should be pursuing regime change in Iran now, through covert operations,
support for Iranian opposition groups (such as the Mujahideen e Khalq,
which we wrongly labeled a terrorist group at Tehran 's request) and by
preparing what may be an inevitable military strike against their nuclear
program.
FP: Mr. Loftus, what do you make of the two gentlemen's comments?
Loftus: If anything, they understate the threat. Let us put
Iran 's nuclear development in context. During the 1990's the Peoples
Liberation Army of China made a strategic decision to trade the components
of the Islamic Bomb in return for greater access to Arab oil, necessary
for China's growth.
The PLA used its proxy state, North Korea , to carry out the nuclear proliferation
deal. Iranian nuclear engineers were frequently observed flying
to North Korea and Pakistan .
For short term diplomatic reasons, the US is going along with the fiction
that the A.Q. Khan network in Pakistan was merely a private criminal enterprise.
Supposedly, this "private" network arranged to provide North Korean missiles
to the Pakistan army in exchange for advanced nuclear centrifuges.
Several of these P-2 centrifuges were discovered in Iran by the
IAEA inspectors.
The Pakistani government has refused to cooperate with the IAEA's investigation
of Iran . Access to uranium stain samples has been denied.
This denial is critical for the IAEA to prove that Iran has its own nuclear
track, which cannot be explained by the nuclear stains found on the
Pakistani centrifuges. Without the Pakistani evidence, the IAEA
is denied the smoking gun to prove that Iran is still lying about its
nuclear program.
At some point, the Bush administration will have to stop sitting on its
intelligence evidence if it wants to make its case to the UN that the
Iran-North Korean-Chinese partnership is the single greatest threat to
world peace.
FP: Thanks Mr. Loftus. This is very terrifying because what exactly
can we really do about this? Make a case to the U.N.? This is a joke.
What's the U.N. gonna do? It's pretty evident by now, isn't it, that the
U.N. is a body that works against the interests of the U.S. , democracy
and freedom? The U.N. should have acted on this long ago.
Mr. Loftus do you agree? And so what do? Do we wait for the U.N. to take
action or is the U.S. gonna have to do something drastic unilaterally?
Loftus: I think the whole mess is about to erupt this fall. My
bet: after the U.S. elections are over.
FP: You want to expand a bit?
Loftus: Not yet. October surprises come in October.
FP: Ok then. Well we'll talk in November about this with you then.
Mr. Bayegan, your view on the U.S. supporting Iran's opposition?
Bayegan: I agree with Mr. Babbin that Iranian opposition groups
should be supported. I would like however to put in a caveat here about
groups such as Mujahedin e Khalgh. This group is abhorred by the majority
of Iranians for its opportunistic stance during the Iran-Iraq war and
its ideological hodgepodge of Islamic Marxism. The track record of the
group as far as ethical and moral integrity is concerned is also quite
bleak. It has been in cahoots with Saddam Hussein, the PLO and many other
brutal terrorist organizations around the globe.
If there is a group with a more shattered popular base than the mullahs
it is the Mujahedin e Khalgh. Having said that, one cannot deny that they
have high organizational and disciplinary skills which could be useful
for overthrowing the mullahs. If support is to be provided to this group
and similar organizations it should be made conditional on their
acceptance of democratic principles and civilized political norms.
Iranians have no affinity for Marxism or Islamic obscurantism dished out
by the mullahs for the past twenty-five years, but can feel at home in
their ancient traditions of respect for human rights and tolerance. Reza
Pahlavi, the son of the late Shah of Iran who lives in exile in the U.S.
, is the only Iranian political figure whose voice rings true for Iranians.
His political agenda of separation of Mosque and state (see his book Winds
of Change) and his crusade for holding a national referendum to let Iranians
freely decide about their national future (a Republic, Monarchy, etc.)
is the most solid ground for bringing about political transformation in
Iran. His campaign, which is the only force that can unite all Iranians,
should be supported with our wholehearted effort and the maximum commitment the
democratic world can muster.
I would like to give the highest emphasis here to the fact that we cannot
achieve a sustainable democratic transformation in Iran without the trust
and blessing of the Iranian public. We have to use all possible means
to isolate the regime and at the same time never for a minute lose sight
of the legitimate aspirations of the Iranian people for peace, national
dignity and democracy. This can be done by encouraging Iranian political
groups to come together under the umbrella of calling for a free and democratic
national referendum.
Regarding Jamie's remark about the UN, I would like to say that the United
Nations, IAEA and for that matter efforts of the three European powers
to coax Iran to convert to a trustworthy regime and keep its nuclear program
peaceful will not work because the mullahs policy of acquiring nuclear
bomb is part of an overall strategy to defeat Western democratic values
and annihilate the state of Israel. It is a betrayal of peace and human
liberty to make concessions to a government which will use any possible
means to secure its deadly objectives. The weakening and disintegration
of the clerical regime can be achieved by concerted international
effort and application of the highest possible pressure in all fields.
FP: Mr. Babbin, what do you make of Mr. Bayegan's emphasis
on democratic principles as an ingredient for U.S. support of Iranian
opposition groups?
Babbin: Mr. Bayegan takes this as a sort of academic exercise.
I don't want us to condition our support of Iranian opposition groups on
some ephemeral affirmation of democratic principals and "civilized political
norms" -- whatever that means. We can, and should, choose to
support those groups that are proving that they are neither Islamic
jihadists nor terrorists of any other stripe, and those which demonstrate
their commitment to democracy by agreeing -- now, not later -- to some
sort of provisional government for Iran when the mullahs are removed.
To do this, we need what we failed to establish in Iraq: a government
in exile, governed by an agreed-on draft constitution that contains provision
for basic rights and provides for free elections within a year of the
mullahs' fall. We should be proclaiming -- long, hard and continuously
-- that regime change in Tehran is our policy, and using every other means
we can to increase the pressure on the mullahs, short of military action
at this time. Military action may be needed as early as next year
if the situation doesn't change dramatically.
I think the MEK is imperfect; maybe it has fewer adherents than other
groups. But for us -- or for anyone such as Mr. Bayegan -- to say
that no one other than their pal (in his case, the late shah's son) has
allegiance of the Iranian people is simply silly. No one -- not
the MEK, not Reza Pahlavi, no one - has allegiance among the people of
Iran. They have been enslaved for 25 years by the mullahs.
I hate to say it, but proclaiming Reza Pahlavi the only accepted voice that
"rings true for Iranians" is the same sort of claim we heard from
the INC three years ago about Ahmed Chalabi. It wasn't true about
Chalabi then, and I don't expect it's true now of Mr. Pahlavi. The Iranian
people will decide for themselves in due course. Anyone who claims
his guy is the ONLY guy to trust now diminishes his own credibility enormously.
Having said that, I see no reason to not support Mr. Pahlavi or to not
rearm and reactivate the MEK. There likely are other groups that
can also be activated, supplied and encouraged. The issue, I say
emphatically, is not to pick the next government of Iran now. The
issue is to ensure that we place enough pressure on the current kakistocracy
in Iran to prevent them from obtaining -- by development or purchase --
nuclear weapons. Whether we do it perfectly or not isn't the issue.
Results count here, and although there are lines we can't and shouldn't
cross, I'm not too picky on how we reach that goal.
I think Mr. Loftus has it right, or at least mostly. The Iranian
nuclear issue will be on the front burner by early next year. In
the UN we hope -- faint hope that it is -- that the IAEA will do what
it is promising now, and report the Iranian nuclear program to the Security
Council as a violation of international law and treaty. But to expect
the Security Council to do anything serious about Iran is to hope too
much. Iran is backed at least by Russia and France (both veto-holding
permanent members) and other Security Council members such as Algeria,
which like Iran is a supporter of terrorists. We lack the votes
to get the Security Council to do anything that will prevent Iran from
becoming a nuclear power.
Having said that, we must plan for the next steps to be taken, because
they will need to be accomplished before the end of 2005. By then,
if not sooner, Iran will have possession of, and/or the ability to manufacture,
nuclear weapons. (I should note that more than one source has told
me that Iran already has three nuclear weapons it has bought on the black
market). We will not have to act unilaterally. Other nations --
especially including Israel -- see Iran as an existential threat.
Iraq, though not yet able to defend itself against the Iranian-funded
insurgency of Moqtada al-Sadr, has an equal stake in preventing
a nuclear Iran. So do all those nations -- from Turkey to Britain
- who will soon be in range of Iranian missiles. The UN will fail with
respect to Iran just as it has failed in every other challenge in
the war on terrorists and the nations that support them. We won't
act alone. But we will have to act militarily, and soon.
Loftus:
The short term goal is to prevent Iran from having nuclear weapons, the
medium term goal is to stop its funding of terrorism, the long term goal
is regime change. Lets take them in order:
Short term: IAEA wants (secretly) to refer Iran to the UN for sanctions
but lacks the smoking gun. Libya, Pakistan, North Korea or China could
easily incriminate Iran, but that would mean outing the entire Arab nuclear
game, There are lots of guilty parties: Saudi funding, Egyptian support,
Syrian centrifuges, Iraqi nuclear scientists working in Libya, etc.
There are a lot of threads to pull apart the tapestry of the Iranian nuclear
cover-up.
BUT even if the smoking gun emerges, the big obstacle is the price of
oil. Europe imports 90% of its oil from the Arabian peninsula.
Arab sanctions are the ones with real teeth. A US naval blockade could
easily shut Iran's economy in weeks or months, but in the interim oil
prices would skyrocket to $100 per barrel. The US can sit out the
price hike with our petroleum reserves, Europe cannot.
Bottom line: if we are to go against Iran, we go alone as usual.
My intel friends tell me that the new oddly shaped warhead on the Shahab
3d missile is an exact duplicate of the North Korean nuclear warhead.
I think Iran already has one to four nuclear weapons, and is prepared
to obliterate Israel in response to any blockade or pre-emptive strike.
I see little consensus for a short term strategy to blockade Iran, let
alone to launch a primitive attack.
The middle term goal: to stop Iranian support for terrorism. Here
there is some hope. The Iraqis have caught Iran by the short hairs
in funding Sadr's rebellion. The Iranian Consul General in Karbala
has been kidnapped by "unknown forces" and has been talking like a waterfall.
The Iranian spies disguised ad journalists and chamber of commerce types
have been rounded up. The confessions have been videotaped, the
secret codes broken. The new Iraqi government has grounds to say
that Iran has declared war, and to call on the Arab states to issue their
own sanctions. This has a glimmer of hope. Iran's weak
points are its European dependent trade economy, and its fear of geopolitical
isolation. They can be hit in the pocketbook. If the Arabs insist,
Europe will follow.
Long term: Wait them out. It took 70 years, but the Soviet
Union crumbled without a nuclear war. It won’t take anywhere near
that long for Iran. Iran has a fragile economy, with massive unemployment
among the young urban populations. The Mullahs will be swallowed by their
own demographics within a decade. Instead of funding the MEK or
SAVAK or yet another Shah, let the American Persian community increase
their highly effective TV and radio broadcasts to Iran. 75% of the
Iranian population is under 25, and they hate the Mullahs with a passion.
These three strategies are not inconsistent. If the Arab states
want to avoid exposure for their criminal conspiracy to develop the Islamic
Bomb, then the price is Iran. If the Arabs isolate the Persians
in punishment for their attack on Iraq, then the Europeans may execute
a volte face rather than risk an Arab boycott. Some oil is better
than none. Let the deal making begin. We have 36 months before Iran
can manufacture an indigenous nuclear stockpile. After that point,
they could defeat America.
Bayegan: What Mr.Babbin calls an academic exercise, I call doing
one's homework before a headlong plunge into another quagmire in the Middle
East. I am surprised at that "whatever that means" cynical tone Mr. Babbin
uses to refer to "democratic principles" and "civilized political norms".
For thousands of Iranians who have been subject to torture, humiliation
and murder by religious tyrants for the past quarter of a century, those
values are of infinite and invaluable importance.
Mr. Babbin speaks in the same breath of support for Mr. Pahlavi and re-arming/reactivating
MKO. The problem with that argument is that unlike MKO, Reza Pahlavi is
advocating a non-violent resistance to the Mullahs and calls for the toppling
of the clerical regime through civil disobedience, economic sanctions
and political isolation. Mr. Pahlavi has never once promoted a military
attack on Iranian soil. Accordingly, any comparison made between him and
the leaders of Iraqi National Congress is jejune or outright calumnious.
Those Iranians who are supporting his campaign are doing so for his peaceful
and democratic approach, and not because they are his pal as Mr.
Babbin is suggesting about myself.
I reiterate here that the non-violent political solution and the call
for a national referendum are the ONLY acceptable means of a regime change
for the majority of Iranians. That is why Americans like Mr. Babbin do
well to cultivate the capacity of listening to the Iranian people and
spending time to study their true sentiments and aspirations.
For instance, does Mr. Babbin have any idea that his argument that "we
have to act militarily and soon" cannot be received with anything except
utter repugnance by Iranians and credible leaders of the Iranian opposition?
No Iranian opposition leader worth his salt is suggesting (As Ahmed Chalabi
did) that the invading armies will be greeted with flowers in the
streets of Tehran. An Iraqi style invasion of Iran is what the mullahs
need to rally Iranians behind them and further delay the collapse of their
hated theocracy.
I agree with Mr. Loftus that Iranians do not need any funding to liberate
their country. He also points out an important factor against the survival
of the clerical regime when he remarks that "75 percent of the Iranian
population is under 25, and they hate the Mullahs with a passion".
This passion is a noble human resistance to oppression and tyranny. It
is a laudable, moral fervor that deserves the support and solidarity of
every member of international community.
What is toted by the Kerry camp as the 'grand bargain' to dissuade the
Islamic Republic from moving towards its WMD objectives is a prime example
of a betrayal of the hope and aspirations of Iranian people.
As a matter of fact, the regime in Tehran which felt extremely vulnerable
after the ouster of Saddam Hussein has been using the nuclear card to
win concessions from the West and continue its reign of terror with impunity.
John Edwards' recent overture to Iran that amounts to showering the mullahs
with presents and offering them a list of incentives shows that the Democrats
have not learned anything from their past mistakes. The war on terror
cannot be won as long as the clerical regime continues to rule Iran. The
Democrats paid the price of their vacillating policies towards the Mullahs
during the presidency of Jimmy Carter. A future President John Kerry cannot
expect to fare any better.
Babbin: Before Mr. Bayegan can accuse me of calumniating, he must
first prove his assertion that Reza Pahlavi is the anointed
future leader of a moderate Iran. That he has not
even attempted to do. I repeat: he sounds almost exactly the same
as those who asserted that Iraqis would flock around Chalabi as their
accepted leader. Having not been in Iran in twenty-five years, Mr.
Pahlavi has to prove to have a large and democratically-oriented following
before his advocates are taken seriously. That he patently
cannot. I have met Mr. Pahlavi, and find him a highly intelligent
and engaging man. I have read one of his books, and believe that
he is inclined to a new, free and democratic Iran. But that is not
enough. Mr. Bayegan's assertions may prove true. I hope they
do. But his assertions are merely that: unsupported and not yet
susceptible of being taken seriously.
Mr. Bayegan also accuses me of cynicism. He confuses cynicism
with realism. I think that those -- such as he -- who ask us to
choose between Iranian opposition groups merely on their say so -- have
a lot to learn about America. We are learning as we go in this war,
and we have learned in Iraq to not believe unsubstantiated claims of broad
support by those who aren't in-country. Am I suggesting a "headlong
plunge" into the Middle East? My dear chap, the Middle East has
taken a headlong plunge into America. We are responding, and not
in kind.
We must remove the regime of the mullahs in Tehran. We can
and should do so. We have no quarrel with the people of Iran but
-- and this is the biggest "but" in the world today -- we must remove
that regime soon, on our time table, with or without the acceptance by
the Iranian people of the time or means we choose. If they disagree,
they should take their grievances out on the repressive regime that holds
them in thrall and seeks to do the same with the rest of the world.
Mr. Bayegan and others don't have standing to argue with us about
how we do what we must do. Our ONLY obligation is to remove the
threat of the central terrorist regime in the world in as humane a way
as we can.
We wish no harm to the Iranian people, and hope that they will understand
that we cannot await their blessing before we act. Mr. Bayegan seems to
be saying that we are under some obligation to ourselves, our posterity,
or to the Iranians to wait until they say we are doing what they might
accept. That reasoning is perfectly circular. If the
Iranians had a legitimate voice through which their government spoke, they
would already be democratic and not a terrorist threat. But
they do not. There is no voice of the moderate Iran that can speak
for anyone inside the nation. Both Mr. Loftus and Mr. Bayegan apparently
wish to wait for some diplomatic or Iranian-generated action to change
what the facts on the ground are now. I believe the time to wait
is rapidly running out.
Just Wednesday, the mullahs announced that they are beginning to enrich
tons of uranium in defiance of the IAEA and the UN. Mr. Loftus is
dreaming if he thinks IAEA "secretly" wants to do something. Even
if it were, IAEA's secret dreams can't and won't disarm Iran. We
must do it, and very soon. With our allies if some choose
to join, alone if we must. And I reiterate, we need not and should
not invade Iran. Destruction of the nuclear program is sufficient
for now, and can be done from the air. By so doing, we may
provide the impetus for a revolution that the Iranian people can mount
themselves. If it does, we should support it with money, arms
and communication assets. Then, and only then, can a new leader of
a free Iran emerge.
FP: Mr. Loftus, last word goes to you. Please comment on the disagreement
between Mr. Babbin and Mr. Bayegan and where you stand. And, as a final
word, let us assume that President Bush called you today and said: 'Mr.
Loftus, Iran has become my #1 priority now. I need your advice on what
to do.' What do you tell the President?
Loftus: I think that perhaps you have seriously underestimated
the Kerry strategy. It is a given that Iran will never accept a
grand strategy, no matter how many enticements are spread before them.
The reason is simple: the bottom line for Kerry's plan is that Iran must
dismantle their centrifuge arrays, give up the indigenous mining of yellow
cake, and end all enrichment experiments. Even if we offer, as Mr.
Kerry has hinted, to provide uranium fuel for free, Iran will still
turn the bargain down. Iran needs the enrichment cycle to build
nuclear weapons, all else is pretense.
Mr. Kerry knows this, and anticipates the rejection of his Grand Bargain.
So why bother? Because we are linking the Grand Bargain to a firm committment
from the EU and other Arab states that rejection means an automatic vote
for sanctions in the UN. Since 90% of Iran's economy is dependent
on oil exports, this is one of the few countries in the world where sanctions
have teeth. Shut down the pipelines, blockade the shipping lanes,
and Iran's economy collapses in short order. That may be enough
to start the revolution from within.
As to bombing from the air, it is not an option. A) we do not know
where all the enrichment facilities are located, B) many of the sites
are underground beneath civilian areas, and C) the much taunted nuclear
bunker buster technology simply will not work after thorough study.
Bombing will rally the Iranian people around the Pasdaran, the new SS,
and accelerate spending on nuclear weapons. Land invasion is not
an option, as Saddam learned.
My advice to the President is that we most go through the motions of offering
a Grand Bargain for diplomatic reasons, but plan on its rejection.
Several of the Mullahs have already denounced Kerry's proposal, so it
is a safe bet to lose. We must get the votes for sanctions against
Iran or consider a naval blockade on our own. 90% of Iran's trade is with
the EU, and most of that cargo comes by sea. What will the Mullahs do
for their people when the foodstocks run out? Let them eat yellowcake?
FP: Jed Babbin, John Loftus and Reza Bayegan, our time is up. Thank
you for joining us. We'll see you again soon.
Back to Top
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FIASCO
A LA FRANCAISE
By AMIR
TAHERI
New York
Post, September 10, 2004
ONE of the
charges leveled against President Bush on Iraq is that he circumvented
the United Nations, ignored allies and acted unilaterally. The theory
is that an OK from U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan and French President
Jacques Chirac is the surest guarantee of success for U.S. foreign policy,
especially in the Middle East.
That theory was put to the test earlier this month - and proved to be
not only false but counter-productive, at least for the time being.
Here is the story: French diplomats, anxious to offer an alternative to
Bushian "regime change," spent a good part of the summer in secret talks
with their U.S. counterparts in search of a common policy on Syria, one
of the oldest members of the club of "states sponsoring terrorism." By
the end of August, the talks had produced agreement on joint action to
end Syria's military presence in Lebanon.
On Sept. 2 came something that had not happened in a while: France and
the United States jointly sponsored a Security Council resolution calling
on Syria to take its army out of Lebanon and allow the disarming of Lebanese
militias, including the Iranian-controlled Hezbollah.
The resolution passed 9-0, with six abstentions, indicating unusual U.N.
consensus. French diplomats were in seventh heaven: They had proved they
could do through diplomacy what the "Cowboy" Bush insists on doing through
force.
But what happened next was less idyllic: Far from bowing to the "collective
will of the international community," Syria decided to ignore the Bush-Chirac
alliance and reacted by, in effect, abolishing the Lebanese state.
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad summoned Lebanon's Prime Minister Rafiq
Hariri to Damascus, the Syrian capital. Hariri was left to cool his heels
for two hours before being admitted into Assad's presence for 15 minutes
to receive "instructions," including an order to have the Lebanese Constitution
amended to allow the six-year term of President Emil Lahoud, a Syrian
appointee, to be extended for three years.
Assad also summoned Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, and
instructed him to amend the Constitution and extend Lahoud's term in a
single session. The Syrian leader insisted that his orders be carried
out within 24 hours after the Chirac-Bush "triumph" at the Security Council.
The point that the Lebanese state has effectively ceased to exist was
driven home when the so-called parliament in Beirut did as Assad had ordered,
by a vote of 96 to 29.
To emphasize his disdain for the United Nations, Assad also ordered a
strengthening of Syria's military presence in Lebanon from 28,000 men
to almost 40,000 men before year's end.
Syria's various secret services, some of which operate their own courts
and prisons in both Syria and Lebanon, have also been ordered to adopt
a higher profile in Beirut. And Iran has stepped up its arms shipments
to the Lebanese branch of Hezbollah, via Syria.
All this is accompanied by a campaign in the state-owned media in Damascus
and the Syrian-controlled newspapers in Beirut against Franco-U.S. "imperialist"
intervention "to undermine Arab unity" by driving Assad's army out of
Lebanon.
Although Syria has been the de facto power in Lebanon for almost three
decades, no one had expected Assad to advertise it so dramatically and
in open defiance of the Chirac-Bush alliance. Assad's stance was more
surprising because he had failed to persuade such long-time allies as
Russia and China to veto the Franco-U.S. resolution.
Why has Assad behaved as he has?
The main reason is that Assad's Ba'athist dictatorship is one of those
regimes that respond only to the threat or the actual use of force. Their
strategy is based on the assumption that while sticks and stones can break
their bones, words shall harm them never!
Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist dictatorship in Baghdad was another such regime.
It had learned from the experience of 13 years, in which it ignored 12
mandatory U.N. resolutions, that diplomacy could never threaten the only
thing that mattered to Saddam: his hold on power.
If Saddam violated 12 resolutions over 13 years before he faced the threat
of war, Assad has 11 resolutions and 12 more years to go. Why pay any
attention to the Franco-American huffing and puffing this early in the
game?
A despotic regime can't afford to heed U.N. resolutions: It would end
up being asked to stop imprisoning, torturing and murdering its opponents,
to accept free elections - in short, to commit political suicide. It would
also lose part of its aura of invincibility and its capacity to terrorize
its population.
Assad is banking on "the great good news" that his media promise: A Bush
loss in November. The Syrian media hope that "the Bush storm" will soon
blow over and that America will revert to its traditional policy of coddling
the despot of Damascus. After all, Bush is the only U.S. president since
1969 who has refused to meet the Syrian ruler. (Bill Clinton met Hafez
al-Assad, Bashar's father, twice and endorsed his occupation of Lebanon.)
Another reason for Assad's defiance: The mullahs of Tehran, who prop up
his regime with money, arms and cheap oil, are determined not to allow
international diplomacy any meaningful role in the region. The mullahs
fear that the Franco-U.S. resolution on Lebanon could set a precedent
and lead to a resolution against Iran's nuclear-weapons program. The mullahs
are also determined to maintain the Lebanese branch of Hezbollah as their
surrogate army in what they see as a war against America and Israel.
The Syrian riposte to the Franco-U.S. move has not been limited to political
maneuvers and propaganda. In close cooperation with Tehran, Syria has
called on its agents and allies in Iraq to step up their campaign of terror
in hopes of weakening Bush's position in the forthcoming U.S. election.
"The fire in Iraq will spread," promises the newspaper Tishrin, an organ
of the Syrian Ba'ath. The Iranian media similarly make no secret of their
hope that a Bush defeat would lead to a quick U.S. retreat from the region.
Well, here we have a textbook case of multilateral diplomacy as opposed
to Bushian "extremism."
Syria has been courted for more than two years by France and other members
of the European Union and offered the widest range of goodies that "soft
power" can provide. President Assad has been feted half a dozen European
capitals and flattered as "a great leader."
We also have a very nice resolution, number 1559, written in the politest
possible language. It is not demanding the moon. All it asks is for Syria
to take its army out of Lebanon, a U.N. founding member, and let the Lebanese
run their own lives, just as the people of East Timor have since the end
of the Indonesian occupation. The resolution does not call for any investigation
of the numerous alleged crimes committed by the Syrians in Lebanon over
the past 30 years, including the murder of two elected presidents and
the looting of the Lebanese treasury.
In other words, "soft power" cannot get softer than this. Yet it is a
safe bet that Syria will not evacuate Lebanon unless it is either kicked
out by force or sees its own regime threatened with destruction as a result
of military action.
Almost a year ago, the European Union tried "soft power" to persuade Iran
not to build a nuclear arsenal, and failed. The "soft power" move towards
Syria is also heading for failure.
Those who still believe that Saddam would have been persuaded to mend
his ways through an endless series of U.N. resolutions would do well to
ponder the Iranian and Syrian experiments. We have a beautiful resolution;
we have Kofi Annan and Jacques Chirac in the driving seat; we are doing
multilateralism, and yet we are getting nowhere.
Should we not wonder why?
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