Update
from AIJAC
Terror in
Saudi Arabia
May
14, 2003
Number 05/03 #06
Today, three
good analysis pieces on the bombing attacks on Monday night on compounds
in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, housing Westerners. Most analysts agree the attacks
was almost certainly carried out by Al-Qaeda, and was probably related
to the arrest of a cell of Al-Qaeda terrorists and the seizure of a cache
of weapons and explosives last week.
First, Yael
Shahar, a researcher at the Institute for Counterterrorism in Herzliya,
says the attack was no surprise giving the known evidence of an expanding
Al-Qaeda network in Saudi Arabia. To read details of what is know about
that network, CLICK HERE.
Next, Middle
East expert Dr. Barry Rubin looks at the wider implications of the attack
in terms of US policy and the war on terror. To read his analysis of what
the US should be doing, CLICK HERE.
Finally,
another well-known Middle East specialist, Dr. Daniel Pipes, looks
at the background to this attack in terms of the history and politics
of Saudi Arabia. To read his knowledgable commentary, and policy suggestions,
published in the Wall Street journal, CLICK
HERE.
Readers may
also be interested in:
Al-Qaeda
in Saudi Arabia: coming out of the shadows
Yael Shahar
Institute for Counter-Terrorism (Herzliya)†May 13, 2003
To analysts
following the security situation in Saudi Arabia, Monday's nearly simultaneous
attacks on complexes housing Westerners in Saudi Arabia came as no surprise.
Osama bin Ladin's al-Qaeda network continues to strike a sympathetic cord
among many in the conservative kingdom. These sympathies increase the
vulnerability of Saudi society to the kind of tolerance for extremists
that has already opened the doors for al-Qaeda in countries from Pakistan
to Indonesia.
To say that
the writing was on the wall is to understate the case. For months, there
have been signs that al-Qaeda sympathizers were forming local cells. In
Saudi Arabia, there is no need to import extremists; there is no shortage
of local elements ready to follow in the footsteps of the 15 young Saudis
who helped fly hijacked planes into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon
a year and a half ago. The kingdom's ultra conservative religious framework
contributes to a situation in which al-Qaeda's jihad against Western culture
falls on fertile ground.
Extensive
al-Qaeda network revealed in Riyadh
The first concrete hints of Monday's events began on March 18, when a
Saudi man believed to be linked to al-Qaeda was killed by the premature
detonation of a bomb he was preparing. A search of the house where the
explosion occurred, located in Riyadh's Jazirah district turned up three
hand grenades, at least a dozen assault rifles, pistols, ammunition and
explosives.
The investigation
into the plot revealed an extensive network of cells--some of them quite
professional and skilled in field craft. The result was a series of increasingly
strident warnings of imminent terror attacks on Western targets in Saudi
Arabia. On 1 May, the U.S. State Department issued an uncommonly specific
<http://travel.state.gov/saudi_warning.html>travel
warning to American citizens in the kingdom. "The Department of State
warns U.S. citizens to defer non-essential travel to Saudi Arabia. Information
indicates that terrorist groups may be in the final phases of planning
attacks against U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia," the document said.
Less than
a week later, on 6 May, Saudi security forces searching for other members
of the Jazirah district cell found themselves in the midst of a gun battle
with militants. The gunmen fled their hideout, still firing on pursuing
security forces. When their car was damaged in the firefight, the carjacked
another vehicle and disappeared into a densely-populated area.
A subsequent
search of the cell's hideout and getaway car turned up a huge cache of
arms, including, according to media reports, 55 hand grenades, five suitcases
loaded with a total of 377 kilograms (829 pounds) of explosive, AK-47
automatic rifles, and 2,545 bullets of different calibres. Police also
found a substantial sum of cash, wigs and other disguises, computers and
communications equipment. This was clearly a well-funded and well-organized
cell.
As a mark
of the seriousness of the situation, the Saudi government took the unprecedented
step of publicizing the existence of the cell. A public announcement was
issued, according to which at least 19 men were being sought in connection
with terrorist plots. The suspects included 17 Saudis, an Iraqi holding
both Kuwaiti and Canadian citizenship, and a Yemeni. Their names and pictures
were shown on state-run Saudi television, and splashed across the front
pages of local newspapers. Interior Minister Prince Nayef bin Abdul Aziz
announced a reward of up to 300,000 riyals (80,000 dollars) for people
who guided authorities to the cell and 50,000 riyals for those who provided
any information about them.
The day after
the raid, a senior Saudi security official announced that suspected terrorists
were receiving orders directly from bin Laden. This announcement too,
was unprecedented. The Saudi government had previously been at pains to
deny that there was significant al-Qaeda activity in the kingdom. At the
same time, Interior Minister Prince Nayef announced in February that Saudi
authorities were holding 253 people with suspected links to al-Qaeda and
that 90 of them were proven to be members of the terror organization.
However, these people were depicted as an aberration: terrorism was the
province of "a few misguided youths." Officials had even gone to great
lengths to find alternate explanations for the occasional bombing. A previous
series of bomb attacks against westerners that killed four people was
chalked up to rivalries in "the illegal alcohol trade." Nevertheless,
the past few years have witnessed a number of low-level attacks on Westerners
and fingers have pointed at a possible al-Qaeda involvement.
Now, for
the first time, Saudi officials were concerned enough to confront the
issue openly. Prince Nayef, speaking to the newspapers the day after the
raids said. "Yes, all the cell members are known to be al-Qaeda operatives."
Nayef said
the suspects received military training in Afghanistan before returning
to Saudi Arabia. "This group has started outside of the kingdom. They
received military training in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, they pretend
to be Islamists and declare others as infidels," he told Al-Watan.
"All of them had returned from Afghanistan ... and a number of them had
been detained and then freed because we found their role was very limited."
Prince Nayef said the men believed in "suicidal ideas, and not in money.
They are young and have been brainwashed."
However,
it wasn't just their ideas that were dangerous. Citing the large quantities
of weapons and explosives found, Prince Nayef pointed out: "The most dangerous
thing is the explosives. Its quantity is large and quality is high. This
is very disturbing and indicates how dangerous these people are. The presence
of such highly advanced explosives indicates that they had been planning
to destroy buildings or big places."
"These men
have only one goal in mind: Jihad (holy war)," he said
Nor was it
only Westerners who were at risk. Saudi officials said that the cell had
been planning attacks on the royal family as well as American and British
interests. The prime targets were the defense minister, Prince Sultan,
and his brother, Interior Minister Prince Nayef bin Abdul Aziz.
This of course,
is nothing new. Bin Ladin and his followers regard the current rulers
of Saudi Arabia as traitors to Islam and to the Muslim nation. His main
claim against the Saudi family is the presence of U.S. military forces
in the site of Islam's two holiest shrines, Mecca and Medina. Recognizing
the use made of this claim by al-Qaeda, and its increasing acceptance
elsewhere in the Arab world, the Bush administration announced April 29
that it would pull almost all U.S. military personnel out of the kingdom.
The presence of some 5,000 American troops in the Saudi Peninsula since
the first Gulf War was touted in the media "as a main reason for the Sept.
11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and other attacks
against Americans."
The truth
of course is more complicated; bin Ladin may have used the presence of
U.S. troops as a rallying cry, but his declaration of war was against
the impact of Western culture, and not the presence of American soldiers
in his homeland. The Saudi royal family--who bin Ladin views as corrupt
heretics propped up by American military power--have always been the target
of his most strident abhorrence.
This time,
recognizing that al-Qaeda was now on its doorstep, the Saudi government
was quick to launch a coordinated counter-attack. The state-controlled
media came out with a series of editorials calling Osama bin Ladin a fanatical
coward, and heaping scorn on the "misguided men who blindly follow his
teachings." Saudi Arabia's highest religious authority, Grand Mufti Sheikh
Abdul Aziz al-Sheikh, described the militants as "corrupt, traitors and
aggressors," and said that they must be "fought and severely punished."
Al Qaeda
"restructuring" reveals emergence of local leaders
What is significant about the Saudi al-Qaeda networks is not so much their
degree of autonomy. Last week, a Saudi weekly published in London reported
that al-Qaeda was preparing a new attack on the U.S. on the scale of September
11. The paper, Al-Majallah, cited an e-mail message from a newly-appointed
al-Qaeda spokesman, Thabet bin Qais, who claimed that "an attack against
America is inevitable." Al-Qaeda, he said has "carried out changes in
its leadership and sidelined the September 11, 2001 team." According to
Thabet bin Qais, "Future missions have been entrusted to the new team,
which is well protected against the U.S. intelligence services. The old
leadership does not know the names of any of its members."
In a later
issue, Al-Majallah quoted an al-Qaeda operative named Abu Mohamed
Al-Ablaj as saying that his group had "been planning major operations
for a long time in the Gulf where it had stocked large amounts of arms
and explosives." In an email to the paper, Al-Ablaj wrote that the recent
raid in Riyadh had not derailed the group's plans. Al-Ablaj described
himself as the "coordinator of the Mujahedin training center" run by al-Qaeda.
Reading between
the lines, what one sees here is the emergence of a local leadership for
al-Qaeda cells--or more accurately, Qaeda spin-offs. These cells are not
directly connected with the "traditional" al-Qaeda leadership, currently
in hiding in Pakistan and elsewhere. The reason that "the old leadership
does not know the names" of the new cell members is simple: they are completely
unconnected. This is not to say that the Saudi network is not al-Qaeda.
But al-Qaeda is not an organization, but a phenomenon--a combination of
shared ideologies, common goals, and of course, a common idea of what
methods to use to achieve these goals. The founding of autonomous cells
in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere is itself one of al-Qaeda's main operational
themes.
In the first
week of March, ICT reprinted a http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=463
call for treason in the name of Jihad," that appeared on an internet forum
popular with followers of Osama bin Ladin. The site, Arabforum.net is
particularly designed to appeal to young Moslems around the world. The
message appealed to Muslims to betray their countries for the sake of
Jihad. It calls upon ìall brothers working in air and sea headquarters,
airports and harbors, serving the U.S.A. and their allies and to all employees
working with the U.S.A. in the oil fieldsî to rise and act to save the
Moslem ìUmmaî (nation). It calls on Moslems everywhere to do what they
can to sabotage the preparations for the war against Iraq ìas a modest
contribution to the Moslem struggle.î ìThe infidel enemy, which we command
you to destroy on the battlefield, is the same enemy which you are serving.
You know its bases, its abilities, its movements, its weak points and
you are, therefore, the source of our strength. This fact places you in
an important and special position in your ability to serve your land and
your religion.î Residents of the Gulf countries are further urged to gather
intelligence and report information in preparation of terror attacks.
The appeal goes on to list the kinds of information that should be reported,
including, among other potential targets, "Housing accommodation and administrative
areas used by American technical teams," and "Housing accommodation of
American headquarters employees (local employees)."
One of the
immediate conclusions from Monday's attacks is the local element: the
perpetrators were on their home ground, were sure of their abilities to
elude capture, and confident of their chances of success. In a country
where young Muslims are increasingly turning to religion for reasons for
their country's woes, the radicalization of the next generation is bound
to have concrete results. One of these results was seen in Monday night's
attack.
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Analysis:
Arab states' complicity with terrorism remains intact
Barry Rubin
Jerusalem
Post, May. 14, 2003
The ability
of Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda group to launch a well-organized terrorist
assault on Americans in Saudi Arabia shows that his group is still very
much alive. The attack, coming just as US Secretary of State Colin Powell
was about to visit the kingdom, belies recent US government statements
that the group is close to extinction. And that was, of course, precisely
the intention of the operation.
Removing
any US presence in Saudi Arabia was the original and remained the main
goal of al-Qaida.While the organization became an international jihad
group, it also had an identity as the revolutionary Islamist opposition
in Saudi Arabia. Al-Qaida certainly does not threaten to overthrow the
monarchy at present, but it does have a secret and sizable following in
the country.
Recent reports
have shown that the extent of private Saudi funding with the compliance
of that government was even greater than previously thought.
Only days
ago, a Saudi diplomat was expelled from the United States because of his
role in helping bin Laden's men. Much of this money was given to buy protection,
to turn al-Qaida's violent energies away from Saudi Arabia and toward
other targets.
This latest
attack shows that such tactics have not worked, and should give the Saudi
authorities an incentive to crack down on the group and really stop the
flow of money from its own wealthy citizens to the terrorists.
A seeming
irony of the attack is that it came after the announcement that US forces
will withdraw from Saudi Arabia over the coming months. They are no longer
needed both because of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in neighboring
Iraq, and due to the fact that the US has new bases in other Gulf states,
especially Qatar.
Of course,
experience has shown as with Israel's experiences regarding both Lebanon
and the Palestinians that a desire to withdraw can trigger terrorism as
surely or more surely than a desire to stay. In this case, the terrorists
could falsely but credibly for some of their Arab audience claim the withdrawal
as a victory for them.
The people
who were victims of the attack in Saudi Arabia were American technicians,
not soldiers. They were in the country to help the Saudi military absorb
its hi-tech imported weapons, and they would not be leaving with the uniformed
US forces.
At the same
time, the terrorists' message is that Arab states with their regular armies
may be defeated, but the heroic Arab guerrillas fight on, using the only
tactics that can really bring total victory. Iraq's defeat could be to
the bin Laden-style jihadists what the 1967 war was for Yasser Arafat
and the PLO. Again, this is a parallel to experiences in the history of
the Arab-Israeli conflict.
For US policy,
of course, the attack requires some rethinking. While this point should
not be exaggerated, there has been a tendency to think that the battle
with bin Laden was the old phase in the war against terrorism, replaced
by the priorities arising out of the war with Iraq.
This does
not mean that vigorous American activity was not continuing, for example
to cut off financial backing for al-Qaeda, but now it must be further
increased. Clearly, this phase has not come to an end and requires a continuing
emphasis by the United States, as well as cooperation with local states.
Yet such
cooperation is often lacking. While both Syria and Iran have taken certain
steps to "prove" they are part of the anti-terrorist coalition only hours
before the attack Iran's UN ambassador had published a New York Times
op-ed piece explaining how his country suffers from extremism in the region
they are also complicit with continued anti-American terrorism, including
that by al-Qaida. For every terrorist they expel or turn over to US authorities,
they give refuges to five or 10 more. And the last major attack against
Americans in Saudi Arabia, at the Khobar Towers housing complex in 1996,
was sponsored by Iran.
In the investigation
following the Khobar Towers attack, the US was very frustrated by a lack
of Saudi help. Embarrassment at its own security failures and a desire
to avoid a confrontation with Iran led to a Saudi coverup. Again, as al-Qaida
would like, this incident could lead to US-Saudi friction.
The Saudis
have been trying to deny the existence of an internal terrorist problem
just like the Chinese government sought to hide the spread of the SARS
disease there, and with similar deadly results. In one case, they blamed
British workers for the setting off of bombs by terrorists, tortured several,
and threw them in jail.
But the message
from Riyadh is a clear one: The radical Islamist war against the West
continues and in it the Arab-Israeli conflict is only one of many battles.
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Arabia's Civil War: The
Saudis vs. The Extremists
By DANIEL PIPES
Wall Street
Journal, May 14, 2003
The four
bombings in Saudi Arabia Monday, which killed dozens, including 10 Americans,
are symptomatic of a deep fissure in that country. The argument is over
religion, politics and foreigners -- and it goes back a long way. The
West must react by helping the Saudi family win this dispute, while putting
pressure on it to reform.
Saudi Arabia's
origins lie in the mid-eighteenth century, when a tribal leader named
Muhammad al Saud joined forces with a religious leader named Muhammad
bin Abd al-Wahhab. The first gave his name to the kingdom that (with the
exception of two interim periods) still exists; the second gave his name
to the version of Islam that still serves as the kingdom's ideology.
On first
appearance, the Wahhabi version of Islam was seen as wildly extreme and
was widely repudiated. Its fanatical enmity toward other Muslims and its
rejection of long-standing Muslim customs made it anathema, for example,
to the Ottoman rulers who dominated the Middle East. The Saudi kingdom
disappeared twice because its military and religious aggressiveness made
it so loathsome to its neighbors.
The current
iteration of the Saudi kingdom came into being in 1902 when a Saudi leader
captured Riyadh. Ten years later, there emerged a Wahhabi armed force
known as the Ikhwan (Arabic for "Brethren") which in its personal practices
and its hostility toward non-Wahhabis represented the most militant dimension
of this already militant movement. One war cry of theirs went: "The winds
of Paradise are blowing. Where are you who hanker after Paradise?"
The Ikhwan
served the Saudi family well, bringing it one military victory after another.
A key turning point came in 1924, when the father of today's Saudi king
captured Mecca from the great-great-grandfather of today's Jordanian king.
This victory had two major implications. It vanquished the last remaining
rival of the Saudis and established the family as the leading force on
the Arabian peninsula. And it brought under Saudi control not just another
town but the holiest city of Islam and a cosmopolitan urban area that
hosted divergent interpretations of Islam.
These changes
turned the Saudi insurgency into a state and brought a desert movement
to the city. This meant the Saudi monarch could no longer give the Ikhwan
and the traditional Wahhabi interpretation of Islam free reign, but had
to control it. The result was a civil war in the late 1920s which ended
in the monarchy's victory over the Ikhwan in 1930.
In other
words, the less fanatical version of Wahhabism triumphed over the more
fanatical. The Saudi monarchs presided over a kingdom extreme by comparison
with other Muslim countries but tame by Wahhabi standards.
Yes, the
Saudi state deems the Koran to be its constitution, forbids the practice
of any religion but Islam on its territory, employs an intolerant religious
police, and imposes gender apartheid. But it also enacts non-Koranic regulations,
employs large numbers of non-Muslims, constrains the religious police,
and allows women to attend school and work.
The Ikhwan
may have lost the fight in 1930, but its way of thinking lived on, representing
the main opposition to an ever-more grandiose and corrupt Saudi state.
The potency of this alternative became startlingly evident in 1979, when
an Ikhwan-inspired group violently seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca. On
a larger scale, the Ikhwan spirit dominated jihad efforts against the
Soviet Union in Afghanistan during the 1980s. And the Taliban regime that
ruled Afghanistan in the period 1996-2001 embodied the Ikhwan in power.
Osama bin
Laden, a Saudi who spent formative years in Afghanistan, is the leading
representative of the Ikhwan movement today. He wants to depose the corrupt
and hypocritical Saudi monarchy, install a Taliban-like government, evict
non-Muslim foreigners, and return women to the harem. His vision has real
appeal in Saudi Arabia; it's widely reported that in a fair election,
he would handily defeat the current ruler, King Fahd.
Thus, the
recent violence in Riyadh ultimately reflects not just a hatred of Americans
but a titanic clash of visions and a struggle for power; in this, it recapitulates
the civil war of the 1920s. Is Saudi Arabia to remain a monarchy that
at least partially accommodates modernity and the outside world? Or is
it to become the Islamic Emirate of Arabia, a reincarnation of the Taliban's
completely regressive rule in Afghanistan?
For the outside
world, the choice is clear; however unattractive, the Saudi monarchy is
preferable to the yet worse Ikhwan alternative. This implies a two-step
approach: help the monarchy defeat its Ikhwan-inspired enemy and put serious
pressure on the kingdom to reform everything from its school system to
its sponsorship of Wahhabi organizations abroad.
Mr. Pipes
(www.DanielPipes.org) is director of the Middle East Forum and author
of "Militant Islam Reaches America" (W.W. Norton).
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