Why the Summit needs to produce more than a ceasefire

Update from AIJAC

Why the Summit needs to produce more than a ceasefire

June 3, 2003
Number 06/03 #01

With the Aqaba Summit due to start tomorrow night, here are three pieces with deal with criteria for success.

Firstly, Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer points out that Palestinian plans to get terrorist group like Hamas to agree to a temporary ceasefire, but to do nothing about their organisations (except maybe make them part of the security forces) is a blatant violation of the Roadmap. Krauthammer says Bush should not allow this to standif he wants genuine progress to peace HERE.

Meanwhile, Shoshanah Haberman of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy supports Krauthammer's point, by going over the history of ceasefires Hamas has agreed to, but then used to prepare for the next round of violence. To read her discussion of ten such cases, CLICK HERE. Another excellent general comment on the need for changed Palestinian behaviour comes from Ha'aretz columnist Yoel Marcus, representing Israel's sensible left.

Finally, former Middle East mediator Dennis Ross offer Bush some good general advice for the Summit in the Wall Street Journal. To share his accumulated wisdom from more than ten years of efforts, CLICK HERE.

Readers may also be interested in:

An excellent analysis of Israeli and Palestinian negotiating positions by Barry Rubin.
A very clever analysis of America hatred by Thomas Friedman.
More reports on Anti-American and antisemitic venom coming from Saudi Mosques.

No Phony 'Cease-Fires' With Terrorism

By Charles Krauthammer
Washington Post, Friday, May 30, 2003

On May 23, just a week ago, the official newspaper of the supposedly reformed Palestinian Authority carried a front-page picture of the latest suicide bomber dressed in suicide-bomber regalia. It then referred to the place where she did her murdering as "occupied Afula." The town of Afula is in Israel's Galilee. It is not occupied. It is not in the West Bank or Gaza. It is within Israel. If Afula is occupied, then Tel Aviv is occupied, Haifa is occupied and Israel's very existence is a crime.

This bit of incitement and delegitimization was, to my knowledge, reported in not a single American newspaper. It is simply too routine. It is the everyday stuff of Palestinian newspapers and television, schoolbooks and sermons. Appearing, however, after the Palestinians had presumably adopted new leadership committed to (1) ending terrorism and (2) accepting Israel, this outrage caught the eye of Robert Satloff of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Satloff brought it to American attention noting that "it is difficult to imagine a more chilling message to Israelis who doubt Palestinian commitment to a two-state solution."

President Bush, engaging his personal prestige in the Arab-Israeli peace process, is headed to Middle East summits in Egypt and Jordan. He is in danger, however, of heading straight back to Oslo, that eight-year exercise in delusion and self-deception that led to the bloodiest fighting between Israelis and Palestinians in 50 years. Dennis Ross, chief U.S. negotiator through the Oslo process, has admitted that one of the great failings of Oslo was the willful refusal of both Americans and Israelis hungry for peace to confront Palestinian violations of the agreements, most notably the incitement to kill Jews and the constant propaganda delegitimizing Israel's right to exist.

There was some hope for change when Mahmoud Abbas became Palestinian prime minister and spoke of ending the violence and accepting Israel. But as of now, Abbas has done nothing. And just this week Yasser Arafat demonstrated who is the real boss of the Palestinians when he deliberately forced a postponement of a summit meeting between Abbas and Ariel Sharon. Until Abbas is in control, the president's visit will constitute a reward for nothing more than cosmetic reform.

The only logic of Bush's visit is that perhaps a photo op with the president of the United States will elevate Abbas and give him the authority to do what he has to do. But the premise of the president's Middle East policy, announced last year on June 24, was that the United States would help the Palestinians achieve statehood in response to real Palestinian reform, not just words.

Moreover, the "road map" for peace, which the Palestinians say they have accepted, explicitly demands of the Palestinian leadership "sustained, targeted, and effective operations aimed at confronting all those engaged in terror and dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and infrastructure."

Abbas is talking very differently. His objective, he says, is to persuade the suicide bombing specialists -- Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades -- to accept a temporary cease-fire. This would be a disaster for any prospect of peace. It means that the terrorists who have been hunted down by Israel ever since it finally decided to strike back after last year's Passover massacre would receive immediate sanctuary: time to rebuild, regroup, rearm and prepare for the next, more deadly orgy of violence.

If what Abbas means by peace is that the terrorists just lay low for a while, then it is not a peace of the brave but a peace of the knave. If that is what President Bush accepts as "peace," he not only will have betrayed Israel, he will have doomed American policy, because he will have ratified a prescription for continued and much more bloody violence.

The requirements of a successful summit are clear. Abbas has to take real steps to curb terror. Let him begin in just one city. Israel will withdraw, but only if Abbas asserts authority and actually goes after the terrorists in that town. No revolving-door arrests. No temporary cease-fire. Nothing less than "sustained . . . operations aimed at . . . dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and infrastructure."

And Abbas has to do something even simpler. Stop official Palestinian media from extolling suicide bombers. Stop official Palestinian media from referring to Israel as occupied territory. Talk about peace -- in Arabic, not just in English -- the way Anwar Sadat did 25 years ago. Israel reciprocated then; it will reciprocate now. Without such elemental steps by Abbas, however, no peace is possible -- and the new Bush peace initiative will amount to nothing more than Oslo redux.

BETWEEN HUDNA AND CRACKDOWN: ASSESSING THE RECORD OF HAMAS CEASEFIRES

By Shoshanah Haberman

PEACEWATCH #424
June 2, 2003
THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE'S SPECIAL REPORTS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI
PEACE PROCESS

In recent days, both Palestinian Authority (PA) chairman Yasser Arafat and prime minister Mahmoud Abbas have said they expect an agreement on a Hamas ceasefire (or hudna) to be announced soon. According to Abbas, Hamas -- in Arabic, "the Islamic Resistance Movement" -- "will commit to halting terrorism, both within the green line and in the territories." As longtime Palestinian minister Saeb Erekat explained, Abbas needs a ceasefire agreement to jumpstart negotiations for Palestinian statehood. Abbas, said Erekat, "will insist on this declaration [of a ceasefire] because that's the key . . . for him to go out and tell the Palestinians, 'Look, we've got the Israeli government to recognize the Palestinian state, [so] we need two years in a peaceful, meaningful peace process.'"

So far, no Hamas leaders have contradicted Abbas, though they have added conditions to any ceasefire, such as an Israeli agreement to end targeted killings and free prisoners. Even Hamas spiritual leader Shaykh Ahmad Yassin did not reject the idea of a hudna, though he cautioned that Hamas would never voluntarily give up its weapons. Indeed, if the past is any indication, a ceasefire agreement is likely; such ceasefires have been regular occurrences in PA-Hamas relations.

Ceasefire Redux

In all, ten ceasefires have been declared or offered by Hamas since 1993. In some cases, they followed periods of PA-Hamas confrontation; at other times, they came on the heels of intense pressure placed on the PA after particularly egregious acts of terrorism committed by Hamas or other groups. It is important to note that all ceasefire offers have been presented at a time when Hamas needed a moment to step back and regroup after an organizationally exhausting confrontation with a more powerful foe (either Israel or the PA).

* In October 1994, after the murder of kidnapped Israel Defense Forces soldier Nachshon Wachsman, Hamas offered Israel a ceasefire, occasioned by the first PA effort to clamp down on Hamas military activity and reach its own ceasefire accord with the group. That accord broke down three weeks later, with bloody fighting between Hamas and the PA that eventually spilled over into renewed attacks on Israelis.

* Animosity between Hamas and the PA continued into 1995. Israelis were targets as well, as the breakdown of the previous ceasefire led to a two-month period that left over fifty dead from terrorist attacks. Yassin declared "merciless war" against Arafat and stated that peace with Israel would be "a crime against Islam." In February, Israel began its own crackdown on Hamas. Within days, Hamas offered Israel a tenyear truce conditioned on Israel's withdrawal from Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem. Despite this offer, Hamas members wounded five and killed two in an attack on Jewish settlers two weeks later.

* Meetings in Cairo in December 1995 saw the first formal attempts at PA-Hamas reconciliation. After a pugnacious start, Hamas made an aboutface and announced its intention to halt attacks against Israel. According to Hamas spokesman Mahmoud al-Zahhar, the move was intended to give the PA "time to see how far it can get" in negotiations with Israel. Soon thereafter, Hamas also agreed to run in Palestinian elections.

* The December 1995 ceasefire -- if it indeed existed -- ended with the January 1996 killing of Yahya "the Engineer" Ayyash, which was the ostensible trigger for a string of suicide bombings in February and March that left fifty dead and more than two hundred injured. Following these attacks, Arafat, under intense Israeli pressure, arrested hundreds of Hamas militants. Hamas offered a new ceasefire proposal on March 1 calling for the release of prisoners in Israeli jails. Days later, a Hamas suicide bomber killed nineteen on a Jerusalem bus.

* On June 20, a Hamas leaflet offered Israel another ceasefire, on condition that Israel end "Zionist terrorism against Hamas and the Qassam brigades." The truce, according to the leaflet, was designed to unite the Palestinian people and promote PA-Hamas reconciliation. Again, Hamas promised swift and violent reaction if spurned by Israel. Israel rejected the offer; soon thereafter, Palestinian gunmen killed three Israeli soldiers.

* In October 1997, Israel's release of Yassin from prison (following the Khaled Mishal affair) occasioned the next Hamas ceasefire offer. On October 7, Yassin renewed the call for a ceasefire conditioned on Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and West Bank as well as the evacuation of all Jewish settlements. Despite this announcement, Hamas officials vowed to continue their fight against Israel, and terrorism continued unabated.

* In November 1997, Hamas again issued its truce offer. A public statement by Hamas's military wing noted that attacks against Israeli civilians would end if Israel ended attacks on Palestinian civilians. Israeli arrests of militants suspected of perpetrating suicide bombings and other attacks continued throughout the month, and by month's end Yassin declared that "the killing will go on."

* Eighteen months later, in May 1999, Yassin reissued his ceasefire offer, conditioned on Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders. This call was timed to coincide with the election of Ehud Barak as Israeli prime minister; the offer was rejected.

* In June 2001, nine months into the Palestinian uprising, a suicide attack at the Dolphinarium disco in Tel Aviv brought intense international pressure on Palestinians to halt terrorism and violence. Although Yassin initially stated that Hamas would not honor Arafat's call for hudna, the organization was soon brought into line, with other Hamas officials agreeing to a temporary ceasefire. Yet, the agreement broke down days later when Hamas claimed responsibility for killing an Israeli soldier and mortars were fired on Israeli settlements. Terrorism continued throughout the summer, punctuated by a Hamas attack in August on a Jerusalem pizzeria that left fifteen dead and over ninety wounded.

* On December 16, 2001, Hamas agreed to suspend its campaign of suicide bombings and mortar attacks against Israelis in the Gaza Strip and Israel proper but reserved the right to "resist occupation" in the West Bank. This ceasefire occurred amid fierce skirmishes stemming from PA attempts to arrest Hamas activists; hudna was agreed upon "for the sake of Palestinian unity." On January 4, 2002, Israel seized the Karine-A weapons smuggling ship destined for Gaza; five days later, Hamas ended the truce by ambushing and killing four Israeli soldiers.

Throughout each of these ceasefire episodes, Hamas leaders continued to support the goals of the original Hamas charter, that is, the creation, through religiously sanctioned violence, of an Islamic state in all of Palestine. Again, this suggests that Hamas ceasefires have served as "breathers," allowing the organization to consolidate its "gains" -- be they against the PA or Israel -- before undertaking another set of attacks.

Prime Minister Abbas has stated that a temporary ceasefire would be unacceptable and that he would insist on "absolute calm." Yet, this falls short of the Roadmap's call for "dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and infrastructure." Indeed, without PA efforts to dismantle the considerable military infrastructure built by Hamas, to deprive its leaders of broadcast and print media outlets, to shut down training and operational facilities, and to collect weapons, there is nothing to prevent any new ceasefire from going the way of previous ones. Moreover, similar efforts would need to be taken against other terrorist groups, whether Islamist (like Palestinian Islamic Jihad) or nationalist (like Fatah's al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades). When asked recently about the possibility of using force against Hamas or any other militant faction in order to ensure disarmament, Abbas stated, "We will never give civil war a chance, even if the agreement is breached."

This PeaceWatch was prepared by Washington Institute research assistant Shoshanah Haberman, drawing on a past article by Seth Wikas (PeaceWatch no. 357, January 3, 2002).

Directions at the Crossroads

By DENNIS ROSS

Wall Street Journal, June 3, 2003

If there was ever a moment to end the ongoing war between Israelis and Palestinians and return to the path of peace making, this is it. In Israel, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has established a new baseline for the Likud Party, speaking of the need to end the occupation of 3.5 million Palestinians and to divide the land with them. Mahmoud Abbas, the first ever Palestinian prime minister, speaks of the folly of the Intifada and his determination to see Palestinians fulfill their responsibilities. And President Bush is signaling with his own foray into Middle East summitry that his administration will do its part to help the parties transform the current reality.

There should be no illusions: Peace is not about to break out. The fundamental divide on Jerusalem, borders and refugees is not about to be bridged between the two parties. But even if a resolution of the core issues is not in the offing, there is an opportunity to bring the day to day struggle that has imposed such high costs on both Palestinians and Israelis to an end.

It won't happen by itself. It won't come from exhortations or slogans. And it almost certainly won't be achieved overnight. Instead, it will result from very practical understandings between Israelis and Palestinians that change the realities on the ground and restore the basic bargain of peace making: Israelis get security, Palestinians get a genuine pathway to independence.

The value of the roadmap is that it provides a point of departure and a general direction for the restoration of that bargain. It was never designed to be a blueprint nor could it be: A blueprint must be agreed on by the parties. The map thus far was negotiated by the U.S., the Russians, the European Union, and the U.N. none of whom are responsible for carrying out a single Palestinian or Israeli obligation.

Inevitably, both Israelis and Palestinians will seek to refine what the roadmap calls for, particularly given their differing interpretations of its every provision. In the tedious and difficult diplomacy that will be required to sustain a renewed peace process, the U.S. will have to play a leading role.

I say this not simply because the Israeli and Palestinian expectations are so different about what the other will need to do to comply with the roadmap, but also because of the obstacles that will continue to make any peace process difficult. Hamas and Islamic Jihad will not meekly acquiesce in their disarmament. To make matters worse, Yasir Arafat will see Prime Minister Abbas's success as his failure. He will seek to block Mr. Abbas's ability to deliver on the Palestinian responsibilities on security just as he will seek to preserve at least the image that nothing can be done without him. And for good measure, Israel will understandably find it difficult to relax controls on Palestinian life which is what Mr. Abbas needs to build his authority if terror attacks against Israelis continue.

So the obstacles are real. But so is the desire on both sides to restore a more normal life. Our involvement with both sides now as they work out practical arrangements on the ground can help them reach necessary understandings and foster the accountability that will be essential to sustaining and building on those understandings.

Having made this potential process a possibility, what must President Bush do in the coming week to launch it effectively? First, his representatives must work closely with Prime Ministers Sharon and Abbas to make sure there are agreements on the initial steps each will take Palestinians on incitement and on security in Gaza and parts of the West Bank and Israelis on lifting checkpoints in Gaza and dismantling unauthorized settler outposts in the West Bank that can be blessed by the president at the summit in Aqaba.

Second, Mr. Bush can, with the G 8 partners, gain support for a rapid infusion of assistance into the Palestinian areas so the new Palestinian government will be able to show its constituents how life will get better. Mr. Bush can also make clear that we will not work with those who continue to have high level meetings with Arafat particularly because he uses those meetings to demonstrate his continuing international weight and to remind those who must carry out the will of the new Palestinian government of the folly of implementing that which he opposes.

Third, the president needs the Egyptian, Jordanian, and Saudi leaders in Sharm al Sheikh to provide an umbrella of legitimacy for a Palestinian crackdown on those who use terror to subvert the possibilities of peaceful coexistence with Israel. Given the terror attacks in Saudi Arabia and Morocco, and their desire for us to play a more active role in the peace process, there may never be a better moment for these leaders to issue a broad declaration that makes clear that no cause can be served by terror, and that those who use terror now are enemies of the Palestinian cause. As Mahmoud Abbas said, terror takes a just cause the Palestinian cause and "destroys it." A public embrace by Arab leaders can show that he has Arab support for what he must do with those who are not willing to forsake violence and terror.

Finally, with the Israeli and Palestinian prime ministers, the president will want to be able to announce agreement on some initial steps to be taken by both sides. But he should also use the summit as a public platform to have each side address the fears and doubts of the other, while committing themselves to his vision of two states and the goals of the roadmap. Prime Minister Abbas can say that terror is wrong and will not be tolerated and that he recognizes that there must be coexistence with the Jewish state of Israel. Prime Minister Sharon can say that he recognizes there is only a political solution to this conflict and that an independent Palestinian state is a necessary part of that solution. And President Bush can say that he won't rest until his vision of two states is achieved, but that there will be no Palestinian state born of violence only negotiations can lead to a solution that fulfills the needs and aspirations of Palestinians and Israelis alike.

All this may be a tall order, but President Bush, having proven himself in warfare, appears to recognize that the current moment won't last. Now is the time to work to restore hope between Israelis and Palestinians.

Mr. Ross, director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, was special Middle East coordinator in the Clinton administration and director of the Policy Planning staff during the first Bush administration.