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Update
from AIJAC
More myths
about terror's roots
May
23, 2003
Number 05/03 #09
Today, Updates
features three pieces that take on myths about suicide terrorism that
have been again appearing in the wake of the latest waves of terror attacks.
First, Robert
Lane Greene, countries editor at The Economist, points out that
the latest attacks more or less prove that the belief that terrorism can
be seen as a result of US policies is simply inconsistent with the facts.
For his arguments in the on-line version of The New Republic, CLICK
HERE.
Next, Max
Abrahms takes on an idea about terrorism that will not die, that is, the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a "cycle of violence." This view seems
to be intimately tied to the way members of liberal societies view conflict,
because almost no evidence seems to stop this from being the dominant
paradigm for describing the situation. In any case, for yet another attempt
to correct this view, CLICK HERE. Reader
may also be interested in a argument by Canadian
columnist David Warren that the offering of "carrots" to terrorists
in order to get them to stop the cycle of violence contributes to the
terrorism problem.
Finally,
a prominent Psychologist, Irwin J. Mansdorf, attempts to correct
the view that suicide bombings is created by despair, depression, poverty
and lack of hope. This may be true of conventional suicide, he say,
but in both general history, and in the Palestinian example, such attacks
are not the result of the pathologies that lead to regular suicide, but
of group pressure, identity and political beliefs. For this analysis,
CLICK HERE
Readers may
also be interested in:
Dubious
Blame
by Robert
Lane Greene
Only at The
New Republic Online
Post date: 05.20.03
Two weeks
ago, the Bush administration announced its intention to withdraw the vast
majority of American troops based in Saudi Arabia--this after months of
growing bitterness between Washington and the House of Saud. Given that
our presence in the Muslim holy land was ostensibly the main source of
Osama bin Laden's hostility toward the United States, you might have thought
that this would have a calming effect on Al Qaeda activity. So how did
Al Qaeda react? To date, nothing so much as a videotape, audiocassette,
or letter to Al Jazeera has materialized. But if last week's bombings
in Riyadh were any indication, it's probably safe to assume that Al Qaeda
wasn't exactly appeased.
Since September
11, commentator after commentator has speculated on what it is about America
that Islamic terrorists hate. And the vast majority of answers to that
question have placed blame at least partly on American policies. Just
two days after the attacks on New York and Washington, for example, Britain's
Guardian newspaper ran an article headlined "THEY CAN'T SEE WHY
THEY ARE HATED: AMERICANS CANNOT IGNORE WHAT THEIR GOVERNMENT DOES ABROAD."
But as the events of last week suggest, it's not so much the things Americans
do that arouse such hatred among the bin Ladens of the world. It's the
enormous power of their civilization, especially when compared to the
relative decline of the Muslim world. And no amount of hand-wringing or
soul-searching is going to change that.
Other than
our presence in Saudi Arabia, perhaps the most common answer to the question
of why they hate us over the last year and a half has been our support
for Israel. The Guardian article cited above claimed that America
has drawn fire because it has "recklessly thrown its weight behind Israel's
34-year illegal military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza as the Palestinian
intifada rages." But just as the bombings in Riyadh and Morocco last week
have dispelled the myth that the American presence in Saudi Arabia was
"causing" terrorism, they should also have put paid to the argument that
our support for Israel is Al Qaeda's major irritant. After all, the Riyadh
bombings came just as Colin Powell was arriving in the region to pressure
Palestinians and Israelis to begin implementation of a "road map" for
peace. The Morocco bombings came just as Ariel Sharon was set to meet
Mahmoud Abbas, the recently appointed Palestinian prime minister. Both
sets of attacks were almost certainly the work of Al Qaeda or affiliated
groups. And both showed that these terrorists--like Hamas, which has claimed
responsibility for a series of bombings since the Sharon-Abbas meeting--have
no desire for peace.
This should
not be news. Islamic terrorists struck repeatedly during the 1990s even
as Bill Clinton worked feverishly for an Israeli-Palestinian peace. While
Clinton met with Yasir Arafat more often than he did any other foreign
leader, Al Qaeda-affiliated Islamists struck the World Trade Center in
1993, two American embassies in East Africa in 1998, the USS Cole in 2000,
and a planned attack on Los Angeles airport was foiled just before New
Year's 2000. Let us stop with the self-deception, favored by well-meaning
American liberals and Palestinian boosters in Europe, that a solution
to the Israeli-Palestinian bloodletting will take away the grievance that
causes young Arab and Muslim men to hate America. It won't.
Iraq, then.
Surely, two wars and twelve years of sanctions against a fellow Arab Muslim
nation serves as one of the root causes of Islamist hatred of America.
Except that evidence for this is nearly nonexistent: Bin Laden was late
to add Iraq to his list of grievances against the "crusaders and Jews."
Though the Morocco bombers may have attacked a Spanish restaurant and
an Italian one because their owners came from countries belonging to the
"coalition of the willing," bin Laden's tardy support for the suffering
Iraqi people has been transparently opportunistic. In fact, it's worth
pointing out that if bin Laden's concern for his co-religionists were
really his chief motivating impulse, he should have been all for the liberation
of Iraq, a development which will allow Islam to flourish in the country
much more than it ever did under Saddam Hussein.
The real
issue, as Bernard Lewis has argued, is that Islamist terrorists and their
sympathizers are in permanent and furious denial of the state of the contemporary
Muslim world. We are getting close to Al Qaeda's real motivation, I believe,
when bin Laden's chief deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, swears that "the tragedy
of al-Andalus"--that is the reconquest of Spain by Christians, completed
in 1492--must not be repeated. The Islamic world, once a united empire
boasting the world's most advanced culture, is today a patchwork of mostly
poor, despotic states that lag behind the rest of the world in political,
economic, and cultural development. Modern Islamists are drastically out
of step with the modern world; they know it and they hate it. They cannot
be placated by any change in American policy, whether reasonable or far-fetched.
They can only be satisfied by the reestablishment of an Islamic caliphate,
governed by sharia, from Morocco to Indonesia. As such, American strategy
in the "war on terrorism" (better described as a war on members of Al
Qaeda and affiliated groups) is justifiably one-pronged, with that prong
being the killing or capturing of Islamist militants.
This does
not make peace between Israelis and Palestinians completely irrelevant.
But its relevance is much more complicated than the simple fact that the
suffering of Palestinians makes Arabs hate Americans. For America, the
real problem created by the absence of peace between Arabs and Israelis
is that it allows Arab autocrats to use Israel as a scapegoat, albeit
an obviously spurious one, for all the defects of Arab-Muslim political
culture. Were the Israelis and Palestinians able to negotiate a meaningful
peace, on the other hand, disaffected Muslims across the Middle East might
finally be forced to turn their frustration where it belongs: on their
own corrupt leadership. And that would be a welcome development. Disconcerting
though it might be, these leaders are, in the end, the only ones capable
of stopping Islamist terror.
Robert
Lane Greene is countries editor at Economist.com.
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The
ìCycle of Violenceî Fallacy
In the
tradition of Oslo.
By Max Abrahms
National
Review, May 22, 2003
The Arab-Israeli
conflict is often framed as a "cycle of violence." A strong Israeli policy
against Palestinian terrorism will only spawn more attacks against Israel,
goes the logic. Conversely, if only Israel made unilateral concessions
to the Palestinians, it would find a partner for peace. This is the conventional
wisdom. And it is wrong.
This past
weekend, for example, Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon met with his
Palestinian counterpart Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) for the highest-ranking
talks between Israel and the Palestinians since the second Intifada began
almost three years ago. Sharon pledged to improve the humanitarian situation
in the Palestinian-dominated West Bank and Gaza, at which point Mazen
declared, "Palestinians promise to make a genuine and real effort to stop
terror." This is precisely the type of peaceful chain reaction that the
prevailing "cycle of violence" formula envisages.
Or is it?
Just a few hours later, a Hamas terrorist blew himself up on an Israeli
commuter bus, killing seven, wounding 20, and throwing this theory on
its head. The terrorist attack was a response not to an Israeli incursion
into Palestinian territory, as the "cycle of violence" theory hypothesizes,
but to the kind of Israeli overtures that terrorism apologists repeatedly
champion. In fact, for rejectionist terrorist groups, such as Hamas and
Islamic Jihad, the timing of the blast could not have been better. In
addition to his get-together with Mazen, Sharon was slated in the coming
days to meet with President Bush to discuss implementing the road map.
According to Bush-administration officials, Israel had hinted that it
was prepared to ease up on closures, checkpoints, work permits, and other
restrictions on Palestinians, as well as release large numbers of Palestinian
prisoners and detainees. The meeting was being billed as the most important
between Israel and the U.S. since the July 2000 Camp David conference.
Of course,
it was Camp David that demonstrated the speciousness of the "cycle of
violence" theory. For a combination of political and strategic reasons,
Prime Minister Ehud Barak offered the house to Yasser Arafat: Israel would
withdraw from 100 percent of the Gaza Strip and 97 percent of the West
Bank, dismantle 63 isolated settlements, and make Arab neighborhoods of
East Jerusalem the capital of a new Palestinian state, with the Palestinians
maintaining control over their holy places and having "religious sovereignty"
over the contested Temple Mount. Revisionist claims to the contrary, Israel
offered to create a "viable" Palestinian state that was contiguous, and
not a series of cantons. "Cycle of violence" believers predicted a commensurate
Palestinian reduction of terror.
Again, just
the opposite occurred. The most generous peace offer in the history of
the conflict was answered with the most sustained wave of Palestinian
suicide bombings in Israeli history. In less than three years, almost
800 Israelis ó mostly civilians ó became victims of terror. Yet, significantly,
the level of bloodshed over this period was not constant. After April
2002, the attacks began to plummet, from 16 in March to six in April,
six in May, five in June, and six in July. For the remainder of the year,
the number of Palestinian attacks dried to a trickle.
How does
one explain this marked improvement in Israeli security? The "cycle of
violence" theory would posit that such a reduction in terror derives from
Israeli softness. Again, this logic was proven false. To staunch the bleeding
from Israel's July 2000 openhandedness, the Israel Defense Forces used
an iron fist. Operation Defensive Shield, initiated in March 2002, brought
the fight to the terrorists by deploying massive numbers of troops to
the West Bank. This was language terrorists could understand. Evidently,
it worked.
Unfortunately,
the roadmap picks up where Oslo left off. Like its predecessor, the current
plan is time-based, not performance-based, envisioning Israeli concessions
with or without concurrent Palestinian reform. The framework for peace
therefore again stands on the "cycle of violence" premise by assuming
that Israeli concessions will beget Palestinian moderation, and that proactive
defensive steps by Israel will only undermine Israeli security. For opposite
reasons, Oslo and Operation Defensive Shield drove a truck through this
theory. Israeli concessions systematically met with yet further acts of
terror, and proactive defensive measures effectively limited terrorist
activity. If the "cycle of violence" theory continues to hold sway, and
Israel is forced to make concessions prior to genuine Palestinian reform,
the road map will enflame the situation. Already, there are painful signs
that this is the case.
ó Max
Abrahms is a research fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East
Policy.
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------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK OF SUICIDE TERRORISM
Irwin J. Mansdorf
Jerusalem
Letter / Viewpoints
No. 496 †
† 15 April 2003
- Since
1993, attempts have been made to portray†Palestinian-Arab perpetrators
of suicide bombings as desperate individuals understandably coping with
a difficult situation, in effect, transforming the attackers into victims,†and
thus diminishing the impact of one's revulsion at such attacks.
- The
use of the "bomber as victim" model has led others to similarly view,
and incorrectly justify, the motivations behind Palestinian-Arab suicide
bombers. Yet, in fact, individual psychopathology or personal feelings
do not appear to play any significant role.
- Unlike
other groups that have used suicide as a political or military tool,
only in the case of Palestinian-Arab terror has there been an attempt
to personalize the perpetrator as a victim of uncontrollable psychological
and motivational forces that forced such extreme behavior.
- It
is actually group dynamics that†reinforces†behavior within a Palestinian-Arab
culture where suicide bombers are viewed as heroes whose faces are prominently
displayed on public posters and where families of bombers are showered
with both respect and financial reward.
A Personal or a Political Act?
Throughout
the recent history of violence in the Palestinian Arab-Israeli conflict,
suicide bombings have come to be one of the more notorious ways for terrorist
groups to strike at Israel. Since 1993, when the current wave of suicide
bombings began, attempts have been made to portray the perpetrators of
these attacks as desperate individuals, driven by hopelessness created
by a brutal occupation. In other words, the individual attacker, faced
with unbearable psychological conditions, is personally coping with the
situation in a desperate, yet understandable, manner. The suicide bomber,
like others driven by emotional distress, is purported to exhibit a predictable
clinical response to an intolerable situation.
Palestinian
Arab spokespersons have often used the approach that these individuals,
most often young, single men (although others have also conducted such
attacks), represent the desperation of the occupation. As such, they have
attempted to promote the notion of personal psychological suffering as
the force behind the group political act of confrontation through suicide
attacks. The attack is thus transformed from one of political violence
intentionally perpetrated on others, to one where the attacker is also
a victim, driven by a combination of psychological variables such as humiliation,
depression, and hopelessness. What results is an attempt to present a
popularized message that many people can relate to, namely, extreme measures
taken in response to extreme provocation.
Typical of
the attempts to de-politicize the acts of suicide bombers are statements
that ascribe the motivation for such attacks to a deep sense of desperation:
"suicide bombers have been driven to desperation by a brutal and humiliating
occupation which has deprived them of their humanity and any hope for
a brighter future."1
In reality,
such an approach is not a de-politicization, but in fact represents an
attempt to actually politicize the act by erroneously ascribing it to
personal and clinical aspects of the behavior. Witness the statements
of Palestinian Authority spokesperson Hanan Ashrawi. In March 2001 she
stated, "if you push the Palestinians into a corner, if you drive them
to desperation, there will be desperate acts."2 A year later, she expanded
somewhat by saying, "the people who do it are people who are individuals
or small groups who are driven to desperation and anger by the Israeli
activities."3 Thus, the suicide bomber is individually "driven" through
a series of emotions similar to clinical symptoms of other suicide victims,
rather than acting as a member of a group with a clearly defined political
purpose and goal. To Western ears, such an interpretation makes inherent
sense, since suicide for political or religious reasons is difficult to
fathom, while ending one's life as a result of other "desperate" reasons
is far more common and understandable.
When a Palestinian
Arab psychiatrist picks up on this theme, it again seems to provide vindication
for those that cast suicide bombers in the role of victims as a result
of psychological pressure rather than perpetrators of politically motivated
murder. "Suicide bombings and all these forms of violence - I'm talking
as a doctor here - are only the symptoms, the reaction to this chronic
and systematic process of humiliating people in an effort to destroy their
hope and dignity. That is the illness, and unless it is resolved and treated,
there will be more and more symptoms of the pathology."4
Portraying
the perpetrator as a victim suffering from a clinical pathology not only
diminishes the impact of one's revulsion at such attacks; it also serves
to refocus the reason for the attack from a group desire to violently
confront one's enemy to a personal desire to escape from unbearable individual
suffering. By defining suicide bombing as an "illness," the bomber is
effectively relieved of any personal responsibility for the behavior.
In this case, responsibility for the "illness" is suggested to be with
the environment breeding the "symptoms," namely Israeli policy.
Despite these
pronouncements, attempts to represent the suicide bomber as primarily
motivated by psychological or sociological (as opposed to political or
nationalistic) variables are simply not supported by the evidence. While
suicide in the traditional clinical sense is indeed related to an individual's
psychological state at the time of the act, the acts of Palestinian terror
organizations, as the acts of other politically motivated groups in recent
history, in no way relate to individual clinical psychopathology or conventional
suicide.
The Use
of Political Suicide in Recent History
The use of
suicide as a political or military tool did not originate with Palestinian
Arab terror groups. Since World War II, there have been several prominent
examples of the use of suicide in a political or military context.
The Kamikaze
Pilot
In World
War II, Japanese "Kamikaze" pilots participated in suicide attacks against
American ships in the Pacific. Researchers of the Kamikaze point out that
these individuals were not suicidal, but rather viewed self-sacrifice
as the ultimate weapon against the enemy. The pilots were driven by a
desire to sacrifice for their country, and did not display any signs of
typical clinically abnormal behavior.
In a study
of the letters of Kamikaze pilots, researchers describe the extraordinary
calm and peaceful spirit they showed prior to their missions. They explain
that the Kamikaze pilot expected something beyond death itself from a
mission that unavoidably culminated in death.5 Motivation for Kamikaze
missions came not from any negativism or a personal desire to end one's
life, but rather from a motivation and group identity related to giving
all for the Emperor and one's country. As described by Taylor and Ryan,
"the individual pilots who undertook such missions were far from defeatist."6
The Tamil
Tigers
The Tamil
Tigers, a secular group devoted to establishing an independent Tamil state
in Sri Lanka, have been responsible for more suicide attacks (over 200)
than any other terrorist group in history.7 Their fighters are described
as fierce, well trained, and totally dedicated to their cause. Before
a mission, they are given cyanide pills in order to avoid being captured
alive and divulging military secrets.8 The Tigers select volunteers from
tough combat units according to their combat record. They are known as
a highly nationalistic force who select both males and females to serve
as "human bombs" to attack selected targets. Nowhere are Tamil fighters
described as suffering from any psychological issues that lead to their
choice to volunteer for these missions. On the contrary, the suicide bomber
is described by a Tamil leader as having "a mind like steel but a heart
like the petals of a flower."9
Buddhist
Monks and Self-Immolation
Another example
of politically motivated suicide is the self-immolation of Buddhist monks
as practiced in Southeast Asia in the 1960s. While these acts never involved
any attacks on others, they nevertheless carried a political message.
The earliest of these acts took place in 1963 when Thich Quang Duc, a
Buddhist monk, set himself on fire in South Vietnam. This act, and similar
acts that followed, served to raise political consciousness against what
were described as the repressive policies of the Catholic regime in South
Vietnam against Buddhists. In describing the motivation of the monks,
it again is clear that clinical symptoms that motivate conventional suicide
were not at play here. "This is not suicide....The monk who burns himself
has lost neither courage nor hope; nor does he desire nonexistence. On
the contrary, he is very courageous and hopeful and aspires for something
good in the future. He does not think that he is destroying himself; he
believes in the good fruition of his act of self-sacrifice for the sake
of others."10
The Common
Political Message
In none of
the above examples was the political or military purpose of the suicide
ever clouded by a message that what was at work was a desperate, hopeless,
or clinically driven individual. In all cases, the perpetrators were first
and foremost focused on the attack, motivated by nationalism and group
identity and not by any personal emotional variables that may have led
them to this extreme behavior. In the political or military aftermath
of these suicides, no attempt was ever made to frame the behavior in the
language of psychopathology or sociological opportunism.
Islamic
and Palestinian Suicide Terrorism
Despite the
contention of some observers, there is actually no evidence to separate
the general motivational framework of Islamic terrorists in general, and
Palestinian terrorists specifically, from that which has been observed
in other politically and nationalistically motivated suicides. As with
other such acts, what is primary is a strong identification with the group
and a motivation to sacrifice oneself for the cause. Individual psychopathology
or personal feelings of desperation or hopelessness do not appear to play
any significant role.
In fact,
Palestinian terrorists themselves have denied any link between clinical
psychological symptoms and their attacks. As stated by one such terrorist,
"This is not suicide. Suicide is selfish, reflects mental weakness. This
is istishad (martyrdom or self-sacrifice in the service of Allah)."11
A Consequence
of Group†Dynamics
In a series
of interviews with would-be suicide bombers, Dr. Jerold Post of George
Washington University describes how group pressure and identity motivates
terrorists to action: "The group members psychologically manipulated the
new recruits, persuading them, psychologically manipulating them, "brainwashing"
them to believe that by carrying out a suicide bombing, they would find
an honored place in the corridor of martyrs, and their lives would be
meaningful; moreover, their families would be financially rewarded. From
the time they were recruited, the group members never left their sides,
leaving them no opportunity of backing down from their fatal choice."
As stated by Post, "Terrorism is not a consequence of individual psychological
abnormality. Rather it is a consequence of group or organizational pathology
that provides a sense-making explanation to the youth drawn to these groups."12
Thus, while
clinical psychological symptoms may not be a factor in the motivation
of the suicide bomber, general psychological techniques do play a role
in creating the group psychology that fosters this behavior. With respect
to Palestinian groups, these factors include a culture where suicide bombers
are viewed as heroes and where families of bombers are showered with both
respect and financial reward. Unlike the shame of traditional suicide
victims, the faces of suicide attackers are prominently displayed throughout
Palestinian areas on public posters heralding their behavior.
The Political
Function of Popular Explanations
What can
be said, therefore, of popular explanations that describe suicide bombers
as desperate, hopeless individuals? First, it appears that these explanations
are not corroborated by actual experience and findings in the field. Suicide
bombers appear to be well motivated to carry out their acts and strongly
dedicated to the political message of their cause, whatever that may be.
While they may feel oppressed, the stimulus for the act is nationalistic
and political, not psychopathological and clinical. In the case of Islamic
terror, the additional variable of becoming a shahid (martyr), with all
its attendant religious rewards, exists.
When pronouncements
are made focusing on individual clinical symptoms and emotional distress
as motivations of the bomber, a political message is being created. As
with the act of suicide bombing itself, this message is aimed at rallying
support against the governmental or institutional target of the attack
and fostering sympathy for the political purposes of the suicide bombing.
In effect, the focus of attention is moved from the victim to the perpetrator,
mitigating the negative effects and terror aspect of the act itself. Despite
the distaste that suicide attacks create, the use of the "bomber as victim"
model by Palestinian spokespersons has led others to similarly view, and
partially although incorrectly justify, the motivations behind Palestinian
suicide bombers. As opposed to other groups that have used suicide as
a political or military tool, only in the case of Palestinian terror has
there been an attempt to personalize the perpetrator as a victim of uncontrollable
psychological and motivational forces that forced such extreme behavior.
What results
is a cadre of amateur pseudo-psychologists who parrot the approach that
the extremism of these acts must mean that some underlying psychological
phenomenon is at work. Cherie Blair, wife of British Prime Minister Tony
Blair, seemed to endorse this approach when, at a London charity event,
she stated: "As long as young people feel they have got no hope but to
blow themselves up you are never going to make progress."13 Former CNN
head Ted Turner stated, "The Palestinians are fighting with human suicide
bombers, that's all they have....I would make a case that both sides are
involved in terrorism."14 British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw also gave
his amateur psychological analysis when he told the London Times: "When
young people go to their deaths, we can all feel a degree of compassion
for those youngsters....They must be so depressed and misguided to do
this."15
The attempt
to focus the reasons behind suicide attacks on psychological rather than
political, nationalistic, or religious factors has also been promoted
by individuals considered Middle East scholars. Shibley Telhami thus writes:
"The most pervasive psychology in the Arab world today is collective rage
and feelings of helplessness and the focus of this psychology is the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict."16 Telhami, who is not a psychologist and has no formal training
in psychology, goes on to write, "To pretend that this issue is simply
one of a choice between good and evil is to know nothing of human psychology."17
An Attempt
at Redefinition
The politicization
and popularization of psychological factors has led some to rename these
attacks as "homicide attacks." The term was first used when President
George Bush's press secretary, Ari Fleischer, stated, "Israel, of course,
had been attacked in a series of suicide bombings which are really homicide
bombings."18
The terminology
used is not insignificant, as "suicide" raises images of individual distress
while "homicide" creates an image of a more insidious, criminal motivation
that indeed reflects on basic issues of right and wrong and good versus
evil. In the media, some have turned to using the term to describe terror
activities that result in the death of the perpetrator as well as the
intended targets. For the most part, however, media outlets, including
Israeli media sources, continue to use the term "suicide" attack.
A corollary
of the use of the term "suicide" attack is the tendency for some media
to include the death of the bomber in casualty counts following a bombing.
The subtle effect of this type of reporting is to associate the death
of the perpetrator with that of the others, making them all "victims"
in the eye of the reader or observer. Particularly egregious are media
accounts that seek to exploit the superficial similarities between perpetrator
and victim, again implying some sort of commonality. In one such account,
the Associated Press declared, "Mirror Images: Two Teen-Age Girls, Bomber
and Victim."19 While this may make for some appealing headlines, these
reports tend to obfuscate the actual intended political purpose of the
attack with irrelevant pop psychology-like personalization.
As a descriptive
term, "suicide" simply indicates that the attacker intended to die in
the attack. While the use of the term itself bears no political significance,
the "spin" provided often does. Any attempt to imply or infer individual
emotional distress as a primary factor in these acts, however, is without
any evidentiary support.
Whether or
not any individual or media source uses the term "suicide" or "homicide"
in describing Palestinian terror attacks, explanations for these attacks
that personalize the attacker's motivation or assumed psychological state
deviate from historical and research-based experience that shows these
acts to be driven by nationalism and political need. While alternative
explanations may have a political purpose, they fail to have any empirically
based foundation in reality. †
* † † * † † *
Notes
1. Samia Khoury, April 15, 2002, http://thewitness.org/agw/khoury.040502b.html
2. http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/meast/03/28/mideast.03/
3. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1997012.stm
4. Eyad Sarraj, "Suicide Bombers: Dignity, Despair, and the Need for Hope,"
Journal of Palestine Studies, 124 (Summer 2002).
5. Rikihei Inoguchi and Tadashi Nakajima, Taiheiyou Senki: Kamikaze Tokubetsu
Kougekitai (Tokyo: Kawade Shobou, 1967), pp. 228-29.
6. Taylor Maxwell and Helen Ryan, "Fanaticism, Political Suicide and Terrorism,"
Terrorism, vol. 11, n. 2 (1988): 108.
7. "Tamil Tigers: A Fearsome Force," BBC News, May 2, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/526407.stm
8. "In the Spotlight: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)," CDI Project,
International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, April 19, 2002,
http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/ltte-pr.cfm
9. Joe Morgan, "Fanatical, But Not Insane," Baltimore Sun, September 19,
2001.
10. Thich Hnat Hanh, Vietnam: Lotus in a Sea of Fire (New York: Hill and
Wang, 1967).
11. Jerrold M. Post, "The Mind of the Terrorist: Individual and Group
Psychology of Terrorist Behavior," testimony prepared for Subcommittee
on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Senate Armed Services Committee,
November 15, 2001, http://www.theapm.org/cont/Posttext.html
12. Ibid.
13. George Jones and Anton La Guardia, "Anger at Cherie 'Sympathy' for
Suicide Bombers," Telegraph, June 19, 2002.
14. Oliver Burkeman, "Ted's Tears," Guardian, June 18, 2002.
15. David Charter and Michael Gove, "Straw's Sorrow for the Human Bombs,"
London Times, June 19, 2002.
16. Shibley Telhami, "Why Suicide Terrorism Takes Root," New York Times,
April 4, 2002.
17. Ibid.
18. Ari Fleischer, Press Briefing, Office of the Press Secretary, April
11, 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020411-1.html
19. Celean Jacobson, "Mirror Images: Two Teen-age Girls, Bomber and Victim,"
Associated Press, April 6, 2002.
Irwin
J. Mansdorf, Ph.D., is a Diplomate of the American Board of Forensic Examiners,
a licensed psychologist in Israel and the U.S.A., and coordinator of the
Israel Citizens Information Council in Raanana, Israel.
The Jerusalem
Letter and Jerusalem Letter/Viewpoints are published by the Jerusalem
Center for Public Affairs. In U.S.A.: Center for Jewish Community Studies
© Copyright. All rights reserved. The
opinions expressed by the authors of Viewpoints do not necessarily reflect
those of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.
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