The Kidnapping of Gilad Shalit/The Document Adopted

Update from AIJAC

The Kidnapping of Gilad Shalit/The Document Adopted

June 29, 2006
Number 06/06 #09

This Update examines the current issues in Israel and the Palestinian Authority - the Israeli incursions into Gaza in response to Palestinian terror attacks and particularly the kidnapping of Corporal Gilad Shalit, and the agreement between Fatah and Hamas to adopt the prisoners' document as amended.

First Yossi Klein Halevi of The New Republic looks at the Israeli response to the kidnapping of Shalit. He urges the Israeli government of Ehud Olmert to continue to take a hard line against Hamas in light of Hamas' involvement, which he regards as a declaration of war. He credits Israel's policies of targeted assassinations for the relative lull in Hamas terror, and warns that Olmert will only be able to implement his plan to withdraw from land in the West Bank if Israelis trust him on security. For this perspective, CLICK HERE.

Next Khaled Abu Toameh of the Jerusalem Post argues that the kidnapping is a result of internal tensions within Hamas. He outlines disagreements between Khaled Mashaal, the extreme hardline Hamas leader based in Damascus, and Ismail Haniyeh, the more mainstream hardline Palestinian Prime Minister, and suggests the kidnapping is an attempt by Mashaal to embarass Haniyeh and prevent him reaching agreement with Mahmoud Abbas. For this fascinating insight, CLICK HERE.

Finally Evelyn Gordon, also of the Jerusalem Post, urges us not to get excited about the agreement over the prisoners' document. She explains that it will do nothing to make Hamas moderate its behaviour, and therefore can not be regarded as a step towards a peaceful settlement. In fact, she reveals, by enshrining Hamas doctrine as official Palestinian policy, it represents a step away from peace. To read this excellent analysis, CLICK HERE.

WHY ISRAEL'S ATTACK ON GAZA ISN'T ENOUGH.

Taken Hostage

by Yossi Klein Halevi

TNR Online

06.28.06

What's the news?" we ask each other, and everyone understands that the question refers to Gilad Shalit, the Israeli soldier kidnapped by Hamas. Though the old socialist Israel is barely a memory, in times of crisis we again become collectivized.

Nothing unites Israelis in outrage more than the seizure of hostages. Next week, on July 4, Israel will mark the thirtieth anniversary of the Entebbe operation that freed over a hundred Israeli hostages, and little has changed since then in the national ethos of rescue. The last Zionist ideal still shared by most Israelis is the determination to fight back. An Israeli soldier held hostage is a taunt against the Zionist promise of self-defense, an unbearable reminder of Jewish helplessness.

Our obsession with hostages is a tactical weakness but a strategic strength. It allows terrorists a stunning psychological advantage: With a single random kidnapping, they hold an entire society emotionally hostage. Strategically, though, hostage-taking only strengthens Israeli resolve.

And resolve is precisely what the public now expects of its government. So far, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has responded well. He began by issuing two policy guidelines in dealing with the hostage crisis. The first is that Israel won't negotiate over Gilad's release and won't exchange prisoners. The second is that Hamas leaders--"political" as well as "military"--will be held personally accountable for the fate of Gilad.

If Olmert's government hopes to retain its credibility among Israelis, it needs to maintain those two principles.

In recent months, the public has become increasingly disillusioned with the government's failure to adequately respond to the almost daily rocket attacks on Israeli towns and villages, especially Sderot. No Israeli town within the 1967 borders has experienced the kind of relentless attacks that Sderot has suffered. Even Hizbollah's Katyusha rocket attacks on the northern town of Kiryat Shmona in the early 1980s occurred in waves, with periods of reprieve between them. In the ten months since the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, though, Sderot has barely known a day of peace.

After the withdrawal, Israelis expected the government to enforce a policy of zero-tolerance for Palestinian attacks emanating from Gaza, even for attacks that didn't cause fatalities. Instead, the government responded unevenly, often ignoring rocket attacks that caused no damage.

Many Israelis see Hamas's raid on an Israeli military post within the 1967 borders as a result of the weakness Israel has projected. In yesterday's letters column in the daily Maariv, for example, the hardline consensus was almost unanimous. "We told you so," wrote one reader who identified himself as "right wing." "Why doesn't Israel shut off electricity and water to Gaza?" demanded another reader. "Enough words, it's time to act," insisted a third.

That perception of weakness could have far-reaching domestic consequences. The premise of Olmert's centrist party, Kadima, is that only a hawkish approach on security will convince Israelis to implement a dovish policy on territory. Given the Sderot precedent, though, Olmert is failing to uphold that centrist doctrine. For Olmert to win the public's agreement for another unilateral withdrawal, he needs to begin proving that he is capable of defending Tel Aviv from Palestinian rockets. And the place to begin convincing Israelis is Gaza.

The military invasion of Gaza that began last night, and whose purpose is to surround the area where Gilad is presumably being held, must only be the first step. A brief invasion, a "show of force," is hardly adequate. Instead, Israel needs to resume its policy of systematically targeting Hamas leaders, just as it did several years ago, culminating in the assassination of Sheik Yassin. That policy drove most of Hamas deep underground and led to the cease-fire between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

Resuming assassinations against Hamas's political echelon is, of course, a declaration of war against the Hamas regime. But given its official sanctioning of kidnapping, Hamas has already declared war against Israel. Hamas's adoption of the tactics of Al Qaeda in Iraq comes as no surprise. After the killing of Zarqawi, Hamas issued a statement mourning his death and urging continued "resistance," thereby making the Hamas regime the world's only openly pro-Al Qaeda government. Unfortunately, the international media missed the significance of that moment.

That lapse in media judgment is worth recalling in the coming days, when much of the media will be presenting the "prisoners' document"--a set of demands drawn up by Hamas and Fatah members imprisoned in Israel--as a historic Hamas concession, offering "tacit" recognition of Israel. In fact, the document does nothing of the sort. Nowhere does the document recognize the right of Israel to exist. Instead, it calls for Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders, followed by the "right" of Palestinian refugees to resettle in Israel and demographically overwhelm the Jewish state. The prisoners' document, in other words, is a plan for the phased destruction of Israel--precisely why Hamas can endorse it.

Driving on the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv highway, I saw this graffiti: "Olmert, gadol alecha"--which roughly translates as, "Olmert, the job is bigger than you are." For Olmert to disprove that growing suspicion among Israelis, he must commit himself to the destruction of the Hamas regime. Sooner or later, Israel will have no choice but to adopt that policy. The only question is whether Olmert will still be prime minister when that happens.

Yossi Klein Halevi is a foreign correspondent for The New Republic and senior fellow of the Shalem Center in Jerusalem.

Analysis: Kidnap shows Hamas tension

Khaled Abu Toameh

THE JERUSALEM POST

Jun. 28, 2006

The kidnapping earlier this week of IDF soldier Gilad Shalit has revealed the nature of the secret power struggle that has been raging among the top brass of Hamas political leadership ever since the Islamic movement won the parliamentary election last January.

Today it is evident that there are two major forces in Hamas - one headed by Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh and the second by Damascus-based Khaled Mashaal. Haniyeh represents the relatively moderate and pragmatic camp in Hamas, whereas Mashaal is viewed as a hardliner who is taking Hamas toward further extremism.

In many ways, the dispute within Hamas resembles the historic conflict between the 'old guard' and the 'young guard' in the rival Fatah party. But while the power struggle in Fatah has been over money and power, the feud in Hamas is over the movement's future political and military strategy.

Haniyeh and his aides insist they had nothing to do with the attack on the IDF post near the southern border with the Gaza Strip.

In private conversations with Fatah leaders, they revealed that the attack was carried out on instructions from the Hamas leadership in Syria and Lebanon. Although Haniyeh's men did not mention names, the Fatah leaders were quick to hold Mashaal responsible.

Ever since he entered office, Haniyeh has been working hard to persuade the international community that there is no reason to fear Hamas's presence in power. In a series of interviews with the Israeli and foreign media, he even went as far as talking about the possibility of accepting a long-term truce with Israel.

Unlike Mashaal, Haniyeh has also been keen on maintaining good ties with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and most of the Fatah leadership - a fact that has angered Mashaal and other Hamas leaders abroad. Despite the tensions between Hamas and Abbas's Fatah party, Haniyeh has refrained from criticizing the PA president. Fatah, for its part, has also avoided attacking Haniyeh in person.

Two months ago, when Mashaal openly accused Abbas and Fatah leadership of conspiring with Israel and the US to bring down the Hamas government, Haniyeh was said to be unhappy with the accusations. He reportedly told Fatah officials that he totally rejected Mashaal's allegations.

Mashaal's remarks drew sharp criticism from Fatah, whose leaders accused him of serving as a puppet in the hands of Syria and Iran. Still, the thousands of Fatah supporters who took to the streets to protest Mashaal's accusations stopped short of blaming Haniyeh for any wrongdoing.

Last month, following Abbas's decision to hold a referendum on a controversial document drafted by some Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails, Haniyeh endorsed a conciliatory approach while Mashaal categorically dismissed the document as a plot designed to topple the Hamas government.

Mashaal reportedly instructed Haniyeh and other Hamas leaders in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to do their utmost to foil Abbas's planned referendum. But Mashaal's orders have since fallen on deaf ears, especially after Haniyeh preferred to negotiate a compromise with Abbas over the prisoners' document.

Haniyeh's strategy over the past few months has been to avoid resuming terror attacks on Israel. That's mainly because he wants to succeed in government and to prove to the world that Hamas is capable of running the day-to-day affairs of the Palestinian public. To the dismay of Mashaal, Haniyeh has even stated in public that he was not opposed to Abbas's desire to resume peace talks with Israel.

Sunday's attack on the IDF post and the kidnapping of Shalit have placed Haniyeh in a very difficult situation, particularly since his movement has taken credit for it.

Sources close to Haniyeh said on Tuesday that the Hamas gunmen who carried out the attack did not consult with the Hamas political leadership in the Gaza Strip prior to the operation.

According to the sources, the attack was clearly aimed at embarrassing Haniyeh and thwarting his attempt to reach an agreement with Abbas over the prisoners' document. They noted that the attack was carried out against a backdrop of reports that Abbas and Haniyeh were closer than ever to signing an agreement that would also have seen the establishment of a new government consisting of independent figures and technocrats.

If anything, the attack also shows that Mashaal has control over certain elements in Hamas's armed wing, Izaddin al-Kassam. It remains now to be seen how Mashaal and his lieutenants will react to Tuesday's news that Haniyeh and Abbas had finally reached an agreement over the document.

Hamas officials in Ramallah and Gaza City said they did not rule out the possibility that the agreement would further escalate the power struggle between the two Hamas camps.

The prisoners' letter - don't get too excited

Evelyn Gordon

THE JERUSALEM POST

Jun. 28, 2006

Whether the Prisoners' Letter, which Fatah and Hamas initialed on Tuesday, will end Palestinian infighting remains unclear. As propaganda, however, the document has been an unqualified success.

Both in Israel and abroad, the media (this paper notably excepted) have universally lauded the document for "implicitly recognizing Israel," something Hamas has hitherto refused to do. Even the Wall Street Journal - not usually a Palestinian apologist - credited it with "implicit recognition of Israel" in a June 15 editorial.

Yet in fact, the document does nothing of the sort - and not only is this plain from the text, but Hamas spokesmen have said so explicitly.

To see the document as "implicitly recognizing Israel" requires interpreting its demand for a Palestinian state in "all the territory occupied [by Israel] in 1967" as signifying this territory only, thus implying an Israel alongside. Unfortunately, the text belies this interpretation.

According to a Hebrew translation published by Haaretz, the actual wording is as follows: "The Palestinian people … desires the liberation of its lands and the realization of its right to liberty, return, independence and self-definition, including the right to establish an independent state with holy Jerusalem as its capital on all the territory occupied in 1967" (emphasis added).

In other words, a state in this territory is merely one part of the broader goal of "the liberation of [Palestinian] lands." Or to put it in historical context, this is a reincarnation of the PLO's 1974 "phased plan," under which any "liberated" territory would serve as a base for pursuing Israel's ultimate destruction.

And, lest anyone misunderstand, both the documents' authors and other Hamas spokesmen have stated this explicitly.

ON JUNE 6, Abdel Khaleq Natsche, who signed the document for Hamas, and Bassam al-Sa'adi, who signed for Islamic Jihad, issued the following clarification: "We scorn the attempts to attach nonexistent content to the document, and therefore, we emphasize that it does not contain any declaration or hint of recognition of the occupation state and does not contain any call for this."

Mohammed Abu Tir, a senior Hamas parliamentarian, also made this point in a subsequent interview with Haaretz (June 8): Hamas, he said, has no problem with the document's demand for a Palestinian state in "all the territories occupied in 1967," but does not accept its "recognition of international decisions that indirectly mean recognition of Israel."

In other words, Hamas does not see the call for a Palestinian state as implicitly recognizing Israel; it if did, it would object to this article, too. Rather, it views such a state as compatible with its goal of Israel's destruction.

BUT THE document also offers additional proof of its nonrecognition of Israel's right to exist: its insistence on a "right of return" for all Palestinian refugees and their descendants, which is a euphemism for eliminating Israel demographically. The 4.3 million refugees and descendents (according to UN figures), combined with Israel's 1.4 million Arab citizens, could democratically vote the Jewish state (5.3 million Jews) out of existence.

Natsche and Sa'adi, incidentally, have since withdrawn their support of document entirely. However, according to Natsche, this was due not to its content, but to Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas's "abuse" of the document for political gain.

Media outlets have also lauded the document on another score: an alleged Hamas concession on terrorism. Granted, far from renouncing terror, it explicitly urges continued attacks on Israelis in the territories. Nevertheless, say media pundits, confining attacks to the territories, while eschewing them inside Israel, would constitute progress.

However, the document does nothing of the sort: It says merely that "resistance" will "focus" on the territories. In other words, the territories will be the main, but not exclusive, venue for attacks. And this is how Fatah and Hamas both understand it - as proven by the fact that Fatah, according to Haaretz's veteran Arab affairs correspondent, Danny Rubinstein, unsuccessfully urged Hamas to indeed limit attacks solely to the territories by adding the word "solely."

BUT THE document does not merely preserve the terrorist status quo: For the first time, it enshrines terror as official PA policy. Hitherto, while Hamas and Fatah both practiced terror, Fatah at least paid lip service to the need to end it. The document, however, calls for "establishing a unified resistance force, called the Palestinian Resistance Front, which will lead the uprising against the occupation, and also unifying and coordinating resistance operations and creating a unified political authority for the Front."

Since "resistance" is the Palestinian euphemism for terror attacks, this means that terror, rather than being the work of "opposition groups" (as the PA used to claim), would become official policy.

Indeed, the only mystery about this clause is how Abbas, who publicly adopted the document "as is," can still be lauded by the world - including Israel's government - as having "repudiated terror."

Finally, the document has been praised for accepting international agreements, thereby also allegedly implicitly recognizing Israel. Yet as Natsche and Sa'adi explained in their clarification, "the document's reference to recognizing just international resolutions does not mean recognizing all resolutions, but only those that do not harm the Palestinian people."

And, to remove all doubts, Fatah and Hamas agreed in negotiations last week to amend the text to explicitly recognize only resolutions "that serve the Palestinian people."

Hamas, however, does not believe that any existing Israeli-Palestinian agreements serve the Palestinian people; it denounced them all as betrayals, mainly because they recognize Israel. Thus these agreements are clearly not among those that the document recognizes, and this article cannot be read as implicitly recognizing Israel.

The international community set three conditions for relations with the Hamas government: recognizing Israel, renouncing terror and accepting previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements. The Prisoners' Letter, however, does none of the above: It does not recognize Israel, even implicitly; it does not recognize previous agreements; and far from renouncing terror, it enshrines it as official policy.

Despite this, the media have swallowed Abbas's propaganda wholesale and are touting the document as sufficient to satisfy international demands. One can only hope that world leaders will scrutinize it with greater care and honesty.