Update from AIJAC

Power Struggles in the Middle East

At this time of flux in the Middle East, various power struggles are reaching very interesting stages. Today's Update looks at three of these ' Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinian Authority.

First, David Rudge of the "Jerusalem Post" spoke to former IDF intelligence officer Moshe Marzouk, now at the Herzliya Interdisciplinary Center, about the return to Lebanon of leading Christian figure and former Lebanese President General Michel Aoun after 15 years of exile by Syria. For his analysis of Aoun's return and its implications, CLICK HERE.

Robert Rabil of The Washington Institute gives an interesting insight into the way Syria is ruled, and the continuing predominance of the hardliners under Bashar Assad. For this insight, CLICK HERE.

Zvi Bar'el suggests that Hamas is now undergoing a transformation common to other Islamist organisations through the Middle East in the wake of some success in the Palestinian elections ' it is having to consider compromising what it sees as its principles for a stake in the political control of its people. For his analysis, CLICK HERE.

THE JERUSALEM POST
May. 9, 2005

The return to Lebanon on Saturday of former Lebanese Army commander Gen. Michel Aoun, some 15 years after being forced into exile by Syrian forces, is a symbol of hope for those Lebanese seeking a democratic, independent and sovereign state, according to analyst Moshe Marzouk.

Aoun, an ardent opponent of Syria's control over the Land of the Cedars, was given a hero's welcome by a huge crowd of supporters in Beirut's Martyr's Square shortly after alighting at the capital's airport from a flight that had brought him, his wife and scores of aides, from Paris.

The man, who led a "war of liberation" against Syria in 1989-90 and had to take refuge in the French Embassy in Beirut after the bombing of his palace by Syrian Air Force planes that brought an end to the fighting, seems to have his sights set on the presidency.

Aoun, however, first has to open lines of communication with potential political allies in the ranks of the so-called opposition forces whose anti-Syrian protests in the wake of the assassination of former prime minister Rafik Hariri were instrumental in forcing Damascus to withdraw its military from Lebanon.

It was the pullout of Syrian troops, which was completed at the end of April, and the cancellation by a Beirut judge of an arrest warrant against, Aoun that enabled him to return to Lebanon.

"Aoun might have been in exile for 15 years but in practice he has remained very much involved in Lebanese affairs and he received many visits from Lebanese seeking his advice," Marzouk, a former senior officer in IDF intelligence, told The Jerusalem Post on Sunday.

"Aoun's return to Lebanon is a symbol of hope for those opposed to Syria's occupation and those who want Lebanon to be free. It also represents a symbol to those opposed to the strengthening of extremist Islamic forces, especially Hizbullah, and who want to see Lebanon as part of the West and not part of dictatorial Arab states," he said.

Marzouk, now a senior researcher at the Herzliya Interdisciplinary Center's Institute for Counterterrorism, noted that Aoun's reappearance in Lebanon on the eve of the national elections was likely to have an effect in the political arena.

"I believe that the internal political struggles between the various factions, and especially between pro-Syrian elements and opposition forces, are likely to become more blatant in the run-up to the elections, which are scheduled to be held from May 29 to mid-June," he said.

Lebanese parliamentarians are currently engaged in heated debates over the size of constituencies and the number of representatives that would be returned to the parliament from each district.

Smaller constituencies would favor the Christians, Druse, and Sunnis while larger ones would give a bigger representation to the Shi'ites, who compose the majority of the population in Lebanon.

Mapping the districts in advance could help pre-determine the outcome of the elections by ensuring, for instance, that there would be sufficient support in certain expanded constituencies for pro-Syrian candidates.

Aoun, as someone who is viewed by many as a Lebanese patriot and who has not been actively involved in politics for 15 years and cannot be accused of corrupt practices, could play a pivotal role in helping unify the opposition forces to thwart such attempts.

Marzouk stressed that Syria, which has reportedly left its intelligence network and security apparatus intact in Lebanon, would do its utmost through these agencies and its Lebanese proxies to undermine all the efforts of Aoun and the opposition forces.

He said it was highly unlikely that Syria would sanction any attempts at this stage to assassinate Aoun because of the potential ramifications in light of the spontaneous reaction by tens of thousands of Lebanese to the killing of Hariri.

"The Syrians and their Lebanese supporters will do everything possible to ensure a pro-Syrian majority in the parliament and that pro-Syrian President Emile Lahoud will continue in office to protect Syrian interests and ensure continued close ties between Beirut and Damascus," said Marzouk.

Aoun in the past expressed his interest in a peace accord between Lebanon and Israel and of the need to disarm Hizbullah and extend Lebanese sovereignty over the whole of Lebanon, including the south.

In the intervening years, however, he and leaders of his Free Patriotic Movement have adopted the stance that any peace accord with Israel should be part of a general peace treaty with neighboring Arab states and that there should not be an agreement solely between Israel and Lebanon.

Marzouk said the attempt in 1983 to reach a separate peace accord with Lebanon was one of the biggest mistakes ever made by Israel and one that should never be repeated.

"Israel is not involved in any way in internal Lebanese affairs and has nothing to do with Aoun and that is how it should be. Aoun is identified as a politician and leader who is concerned first and foremost with Lebanon," he said.

Aoun has not, apparently, changed his mind about the need for Hizbullah to be disarmed and for it to become a political movement but he may have decided to adopt a more pragmatic approach, given reports that a channel of communication is to be opened between him and the extremist Iranian-backed and Syrian-supported Shi'ite organization.

The former Lebanese Army chief was acting as prime minister and, in practice, as president at the time he led the armed struggle against Syria and its Lebanese allies in the battle he lost in 1990.

Aoun does not hide his intention to become president in place of Lahoud. To achieve that, however, he will need to win the support of all those in the opposition who, in turn, will need to win a clear majority in the parliamentary elections.

The only other way to oust Lahoud would be by people power and a resumption of the mass demonstrations, backed by the international community, that paved the way for the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon.

In the interim, Aoun will have to tread very carefully through the minefield of Lebanese politics if he is to capitalize on the support he has received on his return from exile and turn the symbol of hope for a genuinely free Lebanon into a reality.

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The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
PolicyWatch #992

How Is Syria Ruled?

By Robert Rabil
May 9, 2005

On the heels of its military withdrawal from Lebanon, Syria is preparing for the Tenth Regional Congress of the Baath Party, the first such congress in five years and only the second in twenty years. Prior to the regional congress, scheduled for June, the party will hold a national pan-Arab congress, its first in twenty-two years. President Bashar al-Asad may hope to use these events to advance his reformist claims. Indeed, several initiatives are expected toward this end, including changing the name 'Baath Arab Socialist Party' to 'Democratic Baath,' dismantling the national leadership, and amending the law for political parties. The congresses provide a good opportunity to examine Syria's political structure, offering a window into the regime's mindset and its potential reactions to regional developments.

Background: Hafez al-Asad's Authoritarianism

In November 1970, following a period of political upheaval in Syria, Hafiz al-Asad assumed power in a bloodless coup. Shortly thereafter, he set about remaking the country's political system, creating a formal structure in order to institutionalize his regime. In 1971, he appointed a 173-member parliament, which then nominated him as the sole candidate for the presidency. This established a pattern of national referendums in which Asad regularly received the approval of around 99 percent of voters. In 1972, he established the Progressive National Front (PNF), whose function was to rally Syria's progressive forces around the Baath Party in the interest of confronting Israel. In 1973, Asad promulgated a 'permanent constitution,' which designated Baath 'the vanguard party in the society and state.' The document's preamble emphasized the party's revolutionary direction, establishing a nexus between the national and socialist struggle, the unity of Arab republics, and the struggle against colonialism and Zionism.

These reforms came to be known as the 'corrective movement.' They created the formal structure by which Syrian politics were conducted. Yet, actual power resided in an informal structure based on the relationship between regime loyalists and the mostly Alawi military and security officers. Regarding the latter, Syria had been placed under a state of emergency since 1963, and Asad justified continued martial law by claiming that Syria was in a state of war with Israel. The dreaded Mukhabarat (security services) were granted a particularly powerful role that extended beyond security matters. At the same time, Asad promoted his leadership cult. As early as May 1971, the new Baath Command designated him 'Qaid al-Masira,' or 'Leader of the [Nation's] March.' Similarly, in January 1985, the party's Eighth Regional Congress underscored that 'loyalty to him is loyalty to the party and to the people and their cause.'

The various branches of the regime's formal structure'especially the parliament, the PNF, and the popular organizations, along with the state-owned industries'played the role of mobilization and control, effectively co-opting potential opposition. In 1990, for example, the parliament was enlarged from 195 to 250 members. One-third of the seats were reserved for independent deputies, offering token representation to social forces that hitherto had none while preserving the Baath majority's control. Similarly, the regime developed the popular organizations into hierarchical, quasigovernmental bodies dedicated to upholding the state's priorities. Indeed, Syria's various unions and associations (representing, teachers, artisans, writers, peasants, etc.) served as perfect fronts through which to control society at large. Through these and other means, Asad molded modern Syria into an authoritarian state that in many ways resembled a prison, with all activity revolving around his power and omnipresent leadership cult.

How Bashar Rules

On June 10, 2000, Hafiz al-Asad passed away after thirty years in power. The dreaded and stern rule of the 'respected' leader, whose cult of personality fused Arab nationalism and Arab leadership qualities, gave way to the rule of Bashar al-Asad. Bashar lacks his father's personality cult, and his legitimacy has been further affected by the regime's failure to cope with socioeconomic challenges and reformist aspirations. Needless to say, Syria, like most other Arab countries, faces serious economic, social, and political problems while at the same time undergoing explosive population growth. Bashar is no Mikhail Gorbachev; he is not eager to introduce the Syrian equivalent of perestroika or glasnost, which could unseat him from power. In fact, he clamped down on the reform movement that he himself helped launch once he realized its ramifications for the political system.
 
The manner in which Bashar has reshuffled his government indicates that the locus of power in Syria remains fluid, further obscuring the country's decisionmaking process. Decisions are made behind closed doors, with no effort to explain their rationale to the Syrian people. But as Syrian analyst Ammar Abdulhamid perceptively observed, 'After all these years, one thing is clear: in times of crises, or when it comes to decisions of major significance, Syria's top leaders, for whatever reason, tend to side with the hardliners. Thus, they bear the greatest share of responsibility for Syria's present condition.'

The country's informal levers of power remain in the hands of Alawi officials. Bashar's brother, Maher, has emerged as the strongman of the Republican Guards, whose main function is to protect the presidential palace and the capital. Ghazi Kenan, former chief of intelligence in Lebanon and confidant of Bashar's father, was appointed minister of interior in October 2004. Kenan developed a reputation for his shrewd manner and brutal tactics, though he has come to advocate gradual reform. Bashar's brother in-law, Asef Shawkat, was recently appointed chief of military intelligence; he is considered a hardliner. Bahjat Suleiman, another hardliner, heads the internal security division of the General Intelligence Directorate, and his influence surpasses that of organization chief Hisham Bakhtiar. (It should be noted that, according to the rumor mill in Damascus and Beirut, Maher, Shawkat, and Suleiman supported the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri while Bashar and Kenan opposed it.) Gen. Muhammad Mansoura replaced Kenan as head of the Political Security Directorate, and his power is reportedly on the rise. Gen. Zoul Himma Chaliche, Bashar's cousin, is in charge of protecting the president. Gen. Ali Habib replaced Hasan Turkmani as chief of staff in May 2004, while Turkmani replaced Mustafa Tlas as defense minister. All of these officials, with the exception of Turkmani, are Alawis with tribal and/or familial connection to Bashar (as his last name connotes, Turkmani is a Turkman). The only Sunni official with significant power is Vice President Abd al-Halim Khaddam, whose hardline policies are infamous.

Indeed, the configuration of the new power structure in Syria has followed the old pattern institutionalized by the late Asad. No organic change had taken place; Bashar's regime appears to rely on an informal core of loyal military officers, mainly Alawi, and a formal core of high-ranking state officials, mainly Sunni. Similarly, the political system has undergone no significant institutional changes. Because he lacks his father's leadership skills and personality cult, Bashar may settle for consensus among his junta of Alawi officers rather than create a crisis that could break the system.

Regional Implications

Washington's decisions to invade Iraq and promote democracy in the greater Middle East have not only shattered the regional status quo, around which Syria built its reputation as the vanguard of Arab nationalism, but also threatened the very survival of the regime. Protecting Syria's own status quo by weathering internal and external threats has become a momentous challenge for the Syrian leadership. Accordingly, Bashar has attempted to solidify his rule by closing ranks with the top leaders of his regime. His efforts have strengthened the hardliners' determination to protect their entrenched interests, effectively undermining U.S. efforts to promote democracy in the region. Unless Bashar weans himself from the hardliners, Syria is set to clash with the United States over the future of the Middle East. In this respect, Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon was only a tactical retreat.

Robert G. Rabil, an adjunct scholar of The Washington Institute, is a visiting professor of political science at Florida Atlantic University and author of Embattled Neighbors: Israel, Syria, and Lebanon (2003).

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Analysis / Popularity is suddenly important for Hamas

By Zvi Bar'el

Ha'aretz

The Hamas leadership made an interesting distinction yesterday: "This is the first time a ruling party has accused the opposition of falsifying election results." Indeed, Hamas' achievement - it was not a victory - was that it managed to undermine the conventional wisdom that the there was no real competition for the ruling party, the party that formed the Palestinian national liberation movement, Fatah.

Hamas did not win a majority on the municipal councils, and their wins in the large cities cannot be considered an unequivocal victory for the Hamas, since many voters gave their votes to fellow clan members who happened to belong to Hamas. But there can be no ignoring the basic political breakdown in which Hamas has about one-third of the electorate, with Fatah and the other, smaller parties, the rest.

This division, even if it is not ideologically precise, and even if it still enables the building of political coalitions by rivals, now foreshadows the Palestinian Legislative Council elections. On that basis, it is possible to anticipate that the two-thirds/one-third breakdown will remain for the PLC elections in July. Practically speaking, that means that the two main movements, Fatah and Hamas, will have to make ideological and political concessions to sustain the Palestinian state.

As far as Fatah is concerned, the vote means a loss of power, but not a loss of control, and therefore the relative success of Hamas could force Hamas to go even further in adopting a political-pragmatic approach and not an ideological-dogmatic one, at least until the establishment of the Palestinian state.

In the elections, as in the first round of voting for local councils, and in Hamas' plans to take part in the parliamentary elections, Hamas is going through a process that most of the religious movements in the region are now going through. It's a process in which political achievements are important in and of themselves, even if they have an ideological price.

For the last five years, Hezbollah has been going through a process of politicization that will eventually have to provide a replacement for the excuse of war against Israel; the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is expressing support for Hosni Mubarak even though they oppose him ideologically; and Hamas is participating in processes that are the result of the Oslo accords, which Hamas regards as the original sin of the Palestinian movement.

Those who look carefully at the Hamas covenant nowadays will find it difficult to identify any of its elements in the movement's recent behavior: It is cooperating with Fatah in the cease-fire and not waging war against Israel; the slogan of a religious state is not being heard at all in public; it is cooperating with the head of the Palestinian Authority, who was elected in a vote that was considered the result of Israeli and American pressure; and now it's participating in municipal and parliamentary elections while the Israeli occupation continues.

Armed struggle does remain an option for Hamas, but it is an option that the movement will have to consider carefully, since it would entail more than renewing the war with Israel. It would risk their popularity and involve a clash with the two-thirds of the Palestinian public that gave its vote to either Fatah or one of the other parties, and not to Hamas. The need to read the popularity map politically is something new for Hamas, and that might be the greatest achievement of all in these elections.

Copyright © AIJAC 2005
Last Updated 17 May, 2005