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Updates from AIJAC

After Afghanistan/Bin Laden

October 11, 2001
Number 10/01 #05

The first two articles in today's Update look at the wider Middle Eastern goals the US should seek from its current war on terror. One is from Washington Post Foreign Editor Jim Hoagland, the second from Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and Former Soviet dissident Natan Sharansky. After this, Greg Easterbook of The new Republic looks at the restrained strategies employed by the US and Britain in their airstrikes on Afghanistan, though the piece deals only with the first night of the attacks.

Following this, there are two pieces on Bin Laden. Alexander Rose of The National Post looks at Bin Laden's recent statements and what they tell us about his worldview and overall goals. And Bo Crader of The Weekly Standard provides a handy year by year biography of Bin Laden.


A Force for Change in Societies That Have Given Up on the World

Jim Hoagland

The Washington Post, Thursday, October 11, 2001

Decisive use of airpower gave the United States control of the skies over Afghanistan this week. The Bush administration's larger task is to transform the shock waves of the military strikes into a force for change in societies that have fundamentally given up on themselves and the world. The initial reactions to the U.S. raids demonstrate that this is a realistic goal. Other nations and leaders quickly took the expressions of American anger and determination into account in their own calculations of advantage or survival.

As exhortations and promises never could, the exercise of raw American power moved others to act or speak in ways that undermined previous complicity with terrorism. Understanding and shaping that reaction - I see it as reasoned respect for the effective use of power - is vital to the Bush administration as it develops and pursues its war aims.

The United States possesses few ideological or cultural assets, and a large number of political drawbacks, in getting others to help fight anti-U.S. terrorism in the Islamic arc of the Middle East and South Asia. Coercive power is one of the few readily available U.S. assets in this campaign.

It must not be squandered or neutralized by excessive fear of reaction in the so-called Arab street or of the fragility of the rulers of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. The Clinton administration demonstrated for eight years, primarily in Iraq, that the shock effect of air raids and missile strikes wears off quickly when they are not linked to a strategy of national survival. The Bush White House has every reason to avoid that mistake.

This is not to underestimate the difficulty of using the blunt instrument of military force for political effect, especially in the Third World. Missiles and precision guided bombs cannot reach to root causes. They cannot, even if used in disciplined fashion, reduce the deep resentments that terrorists like Osama bin Laden and his Qaida gang manipulate. If misused, force will magnify those resentments greatly and breed new outrages.

But, like individuals, nations command respect and support when they respond decisively to protect themselves against those who seek to inflict harm and destruction. Not choosing can no longer be a choice when a nation's existence is at stake.

Extremists glorifying the Sept. 11 mass slaughter of Americans staged by Qaida rioted in Gaza on Monday. Palestinian policemen turned their guns on the protesters and killed two of them. The Palestinian Authority's spokesman, Yasser Abed Rabbo, belatedly stepped out of the bloodstained embrace of bin Laden to say: "We don't want crimes committed in the name of Palestine."

That is a small step, but it is an important one in deflating the unthinking acceptance in the West of the view that Arab public opinion - colourfully styled as the "Arab street," since Arab governments won't permit expression of political views at the ballot box or in the media - is a one-way avenue running toward a chauvinistic extremism that dare not be challenged. If Yasser Arafat is willing to confront directly, in words and deeds, the malignant anti-Americanism of his followers, can Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, Saudi Arabia's King Fahd or Syria's Bashar Assad continue to do less? Can the highest ecclesiastical authorities of Islam remain silent about the enormous damage that bin Laden does their religion and fail to denounce him as the infidel? They can, but only at enormous risk as the neutral ground shrinks in a global conflict that has turned hot.

The civilization most at risk of failure in this conflict is not that of Western secularism but that of Islam. Islam is at risk from its own submerged internal civil war. The Arab political system faces a similar risk in refusing to face up to internal challenges while falsely blaming external factors for its difficulties. In Pakistan, as U.S. bombers loaded up for the Afghan campaign's opening, President Pervez Musharraf finally acted. He fired senior intelligence officers who ran terror camps in Afghanistan for him and who created Taliban rule there. The fear of General Musharraf's apologists that he could not do that and survive was rapidly overtaken by the general's own fear that he probably would not survive if he did not fire the Taliban's allies.

That is a clarity that flying bullets can induce when reason has regrettably failed. Rightly reluctant to establish empire that it would not sustain in that tumultuous region, the United States must use and manage its power to shape the behaviour and limit the choices of friend and foe alike in this struggle of survival.

Copyright © 2001 The International Herald Tribune


THE AIMS OF WAR

What Are We Fighting For? Make the Middle East safe for democracy.

BY NATAN SHARANSKY

Wall Street Journal, Wednesday, October 10, 2001

In any successful war, individual battles must be fought with an eye towards the overriding objective. That is why it is so crucial that the Bush administration and the free world it hopes to mobilize clearly define the objectives in the ongoing war on terrorism.

To be sure, victory in this war will demand that the empire of terror run by scores of organizations and supported by several sovereign states be utterly destroyed.

But our goals must be far more ambitious. The democratic world must also seek to expand the very freedoms our enemies want to destroy. We must use the torch of liberty they hope to extinguish to light a path toward freedom in a region where hundreds of millions still live under tyranny.

The democratic world must export freedom throughout the Middle East not only for the sake of people who live under repressive regimes, but for the sake of our own security. For only when the world is free will the world be safe.

The consequences of merely eradicating an enemy rather than building a friend were made crystal clear in the decades following World War II. In Eastern Europe, the evils of Nazism were replaced with the evils of communism. One dictatorship replaced another and the effect was continued internal repression and external belligerence.

In contrast, democracy was forced on Germany and Japan and the result has been over 50 years of peace and stability--both within those states and in their relations with the outside world.

The logic of why democracies do not go to war with each other is ironclad. When political power is a function of popular will, the incentive system works towards maintaining peace and providing prosperity.

For nondemocratic regimes, war and terror are essential to survival. In order to justify the internal repression that is inherent in nondemocratic rule, dictators and autocrats must mobilize their nation for wars against both internal and external enemies.

Democratic leaders can be corrupt, prejudiced and xenophobic. But they will not survive long in office if they impoverish their people and sacrifice their sons in wars that are not vital to their nations' existence. That is why war is always the last option for democratic states.

Ironically, the same reasons that incline democracies toward peace make waging war against implacable enemies all the more difficult. It is easy for democratic leaders to avoid making the difficult choice of leading a free people into battle. Compromise is always more tempting.

Winston Churchill fought the forces of compromise in Britain and rallied his country to defeat the Nazis. Ronald Reagan did much the same when he rejected decades of accommodation with the Soviet Union and sought to break the back of the Evil Empire. Both men understood that in a battle against evil there must be no concessions. And both understood that to defeat evil, one must be prepared to stand alone.

Unfortunately, despite the lessons of the past century, the spirit of expedient interest is alive and well. Its insidious logic attempts to justify including, in a coalition of freedom, regimes like Iran and Syria that actively support the very evil we wish to eradicate.

The same spirit continues to convince many that strong dictators are the key to maintaining a strong and stable peace. The decade-long misguided attempt to forge an Israeli-Palestinian peace by financing and relying on Yasser Arafat's dictatorship, instead of linking political and economic benefits to the liberalization of Palestinian society, is more than ample proof of this.

Though most policy makers understand the merits of exporting democracy in principle, few think such a policy is applicable to the Middle East. Some hide behind the veil of political expedience, arguing that championing democracy will destabilize the entire region. They say this in spite of much evidence to the contrary.

I suspect, however, that buried beneath the concern for instability is an erroneous assumption that sees Arabs and Muslims as incapable of living under democratic rule.

Of course, the same nonsense was spouted about the mentality of the Soviet peoples, or the cultural differences of the Japanese. Those assessments of the unsuitability of peoples for democracy were as wrong then as they are today.

What is expected from people who live under dictatorships is not that they abandon their culture, sacrifice their values, or alter their way of life. It is only that their leaders be dependent on them and that they be allowed to express their views openly. And just as was the case in Japan--a nation that had never known democracy and whose culture was said to be antithetical to the idea of popular rule--Arabs and Muslims can live in freedom and retain their unique identities.

Does that mean that the democratic world must declare war on every nondemocratic regime? Certainly not. True, there are regimes that must be held directly accountable for terrorism and be defeated militarily. But if the free world subjects other regimes to economic and diplomatic pressures, and at the same time links concrete economic and political benefits to the liberalization of their societies--as it did to the former Soviet Bloc in the last years of the Cold War--then I am convinced that many nations throughout the region can be induced to begin the long march toward freedom.

I have advocated for a number of years the implementation of a Marshall Plan for the Middle East. The aftermath of the war against terror may provide the perfect opportunity to mobilize international support for its implementation.

If the democratic world hopes to wipe the evil it saw on Sept. 11 off the face of the earth, it must not be satisfied with rooting out the network of terror. It must also plant the seeds of democracy. For only by planting those seeds today can we hope to secure our tomorrow.

Mr. Sharansky is deputy prime minister of Israel and a former Soviet dissident.

Copyright © 2001 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved.


Handled With Care

by Gregg Easterbrook

The New Republic Online, Post date 10.02.01

Yesterday U.S. and British forces struck Afghanistan, and today attacks are likely to continue. Where do the strikes stand in historic terms, and what do they forebode?

Of most immediate interest about the first night of strikes is the comparatively restrained use of force, considering what the United States might have done. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said about 50 cruise missiles were fired, while 15 bombers and 25 naval fighters were involved. Given the planes employed (B-1s, B-2s, B-52s, F-14s and F-18s) and the types of munitions they typically carry, between 300 and 400 tons of ordnance would have struck. Weirdly, this is roughly the same weight as the fuel that exploded on the three jetliners that terrorists crashed into the Pentagon and World Trade Centre last month.

More significantly, 300-400 tons of ordnance is moderate by the standards of aerial warfare. During World War II, for example, the United States dropped 13,500 tons of munitions on one target, the Ploesti refinery in Romania, and pretty much every bomb was needed to reduce this chief Nazi oil installation to rubble. Today's ordnance is much more accurate than that used half a century ago, but even if, say, 90 percent of the Ploesti bombs missed, that still means a single target in World War II was hit harder than all of Afghanistan was hit yesterday.

One of the principles of just-war theory is "proportionality," and the restricted total tonnage of the first strike suggests this principle is being followed. As the Taliban are claiming a total of 20 civilians dead--probably an exaggeration--the first strike also shows incredible American and British effort not to harm the innocent. Even a single Afghan civilian death is a tragedy, of course. But Islamic terrorists struck the United States without giving any warning, and killed at least 5,000 civilians. The United States struck back after 26 days of loud and repeated warnings, and killed 20 civilians or fewer. It would be nice to hear those on the left and in the Arab world, who depict U.S. adventurism as the real problem, admit the huge moral disparity between these two sets of goals, procedures and results.

Civilian casualties yesterday were low because the United States used its most accurate weapons. Cruise missiles almost never hit the wrong thing, and owing to their accuracy, they can carry a relatively small 1,000-pound warhead, which poses relatively little risk of unintended harm to the innocent. Western and Arabic reporters in Kabul both said they heard blasts but no sound of aircraft, which suggests the Navy planes were firing many of the oddly named SLAM, a sort of mini-cruise missile with a range sufficient to prevent the launching aircraft from being heard. The SLAM is the most accurate tactical air ordnance in the current inventory, again reducing risk of civilian death. The B-1s and B-2s also carried precision bombs with a low chance of accidental killing. American B-52 bombers did drop "dumb" or iron bombs, but only on terrorist training camps, where all targets are military.

What was the purpose of the initial strike? To destroy terrorist facilities and also Taliban air defences, so that U.S. aircraft can operate above Afghanistan relatively freely. (U.S. and British planes and especially helicopters will still be in peril from small-arms fire and shoulder-launched missiles like the Stinger.) Once U.S. and British aircraft can operate relatively freely, probably after a few more nights of strikes, commando units are expected to enter Afghanistan for the difficult tasks of searching out Osama bin Laden. Strikes will continue at night rather than during daylight not for the safety of the attackers--most weapons being used at this stage are "beyond visual range" hardware in any case--but for the safety of civilians. In the dead of night civilians are off the streets and away from military installations.

Contrast the care taken by the United States and Great Britain to avoid civilian casualties with the way the self-declared champion of Islam, Osama bin Laden, behaves. Wherever bin Laden goes, Muslims die. Sudan was wracked by Muslim-on-Muslim killing when bin Laden was present. Muslim-on-Muslim killing intensified in Afghanistan when bin Laden arrived. Now he delights in sending Muslims off to commit suicide, and he seems to hope that he'll incite Western massacres of Muslims in Afghanistan and trigger Muslim-on-Muslim killing rampages in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. This is what hadith, or Muslim spiritual tradition, warns that the servants of Satan will attempt: to cause global upheaval that kills Muslims. Hadith also warns that their reason will be that they serve the Devil, not Allah.

>From the historical standpoint, this parallels the behavior of another follower of Satan, Hitler. He murdered Jews, gypsies, and others--but also killed Aryan Germans with great enthusiasm. Hitler seemed to revel in making Aryan Germans die: refusing to allow his army to retreat from Russia, even though he knew that staying there would lead to a massacre of Aryan Germans; refusing to surrender after the Werhmacht collapse of March 1945, even though he knew this would lead to the leveling of German cities and the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Aryan Germans; ordering German boys and senior citizens to fight to the death in the final week at Berlin, even though he knew this would mean a pointless slaughter of Aryans. Hitler and bin Laden share the eagerness to see their own people lying in pools of blood. There seems little mystery about who is being served.

GREGG EASTERBROOK is a senior editor at TNR.


The Final Saladin

by Alexander Rose

The New Republic Online, 10.10.01

What does bin Laden want? Since September 11, a kind of conventional wisdom has held that bin Laden merely wants to exorcise Americans and Jews from the Arab/Muslim world. Once purified, the Middle East and Central Asia will, apparently, embrace his odd brand of radical Islamism. Listen closely to bin Laden's speech from Sunday, however, and you begin to notice a rather different motivation at play. You can hear it not in his series of insults and threats of revenge, but rather in a handful of historical references he employed. Unintelligible to most Westerners, but immediately recognizable to any Islamic audience, they suggest that bin Laden pangs for a far greater goal.

He begins by saying he wants to "let the whole world know that we shall never accept that the tragedy of Andalusia would be repeated in Palestine. We cannot accept that Palestine will become Jewish." Bin Laden here is referring to Andalusia ("Al-Andalus"), or Islamic Spain. After the Prophet's death in 632, Islam spread inexorably westward from the Arabian Peninsula until it reached the southern frontier of France. Ensconced in Spain, the Muslims established a magnificent civilization centred around that queen of cities, Cordoba. But, in the eleventh century, Christian forces under Alfonso VI recaptured Leon, Castile, Portugal, and finally, after a seven-year siege, Toledo, marking the start of a European reconquista of Christian lands. Over the coming centuries, the Muslims would be pushed further down into the south, where by 1482, only the Islamic kingdom of Granada held out. By the time Columbus sailed the ocean blue, the Muslims had split along clannish lines, and Ferdinand and Isabella, rulers of Castile and Aragon, swooped. Soon the flag of Christian Spain fluttered above Granada's splendid citadel of Alhambra.

The "tragedy" of Andalusia continues to hold out a lesson to Muslims: Spain was lost not in a heroic but doomed feat of arms, or by Christian fortitude, but because Muslims succumbed to the evils of faction, so allowing the infidels to take advantage of their weakness. Indeed, those squabbling Muslim kings who allied themselves alongside Christian princes to oust their dynastic rivals are, to this day, reviled. Bin Laden, put simply, is warning such Muslim "sell-outs" as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, who are placing themselves in hock to President Bush's Christian coalition, that they will bring a fatal rupture within Islam and allow the Jew-Zionists to wrest Palestine away from the Muslims.

More importantly bin Laden believes that Andalusia is shorthand for Islamicizing the world or, at least, for forcibly restoring the imperial glories and religious dynamism of Islam's earlier centuries. Spain, he feels, was treacherously ripped from the hands of its rightful Muslim owners and, humiliatingly, remains gripped in the talons of the Christians. Likewise Palestine (obviously) must be reclaimed, the compromised crypto-Muslims running Arab/Muslim states must be purged (always remember that real Islamists think Nasser, of all people, was a Western stooge), and the borders of Islam returned to their greatest extent. History must be reversed: no more disgraceful retreats from the Andalusias of this world.

Bin Laden proceeds to call for a "new battle, [a] great battle, similar to the great battles of Islam, like the conqueror of Jerusalem". Most likely bin Laden means the doughty warlord Saladin, who first united the warring thrones of Egypt and Syria under his mastership before storming Jerusalem in 1187 and ousting the Crusader kings, who had taken it in 1099 during the First Crusade. Following the expulsion, Crusader fortresses in the Levant quickly succumbed to the sultan's martial sway, and the Christians never quite recovered their confidence. Eventually even Constantinople--seat of Byzantine emperors---would fall, opening the road to the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans and the sieges of Vienna itself. The Muslim onslaught broke through the ancient boundary separating Europe and what would eventually be called the Middle East--and then kept going, seemingly inexorably.

Saladin's victories marked the turning point in Muslim fortunes because, according to later Islamic historiography, he could be represented as having converted what had merely been a series of fairly small skirmishes between Europeans and Arabs into a grander epic of jihad to repulse "Crusader Imperialism" and extend Islam's borders into the Christians' own backyard. Thus, bin Laden megalomaniacally fantasizes himself a new Saladin, a great captain who will not just repel but will actually crush the Christian West.

Bin Laden is not, as American equivocators would have it, merely annoyed about the America's "colonialist" occupation of Saudi Arabia or Washington's apparent support for Israel. No, his goal is both irrational and unrealistic, which makes it doubly dangerous. Irrational because it cannot be assuaged by "domestic reforms" or US political compromises; unrealistic because it fantasies creating a global Islamist empire. In his historically derived ideological utopianism, if little else, bin Laden is indeed a worthy heir to Hitler and Stalin.

ALEXANDER ROSE is Washington correspondent of the National Post.


Osama, This Is Your Life

A detailed guide to the life and times of al Qaeda financier and puppetmaster Osama bin Laden.

by Bo Crader

Weekly Standard, 10/10/2001

1957

* July 30: Born in Riyadh to Yemeni bricklayer cum construction magnate Mohammed bin Laden and his fourth wife, reported variously as a Syrian or Palestinian woman.1

* He is the 17th of Mohammed's reported 52 children and the only child of his mother. 2

1968

* Inherits somewhere between $20 and $80 million when his father perishes in a plane crash. Reports that his inheritance was between $200 and $300 million are generally viewed as inaccurate. 3

1975

* Bin Laden begins school at King Abdel Aziz University in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia. 4 He is largely believed to study civil engineering, although some sources cite his concentration of study as economics, business administration, or management. 5

* Of particular interest to bin Laden are courses in Middle East politics under Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, a former PLO operative. 6

* Others, including a former barber, report that bin Laden was a "spoiled brat" and party animal, drinking heavily, gambling, and entertaining a penchant for belly dancers and bar brawls. 7

1979

* The Soviet Union invades Afghanistan. Bin Laden graduates college and relocates to Afghanistan to aid the mujahedeen against Soviet forces, using his considerable means and family's construction empire to deliver food, ammunition, weapons, and medical supplies to the guerillas. 8

* He also builds a number of training camps, housing facilities, and logistical networks. The organization he establishes for the undertaking of these operations is known as Maktab al Khadimat (MAK) 9 which serves as a global recruiting network for the Muslim forces. 10 This infrastructure later grows into the organization now known as al Qaeda (Arabic for "military base"). 11 The group provides materiel and training to the guerillas, as well as recruits new members and encourages like-minded groups to commit terrorist acts. 12

* Al Qaeda has reportedly trained over 5,000 militants since its inception. 13 Many of those trained are "sleepers," operatives blending in with their environs in host countries until ordered to strike.

1989

* Bin Laden returns to Saudi Arabia after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. He harshly criticizes what he views as the ruling family's pro-Western politics. 14

1991

* Bin Laden openly criticizes the Saudi ruling family for employing Western troops to fight Saddam Hussein in lieu of Saudi troops. He considers the presence of Western troops in the same country as Mecca and Medina a desecration of sacred land. 15

* He relocates to Sudan and, once there, expands his financial network to include an Islamic bank, a construction company, investment organizations, an agricultural business, and export firms. 16 Sometime during the early 1990s he founds the London-based PR organization the Advisory and Reform Committee, distributing propaganda against the Saudi regime's pro-Western inclinations. 17 Such assets are suspected of funding and providing logistical support for al Qaeda operations.

* Bin Laden reports a number of assassination attempts against him while in Sudan. 18

1993

* February 26: World Trade Centre is bombed, killing 6 and injuring more than 1,000. 19 The mastermind of the bombings, Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, is later linked to the al Qaeda network. 20

* October 3-4: Operatives of al Qaeda take part in an attack on U.S. miltary personnel on a humanitarian mission in Somalia. 18 Americans are killed.21

1994

* Bin Laden's Saudi citizenship is revoked. 22

* Bin Laden's family allegedly disavows Osama, although some of his brothers have reportedly maintained contact with him. 23

* Plots to assassinate the pope during his visit to the Philippines and to bomb the Israeli and American embassies in Manila are traced back to bin Laden's al Qaeda network through Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, convicted mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. 24

1995

* Plots to assassinate President Clinton during his visit to the Philippines and to bomb U.S. transpacific flights are also traced back to al Qaeda through Ramzi Ahmed Yousef. 25

1996

* Sudan expells bin Laden subsequent to strong U.S. and Egyptian pressure. 26

* Bin Laden relocates to Afghanistan, reportedly building ties with Taliban leader Mullah Omar. 27

* Al Qaeda member Jamal Ahmed Al-Fadl defects to the United States and reveals both the extent of bin Laden's involvement in international terrorism and the objectives of the organization. 28

* October 12: Bin Laden issues a declaration of jihad, against what he calls the "Zionist-Crusader alliance and their collaborators," the United States, Israel, and their allies. 29

* The United States begins negotiations with the ruling Taliban over an extradition of bin Laden. These talks continue until the present day. 30

1998

* February: Issues fatwa calling for the murder of U.S. servicemen and civilians worldwide. 31

* June: United States indicts bin Laden on terrorist conspiracy charges. 32 * August 7: Al Qaeda operatives truck-bomb the United States embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, killing 213 and injuring over 4,500. At approximately the same time, al Qaeda agents detonate a bomb in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing 11. 33

* August 20: U.S. launches cruise missile attacks against a suspected al Qaeda meeting near Khost, Afghanistan, and a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan suspected of producing chemical weapons. 34 Although reportedly killing between 20 and 30 al Qaeda members, the attacks are now largely viewed as ineffective. 35

* After the attacks bin Laden begins to use couriers in lieu of cell phones and electronic wire transfers to make it difficult for tech-heavy U.S. intelligence networks to track him. 36

* Bin Laden reportedly attempts to develop a "super-heroin" that could be used to increase addiction and undermine stability in the Western world.37

* December 22: Bin Laden neither denies nor accepts responsibility for the embassy bombings, but praises the attacks and identifies himself only as a source of inspiration for the terrorists. 38

1999

* Administration and Treasury Department officials travel to the Middle East in an attempt to pressure governments into freezing al Qaeda's assets, with limited results. 39

* June 7: Bin Laden is placed on the FBI's "Ten Most Wanted List" with a reward of $5 million for his capture. 40

* Late December: An individual attempting to sneak over 100 pounds of bomb-making material into the United States is apprehended. He confesses to plotting to detonate the materials at the Los Angeles International Airport on New Year's Eve. He received his training and instructions at an al Qaeda training camp. 41

2000

* January 3: Al Qaeda operatives attempt to bomb a U.S. destroyer in the Middle East, but fail when their explosive-laden boat sinks. 42

* October 12: U.S.S. Cole bombed by a small mooring ship while docked in Aden harbour, killing 17 and injuring 40. Perpetrators are identified as having been trained by al Qaeda. 43

* An unidentified Afghan group attempts to assassinate bin Laden. 44

* At his child's wedding bin Laden recites a poem he wrote about the attacks on the Cole: "The pieces of the bodies of the infidels were flying like dust particles/ If you had seen it with your own eyes, your heart would have been filled with joy."45

2001

* Training videos depicting bin Laden and others calling for attacks against American and Jewish targets are distributed worldwide. 46 * August and September: Bin Laden associates are instructed to return to Afghanistan before September 10. 47

* Just before September 11: Bin Laden indicates he is preparing an upcoming attack on the United States. Known associates of bin Laden name September 11 as the date of the attack. 48

* September 11: Two L.A.-bound jetliners crash into the World Trade Center towers. Shortly thereafter, another jetliner crashes into the Pentagon and yet another, suspected to be targeting Washington, D.C., crashes south of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Nineteen men have been identified as the hijackers,three of which have been identified as al Qaeda operatives. One of bin Laden's senior associates has been identified as planning the attack.49

* Presently thought to be hiding in Afghanistan with three wives and 15 children as a "guest" of the ruling Taliban. 50 Reports suggest he is in ill health due to kidney problems. 51

* A large portion of his wealth has been frozen by various governments and reports circulate that he is operating at a fraction of his estimated $300 million net worth. 52 Authorities claim to be withholding additional evidence against bin Laden as "too sensitive to release" in an effort to maintain the integrity of any possible criminal prosecution and to protect intelligence sources. 53


1 Kenneth Katzman, Policy Papers, 8/17/2001.

2 Lisa Beyer, Time, 9/24/2001.

3 Robert McFadden, New York Times, 9/30/2001.

4 Lisa Beyer, Time, 9/24/2001.

5 Michael Dobbs, Washington Post, 9/30/2001.

6 Robert McFadden, New York Times, 9/30/2001.

7 Jerry Lawton, Daily Star, 9/28/2001; Christine Middap, Daily Telegraph, 10/4/2001; Yossef Bodansky,

Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America; Robert McFadden, New York Times, 9/30/2001.

8 Oliver Burkeman, The Guardian, 9/25/2001.

9 Lisa Beyer, Time, 9/24/2001.

10 Robert McFadden, New York Times, 9/30/2001.

11 Kenneth Katzman, Policy Papers, 8/17/2000.

12 Robert McFadden, New York Times, 9/30/2001.

13 Robert McFadden, New York Times, 09/30/2001

14 Lisa Beyer, Time, 9/24/2001.

15 Lisa Beyer, Time, 9/24/2001.

16 "Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States, 11 September 2001," a report issued by the government of the United Kingdom; Kenneth Katzman, Policy Papers, 8/17/2000.

17 Kenneth Katzman, Policy Papers, 8/17/2000.

18 Kenneth Katzman, Policy Papers, 8/17/2000.

19 Robert McFadden, New York Times, 9/30/2001.

20 Kenneth Katzman, Policy Papers, 08/17/2000.

21 "Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States, 11 September 2001"

22 Kenneth Katzman, Policy Papers, 08/17/2000.

23 Kenneth Katzman, Policy Papers, 08/17/2000.

24 Kenneth Katzman, Policy Papers, 08/17/2000.

25 Kenneth Katzman, Policy Papers, 08/17/2000.

26 Kenneth Katzman, Policy Papers, 08/17/2000.

27 Barry Bearak, New York Times, 9/19/2001.

28 James Risen, New York Times, 09/30/2001.

29 "Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States, 11 September 2001."

30 "Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States, 11 September 2001."

31 "Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States, 11 September 2001."

32 James Risen, New York Times, 09/30/2001.

33 "Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States, 11 September 2001."

34 Kenneth Katzman, Policy Papers, 08/17/2000.

35 James Risen, New York Times, 09/30/2001.

36 James Risen, New York Times, 09/30/2001.

37 Barry Meier, New York Times, 10/04/2001.

38 "Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States, 11 September 2001."

39 James Risen, New York Times, 09/30/2001.

40 Kenneth Katzman, Policy Papers, 08/17/2000.

41 "Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States, 11 September 2001."

42 "Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States, 11 September 2001."

43 "Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States, 11 September 2001."

44 James Risen, New York Times, 09/30/2001.

45 Lisa Beyer, Time, 9/24/2001.

46 "Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States, 11 September 2001."

47 "Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States, 11 September 2001."

48 "Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States, 11 September 2001."

49 "Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States, 11 September 2001."

50 Robert McFadden, New York Times, 9/30/2001.

51 Lisa Beyer, Time, 9/24/2001.

52 Chris Blackhurst, Independent on Sunday, 9/16/2001.

53 "Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States, 11 September 2001."

Bo Crader is an editorial assistant at The Weekly Standard.

   
 
 

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