Blix's "Smoking Gun"

Update from AIJAC

Blix's "Smoking Gun"

March 11, 2003
Number 03/03 #04

Chief UN Weapons Inspector Hans Blix gave an optimistic assessment of the progress of inspections on Friday, based largely on the agreement to destroy Iraq's illegal Al-Samoud missiles (of which, see below). However, his report also contained, buried in the detail, some revelations that may amount to the so-called "smoking gun", proof positive that Iraq is attempting to keep large quantities of illegal weapons. In particular, the report said Iraq had tried to buy a bunch of pilotless sprayer planes, almost certainly for dispensing chemical and biological weapons; had built and tested another prototype of such planes, and also tried to build illegal missiles. Moreover, there was, Blix said, credible evidence that Iraq was lying about its chemical and biological weapons. To read the whole story from London's Times, CLICK HERE

Next, an editorial from The New Republic argues that those who assert that war should be avoided by either getting Saddam to disarm peacefully, by waiting until UN Security Council approval is possible, or by containing Iraq through inspections are fooling themselves, because none of this outcomes are in fact possible, HERE.

Further, returning to the issue of the Al-Samoud missiles, the real story was not properly reported in Australia. Yes they violated somewhat the range restriction on missiles for Iraq, but they are actually a much more serious violation than that. They directly violate UN instructions about the diameter of the missile and are almost certainly designed to be easily fitted with a second engine that can vastly increase their range and payload, so they can strike Israel, Teheran etc, and probably carry nuclear weapons. Again, the London Times had the report, HERE.

Finally, readers may also be interested in these three good pieces on the probable military course of events in the event of war, from British expert John Keegan, American journalist Greg Easterbrook, and French Iraqi writer Amir Taheri.

Iraq tried to order drones and spray kits

Jon Swain

The Sunday Times - March 09, 2003

SADDAM HUSSEIN has been trying to acquire a fleet of† 300 drones equipped with spraying devices capable of delivering chemical and biological weapons, it was revealed last week.
Iraqi documents seen by The Sunday Times show orders for kits to make the pilotless planes and for gyroscopes and guidance systems enabling them to be flown at targets from a distance. The documents also contain requests for small spraying devices normally used in agriculture that would be specially adapted for use in the air.

Military experts said the drones could pose a serious threat to British troops fighting a war in Iraq. Baghdad admitted that in 1988 it considered using drones to spray biological weapons, but rejected the idea because the craft it had were too small.

According to the documents, the order for the aircraft was made on behalf of the Ibn Firnas industrial centre in northern Baghdad, which is involved in the development and production of drones.

The material, which has been passed to the United Nations inspectors, also revealed Iraq had been trying to develop a rocket capable of travelling 750 miles ó eight times the range permitted by the UN.

Details of the orders emerged as the United Nations declassified a report on Iraqís prohibited weapons programme. Hans Blix, the chief weapons inspector, said there was ìcredible informationî that Iraq never destroyed 21,000 litres of biological warfare agents, including 10,000 litres of anthrax, stored during the 1990 Gulf war. There was also ìcredible informationî that Iraq had 7,000 litres more biological warfare agents in bombs and warheads than it had declared.

Blix mentioned that inspectors had recently discovered an undeclared Iraqi drone with a wingspan of 25ft, which he said had been test-piloted by Iraq and could carry anthrax or other biological weapons to neighbouring countries.

To the fury of British and American officials the disclosure was buried deep in his 173-page report and not mentioned in an oral presentation to foreign ministers. The plane is being studied by inspectors to determine whether it can exceed the authorised range of 92 miles.

Blixís report noted ìa surge of activityî in missile technology and accused Iraq of failing to provide information on where it obtained parts and technology.

It also said mobile, truck-mounted biological weapons units were ìinherently difficult to verifyî and said Iraqís ìactive assistanceî was required to conduct road and rail searches. Although no underground chemical or biologial weapons units were found, inspectors may have missed a ìhidden entranceî, he said.

The inspectors could also not rule out continued research into biological weapons-related genetic engineering, including smallpox and similar diseases.

The document showing Iraqiís intended weapons purchases are filled with technical data and specifications. They show efforts by Baghdad to smuggle a wide range of prohibited items into the country for military purposes through Jordan and Syria, using a network of Iraqi middlemen abroad and private companies in Baghdad.

The documents were provided by an Iraqi engineer, who said he was approached by Baghdad to help arrange the purchase of the drones and associated equipment at the beginning of 1999, a few months after Iraq forced all UN weapons inspectors to leave. ìWhen I combined this inquiry with the others and analysed what could happen if smaller sprayers were attached to the planes I realised Saddam was trying to build a delivery system for weapons of mass destruction,î the engineer said.

He said the request from Baghdad had ceased after the inspectors returned last November.

* A Texas-based company headed by Dick Cheney before he became American vice- president is poised to become one of the biggest beneficiaries of war in Iraq after winning billions of dollars in government contracts. Halliburton, a giant energy services company, will be employed by the Pentagon overseeing efforts to control fires at oil wells, should Saddam set them alight.

Waiting Game

by the Editors
†
The New Republic, Post date 03.07.03 †|†Issue date 03.17.03

The debate over war with Iraq centers on means rather than ends. Unlike Vietnam, where opponents questioned whether the goal of repelling Hanoi's aggression was worth the price in blood, nearly all war critics today concede the necessity of the goal at hand--disarming Iraq. Yet they insist it can be achieved at a lower cost, either by forcing Saddam Hussein to relinquish his weapons peacefully or by obtaining U.N. approval before invading. Those who oppose war are not mistaken to think that either outcome would be preferable to fighting without the imprimatur of the Security Council. Where they go wrong is in believing that those outcomes remain possible. The case for waiting--a case that still appeals to a depressingly large number of liberals--thus rests upon a delusion.

Consider voluntary disarmament. The best way to get Saddam to relinquish his weapons was for the United Nations to draw a line in the sand, in the form of Resolution 1441, and back it up with the threat of force. Alas, the Iraqi dictator has stomped over that line. He failed, weapons inspectors say, to submit a full accounting of proscribed weapons, as he was required to do under 1441. His scientists--no doubt threatened by his secret police--have refused to be interviewed outside the country or have insisted upon tape-recording their interviews. Hans Blix has been reduced to praising Iraq for partial compliance.

War opponents describe this state of affairs as "progress." In fact, it's just the opposite. When crafting Resolution 1441 last November, Russia and France worried that the United States would declare war over some ultra-technical violation. Today, Iraq is allowed to engage without sanction in substantive violations that not even France countenanced three months ago. Resolution 1441 is effectively a dead letter--a development that has only fed Saddam's confidence. As The Washington Post reported last month, "Saddam Hussein's government, apparently emboldened by antiwar sentiment at the U.N. Security Council and in worldwide street protests, has not followed through on its promises of increased cooperation with U.N. arms inspectors." This further degradation of the U.N.'s credibility has erased any slim possibility that the mere threat of force might compel Iraq to disarm.

Some war opponents have therefore retreated to a fallback argument: Even if Iraq never disarms completely, at least the presence of inspectors will keep it from expanding its arsenal. "What can [Saddam] get away with?" Democratic presidential candidate Howard Dean asked recently, "as long as Iraq is inspected, under constant surveillance, surrounded, grounded because of no-fly zones?" But this assertion rests upon an ignorance of history. In the 1990s, while UNSCOM, considered by many weapons experts to be more aggressive than the current inspections regime, prowled Iraq, inspectors and American intelligence were convinced the Iraqi nuclear program had been eradicated. Only a series of high-profile defections--a lucky break unlikely to recur--revealed that Saddam had been working toward a bomb under their noses. And, even if today's inspections are working, history suggests that the minute the threat of force recedes, Saddam will end even his current minimal compliance. Many liberals complain that war will end the inspections, but, if we reach the summer, when war is deemed impossible, it is a sure bet that Saddam will end them himself.

Just as naive is the hope that further delay will convince the Security Council to authorize force. Many Democrats have presented the dearth of international support as essentially a conscious choice by President Bush. As Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle said this week, "The only way to do this and do it right is through the auspices of the U.N. and an international coalition. I think in both cases this administration has fallen short." Yet the Bush administration has demonstrated more interest in the Security Council than the Security Council has demonstrated in Iraqi disarmament. For a dozen years, France and Russia fought to weaken inspections and resisted even modest punishments of Iraq. The last few months have followed the same pattern. When Iraq withholds full cooperation from inspectors, Paris and Moscow are unmoved because this violation falls short of a "smoking gun." When a breakthrough does occur, such as the discovery of the Al-Samoud missiles, they see it as evidence that inspections are working.

It's now clear that the Security Council endorsed Resolution 1441 only as a gambit to avoid war. French President Jacques Chirac revealed perhaps more than he intended last week when he blurted out that "disarmament must happen peacefully." This gives the game away. Disarmament could only come about either through war or the threat of war. If disarmament must be peaceful, then there will be no disarmament. And, when Democrats insist that war must have U.N. approval, they are attaching themselves to the French position. It may seem they are arguing for a certain means, but in fact they are arguing for an end.

the Editors †

Rocket that could strike at the heart of Israel

From James Bone in New York

The Times (London) February 26, 2003

THE missile at the centre of the looming showdown between Iraq and the United Nations may be part of an ambitious secret project to develop a much longer-range missile that could hit Tehran or Tel Aviv, UN and independent missile experts believe.

The specifications of the al-Samoud 2 missile appear to have been designed so that it could be fitted with a second engine, making it a much more potent threat than previously realised, the experts have told The Times.

Hans Blix, the chief UN weapons inspector, has demanded that Iraq should begin destroying the missiles by Saturday, and UN sources say he is ready to call an emergency meeting of the Security Council this weekend if it fails to do so. If Dr Blix reported a violation to the Security Council it would be tantamount to finding Iraq in ìfurther material breachî of UN demands and would transform the diplomatic landscape at a stroke. Even France, the leading opponent of a war, has insisted that Iraq follow Dr Blixís order to destroy the missiles.

The UN inspectorate has dispatched Demetri Perricos, its chief of operations, from New York to Baghdad to oversee arrangements for dismantling the missiles. He is due to arrive in Iraq on Thursday.

Tony Blair predicted yesterday that Iraq would destroy the missiles at the last minute. ìOf course Saddam will offer concessions,î he told MPs. ìThis is a game with which he is immensely familiar. As the threat level rises so the concessions are eked out.î But Saddam Hussein indicated in an interview with CBS television on Monday that Iraq would resist. ìIraq is allowed to prepare proper missiles and we are committed to that,î the Iraqi President said. ìWe do not have missiles that go beyond the permitted range.î Until now the missiles appeared a poor casus belli because the threat they posed seemed limited.

Dr Blixís inspectors have said that the al-Samoud 2 flew over the maximum permitted range of 150km in only 13 of 40 test flights, reaching a maximum distance of 183km.

But experts say that the specifications of the al-Samoud 2 and its use of a Russian-designed Volga SA2 engine suggest that Iraq might be trying to develop a missile with a much longer range that could threaten the entire region.

In building the new missile, Iraq ignored a 1994 UN letter restricting the missileís diameter to less than 600mm. The UN issued the order with the express intent of preventing Iraq equipping the missile with two engines. Baghdad also violated a 1997 UN letter prohibiting the use of engines from certain surface-to-air missiles, such as the Volga SA2, in surface-to-surface missiles.

UN inspectors in Iraq have determined that the al-Samoud 2 has a diameter of 760mm, which would make it possible to equip it with two Volga engines instead of one. Moreover, the diameter of the ìfat Samoudî ó as inspectors call it ó was mysteriously increased from its original 750mm design in 1994, possibly better to accommodate two engines.

ìYou can put two engines in there,î said Tim McCarthy, a former UN missile inspector now with the Monterey Institute of International Studies, which has studied the al-Samoud 2. ìYou indeed can carry a larger payload or go a longer range . . . There is no question it can go proscribed ranges. It would increase by a factor of two or three the range of this thing.î

One source close to Dr Blix said the inspectors suspect that Iraq is copying Indiaís Prithvi single-stage missile. The Prithvi, which is a metre in diameter, can carry a 1,000kg payload, sufficient to transport a nuclear device and has a similar twin-engined design based on SA2 technology. Adding to suspicions is the fact that a new missile test stand at al-Rafah is capable of testing rocket engines above the permissible thrust. Iraq has said that it built a bigger stand after the site was bombed so that it could test two rocket engines side by side. Dr Blix has ordered that the test stand be placed under UN supervision.

Other independent experts say that the al-Samoud 2 may be intended as a two-stage missile like Iraqís previous al-Tammuz project. The al-Tammuz used a Scud as the first stage and a Volga engine as the second stage to reach a range of up to 2,000km.

Iraq first admitted making a ìpaper studyî of the al-Tammuz, but later conceded that it had actually constructed mock-ups of the missile.

Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State, told the Security Council this month that Iraq ìhas programmes that are intended to produce ballistic missiles that fly over 1,000kmî. One liquid fuel system was intended to reach 1,200km, he said.

ìSaddam Husseinís intentions have never changed,î General Powell said. ìHe is not developing the missiles for self-defence. These are missiles to project power ó chemical, biological, and, if we let him, nuclear weapons.î

The UNís 150km limit was imposed on Iraqís missiles as a condition of the ceasefire that ended the Gulf War to make it hard to reach Kuwait City, which lies about 100km from the Iraqi border. Israel is about 300km away and Tehran just over 500km away.