Update from AIJAC

The Current Status of Iran's Nuclear Program

Today's Update tackles the issues relating to the ongoing efforts to stop Iran's nuclear weapons program, with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) now taking a tougher line than it has in recent years.

First, we include a good briefing on the moves by the IAEA, the evidence for Iranian deception and its responses to IAEA pressure from BICOM. For anyone who has not been following this issue closely, this briefing will get you fully up to date fast. To read it, CLICK HERE

Next, there is a longer discussion of policy options for pulling Iran into line by Ilan Berman, writing in the Middle East Quarterly. The piece is not short, but if you have time, it is well worth the effort. To read it, CLICK HERE.

Finally, two Iranian exile leaders discuss the other major problem of Iranian international behaviour, which is the use of government sponsored NGO's to promote mega-terrorism and suicide bombings. The evidence they provide is frightening, and the plans seem directed at the US and the West as much as at Israel. To read this important piece, CLICK HERE.

Iran's nuclear capabilities

• The 35-member Board of Governors of the IAEA unanimously adopted a resolution on 18 June 2004 condemning Iran's behaviour toward nuclear inspections. The resolution "deplores∑the fact that, overall∑Iran's cooperation has not been as full, timely and proactive as it should have been." [3]
• In particular, the IAEA criticised the delay of permission to investigate several locations in Iran where the P-2 centrifuge enrichment programme has appeared to be underway. With the P-2's superior ability to produce sizeable quantities of bomb-grade uranium [4], the IAEA noted "with serious concern" Iran's lack of cooperation in providing information about its P-2 centrifuge activities. [5] In February 2004, the spokesperson for the Iranian Foreign Ministry had denied that Iran possessed these centrifuges. [6]
• The resolution further noted that the IAEA could not verify that Iran's voluntary suspension of uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities had actually occurred, particularly as the IAEA subsequently discovered that Iran had continued its production of centrifuge equipment. The IAEA also found that Iran had advanced its production of UF-6 (uranium hexafluoride) [7], which is the raw material used in the enrichment process. [8]
• The IAEA resolution called on Iran to speedily resolve the remaining issues on the country's nuclear programme, "including by providing full documentation and explanations at the request of the agency". [9]
• Upon hearing of the resolution's adoption, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw remarked that "We fully support the IAEA in this process, and are convinced that this is the right way to engage Iran∑We continue to raise issues of concern with the Iranians as part of our normal relationship." [10]
• The IAEA's Director-General, Dr Mohamed ElBaradei, stated that while Iran has disclosed some features of the country's nuclear programme, "at the same time, as I have indicated and the Board confirms∑we still have an important, central question, and this is has Iran declared fully to us its enrichment program? That is really the issue which is still before us." [11]
   

Evidence of Iran's interest in developing a nuclear weapon

• In 1991, Iran purchased 1.8 tonnes of uranium from China, which it failed to declare to the IAEA. This was in breach of Iran's Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which required Iran to report the importation of such material to the IAEA. [12] Some of the uranium from this import was UF-6, which can be used as the basic material for uranium enrichment. Another form of uranium in the shipment was subsequently converted to uranium metal, one of the main functions of which is for use in the development of nuclear weapons. [13]
• Former US President Bill Clinton imposed oil and trade sanctions against Iran in 1995 for its quest to obtain nuclear arms and the likelihood that it was backing terrorism. [14] In August 2001, President George Bush extended the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) for another five years. [15]
• A CIA report published in 2001 described Iran as having undertaken one of the most complex efforts to obtain nuclear weapons anywhere in the world. The report specifically spoke of Iran's efforts to obtain nuclear and missile technology from countries such as North Korea, China, and Russia. [16]
• In September 2002, Russian specialists began building a nuclear reactor in the Iranian town of Bushehr, located on the Persian Gulf coast. In December 2002, satellite images of nuclear reactors under construction in Natanz and Arak were released. [17]
• The enrichment plant at Natanz and the heavy-water production plant in Arak were built in secret, and were discovered by the IAEA by chance. [18] When Dr ElBaradei visited Natanz in February 2003, he found that Natanz was already a fully-operational uranium enrichment plant which boasted 160 centrifuge machines and extra parts for another 1000 centrifuges. [19] Heavy water reactors, such as the one in Arak, can produce large quantities of plutonium. The highly-enriched uranium which results from processes that can be conducted at these plants is the type that can be used for nuclear weapons.
• IAEA inspectors have found particles of weapons-grade enriched uranium at Natanz. Whilst Iran claimed that this must have resulted from contamination from components purchased on the black market in the 1980's, diplomats concluded that Iran had conducted tests with uranium, and had failed to notify the UN. This was in breach of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [20], which Iran ratified in 1970. [21]
• In June 2003, Iran refused to permit the IAEA to investigate the Kalaye power plant located in west Teheran. It was thought that Iran was testing uranium enrichment equipment at the site˜again, a breach of treaty agreements˜but inspectors were only allowed to the site in August, when major adjustments prevented the IAEA from taking suitable samples for testing. [22]
• Specimens of uranium enriched to 36 percent were found in the Kalaye workshop in August 2003, even though Iran has officially declared that it has not enriched uranium to more than 1.2 percent. Nuclear expert David Albright notes that efforts to enrich uranium to 36 percent, and enrich it further, would only be taken as part of a nuclear weapon's development programme. [23]
• Iran acknowledged in October 2003 that it had manufactured plutonium but claimed that this was not in conjunction with a nuclear weapons development programme. While the IAEA decided not to impose sanctions on Iran, it moved to censure the country. [24]
• In September and November of 2003, the IAEA Board demanded that Iran cease all activities related to enrichment and reprocessing, and the November report "strongly deplored Iran's past failures and breaches of its obligation to comply with the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement". [25] Whilst Iran signed an Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA on 18 December 2003 [26], the IAEA has remained unsatisfied with Iran's progress in fulfilling IAEA demands. The Director General's report of 1 June 2004 revealed that in March 2004, the IAEA Board was still highly concerned by various omissions of information from Iran regarding its nuclear activities, but decided to postpone a decision on the matter until the Board's June meeting. [27] The Board's unanimously-approved resolution was accepted on 18 June.

• Iran responded aggressively to the imminence of the IAEA resolution. Days prior to the official announcement of its passage, Iran declared that it would resume its uranium enrichment programme again if the IAEA approved the draft resolution, which was co-sponsored by Britain, France, and Germany. [28] Iran's president, Mohamed Khatami, announced that "we had, we have, and we will have a nuclear programme to enrich uranium to produce fuel∑we have no moral commitment any more to suspend uranium enrichment." [29]
• Following the approval of the IAEA resolution, the Iranian National Security Council secretary declared that Iran's suspension of enrichment in October 2003 was a temporary measure, and that "we may not want to inject gas into the centrifuges tomorrow but may decide to resume assembling or making parts." [30]
• Mohammad Kiarashi, Iran's former envoy to the IAEA, has said that "Iran should withdraw from the NPT altogether and stop cooperating with the IAEA because the ultimate result of continuing cooperation is revealing all our peaceful national secrets without getting anything." [31]

• An Iran equipped with missile and nuclear technology would pose a great danger to Israel, as well as to the entire region. If Iran were to construct a nuclear weapon, it could conceivably be fastened to a missile which could easily reach Israeli territory. Iran has already developed long-range missiles, including the Shihab-3 intermediate range ballistic missile, whose 1,300 kilometre range makes Israel a feasible target (Israel is approximately 965 km west of Iran). [32] The Iranian Defence Ministry has also announced that it is in the process of developing a stealth missile, which could evade radar detection. [33] Iran's Defence Minister Ali Shamkhani warned in December 2003 that Iran would retaliate with missiles if attacked by Israel. [34]
• Iran's chief negotiator on nuclear affairs, Hasan Rowhani, threatened Israel in May 2004 with retaliation if Israel were to attack Iran's nuclear facilities. In an interview on Iranian state television, Mr Rowhani declared that "Israel knows our hands are well-equipped...If such an incident happens, it will meet a resolute response from our side." [35]
• In response to allegations that Iran may be at the point of a major advance in its nuclear ability, the former president of Iran, Hashemi Rafsanjani, told the official Islamic Republic News Agency in May 2004, "That we are on the verge of a nuclear breakthrough is true. But we are not seeking nuclear weapons." [36] However, Rafsanjani, who is still an influential figure in Iran and is one of its foremost clerics, called in December 2002 for Muslim states to use nuclear weapons against Israel. [37] In 2001, he declared that "in due time the Islamic world will have a military nuclear device, and then the strategy of the West would reach a dead end, since one bomb is enough to destroy all Israel." [38]
• Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom met with IAEA Director-General Dr ElBaradei in Vienna on 19 November 2003. In the meeting FM Shalom stressed the risks that Iran's nuclear activities pose to the international community and especially to Israel. At the time, Dr ElBaradei's most recent report had emphasised that Iran, for approximately twenty years, had continuously violated its commitments to the international community in relation to its programme to develop nuclear technology. FM Shalom argued that the UN Security Council should lead the effort to ensure that Iran's violations are stopped. He additionally stressed that the IAEA and the international community must ensure that Iran halts all of its pursuits to enrich uranium, and that inspections must be thorough and ongoing. [39]
• Iran is a chief sponsor of terrorism against Israel, particularly with its close ties to Hezbollah, which has continuously attacked Israel and its citizens since the early 1980's. In March 2003, an Israeli official commented that "Iran is a regime that denies Israel's right to exist in any borders and is a principal sponsor of Hezbollah. If that regime were able to achieve a nuclear potential it would be extremely dangerous." [40]
• In May 2004, Iran established a 'Committee for Tribute to the Martyrs of the Global Islamic Movement', which in connection with the Global Islamic Movement, has announced that it will undertake "martyrdom operations" to target, among others, "all the Zionists in Palestine". [41] Iranian officials have announced that up to 10,000 volunteers have signed up to be suicide-bombers in various places, including Israel. [42]

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How to Tame Tehran

by Ilan Berman

Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2004

Over the past year, Iran has become a major cause of concern in Washington. The Islamic Republic has been discovered to possess a robust nuclear program, of a scope well beyond previous estimates. It has also made substantial breakthroughs in its ballistic missile capabilities. Less noticed, but equally significant, has been Tehran's growing activism in the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus, and Iraq.

There is a vision and a method to Iran's policies. In the words of Mohsen Reza'i, secretary of Iran's Expediency Council, Iran believes it is destined to become the "center of international power politics" in the post-Saddam Hussein Middle East. [1] Iran's new, more confrontational strategic doctrine even has a name: "deterrent defense." According to foreign minister Kamal Kharrazi, this national security concept is designed to confront "a broad spectrum of threats to Iran's national security, among them foreign aggression, war, border incidents, espionage, sabotage, regional crises derived from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), state terrorism, and discrimination in manufacturing and storing WMD." [2]

Under the rubric of "deterrent defense," Iran is exploiting U.S. preoccupation with Iraq to build capabilities that will establish its hegemony in its immediate neighborhood and enhance its role across the Middle East. Iran's moves, if unchecked, will create a grave and growing challenge to U.S. aims in the region. At stake are nothing less than the geopolitical balance in the Middle East and the long-term achievement of U.S. goals, from stability in Iraq to regional peace.

How has Iran's policy changed? And what can the United States do to thwart Iran's new drive?

Strategic Ambitions

For years, policymakers in Washington had suspected Tehran's rulers of pursuing an offensive nuclear capability. They had viewed with alarm the growing strategic ties between Iran and Russia and had publicly expressed concerns that the centerpiece of that cooperation, the $800 million light-water reactor project at Bushehr, could lead to significant Iranian nuclear advances.

Then, in the summer of 2002, an Iranian opposition group disclosed the existence of an extensive uranium enrichment complex at Natanz in central Iran. This revelation and a series of subsequent discoveries by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)˜ranging from advanced clandestine nuclear development to the presence of trace weapons-grade uranium˜revealed the true extent of Iran's nuclear endeavor.

This effort turns out to have been far broader and more mature than originally believed. Iran is now thought to have some fourteen other facilities, including heavy- and light-water reactors in Isfahan and Arak, and suspect sites in Fasa, Karaj, and Nekka. Together, these constitute all the makings of an ambitious national effort to develop nuclear weapons. [3] Iranian officials, meanwhile, have hinted at the existence of still other, as yet undisclosed, facilities essential to the country's nuclear program. [4]

Iran appears to have agreed to suspend its uranium enrichment activities under an October 2003 deal with France, Germany, and Great Britain. Similarly, international pressure succeeded in prompting Iran to sign the Additional Protocol to the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), permitting snap inspections and invasive monitoring of segments of Iran's nuclear sector by the International Atomic Energy Agency. However, two of Iran's main atomic suppliers, Russia and China, wield veto power on the United Nations Security Council, making it improbable that Iranian nuclear violations would result in meaningful censure. And in fact, ongoing IAEA deliberations have so far failed to yield decisive international action, despite mounting evidence of Iran's atomic breaches.

There is also a lingering uncertainty over Tehran's nuclear timeline. While informed American observers contend that Iran is still some two years (and possibly longer) away from an offensive nuclear capability, [5] others believe that an Iranian bomb could materialize much sooner. In November 2003 testimony before the Israeli parliament's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Mossad chief Meir Dagan warned that Iran could reach a "point of no return" in its nuclear development by mid-2004, following which time an Iranian offensive capability would become a virtual certainty. [6] President Bush has himself warned that the United States "will not tolerate" a nuclear-armed Iran. [7] But if estimates are off, even by a few months, Iran could present the world with a nuclear fait accompli.

At the same time, major breakthroughs in Iran's strategic arsenal have made it an emerging missile power. In June 2003, the Islamic Republic conducted what it termed the final test of its 1,300-kilometer range Shahab-3 ballistic missile. The launch was a success, confirming Iran's ability to target U.S. allies Israel and Turkey, as well as U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf. Since then, with great fanfare, the Islamic Republic has inducted the advanced rocket into its Revolutionary Guards (the Pasdaran). [8]

This potential for proliferation is hardly the only worry. If recent signals are any indication, the Shahab-3 has already evolved well beyond its officially declared capabilities. In September 2003, at a military parade commemorating the anniversary of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, the Shahab-3 was officially described as possessing a range of 1,700 kilometers. [9] Additionally, opposition groups have charged that Tehran's overt missile development actually masks a much broader clandestine endeavor˜one that includes development of the 4,000-kilometer range Shahab-5 and even a follow-on Shahab-6 intercontinental ballistic missile. [10]

Such efforts have only been strengthened by Iranian perceptions of U.S. policy. The Bush administration's rapid dispatch of Saddam Hussein's regime, and its contrasting hesitancy in dealing with a newly nuclear North Korea, has had a profound impact on Iran's calculus. North Korea's nuclear maneuvers, and its ability to successfully stymie U.S. strategy, have led Iranian officials to express their admiration for Pyongyang's resistance to U.S. "pressure, hegemony and superiority." [11] There has indeed been some internal debate in Iran about the risks of stepping over the nuclear threshold. Yet even leading Iranian reformers appear to have gravitated to the notion that nuclear weapons are necessary to shift the regional "equilibrium." [12]

Charm Offensive

These strategic advances, however, are only part of the picture. In tandem with Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile breakthroughs, a significant transformation has also begun in Iranian foreign policy.

For Tehran, the overthrow of Hussein's regime has only fueled mounting fears of a dangerous strategic encirclement. The U.S. destruction of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan had already ensconced the pro-Western˜albeit fragile˜government of Hamid Karzai in Kabul. For Iran, the extremist Sunni Taliban posed an ideological threat, but a U.S. foothold on Iran's eastern border is regarded as even more threatening. Regime change in Baghdad, therefore, confronted officials in Tehran with the two-fold danger that Iran could be pinioned between two U.S. client-states, and that Iraq's fall might be a prelude to a similar U.S. drive to transform their country.

In response, Iran formulated its new strategic doctrine of "deterrent defense." In practice, this has entailed a major expansion of Iran's military capabilities. Heavy defense expenditures, and ongoing strategic partnerships with both Russia and China, have made possible a far-reaching national military rearmament. Defense acquisitions made over the past several years have steadily broadened Iran's strategic reach over vital Persian Gulf shipping lanes, to the point that Tehran now possesses the ability to virtually control oil supplies from the region. [13] Iran has also increased its diplomatic activism in the region, redoubling its long-running efforts to erect an independent security framework as a counterweight to the expanding U.S. military footprint. [14]

As part of this effort, in February 2004, Iran codified an unprecedented military and defense accord with Syria˜one formally enshrining an Iranian commitment to Syria's defense in the event of a U.S. or Israeli offensive. Iranian officials have subsequently made clear that these mutual defense guarantees also extend to Lebanon and to the Islamic Republic's most potent regional proxy: Hizbullah. [15]

Iran has also raised its military and diplomatic profile in the Caucasus. In April 2003, foreign minister Kharrazi embarked on a diplomatic tour of the region intended to marshal support for a common regional security framework for Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Iran, and Turkey as an alternative to cooperation with "external forces." [16] But lukewarm regional responses have prompted the Islamic Republic to nudge these countries into alignment through less subtle means. In mid-October 2003, Iran commenced large-scale military maneuvers in its northwest region, near Azerbaijan. The exercises, reportedly the largest conducted by Iran in recent memory, massed troops on the Iranian-Azeri border in a clear show of force aimed at dissuading the former Soviet republic from expanding cooperation with the United States. [17] A corresponding Iranian naval build-up is now visible in the Caspian Sea in response to Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan's growing military relationships with Washington.

U.S. advances in the region are regarded by Iran as potential threats, but paradoxically they have also presented Iran with opportunities that it has been quick to exploit.

The coalition campaign against Saddam Hussein's regime succeeded in eliminating the threat posed by Tehran's most immediate adversary, thereby cementing Iran's dominant regional standing. Iran has exploited the post-war political vacuum in Iraq to foment instability through a variety of measures, ranging from political support of radical ShiŒite elements to an increase in drug trafficking. [18] This broad offensive has reportedly included the infiltration of hundreds of Pasdaran operatives into Iraq where they have engaged in active recruitment, influence operations, and assassinations˜at a cost to Iran of some $70 million per month. [19]

Hussein's overthrow has also effectively defanged a lingering threat to Tehran: the Mujahideen-e Khalq Organization (MKO), a wing of the National Council of Resistance of Iran. Since the spring of 2003, coalition forces under a U.S.-imposed ceasefire have curtailed the anti-regime group's operations in Iraq. And a subsequent December decision by Iraq's new governing council has labeled the MKO˜previously tolerated and even supported by the Baathists˜as a terrorist organization. [20]

To Iran's east, meanwhile, the fall of the Taliban has removed an ideological competitor for Muslim hearts and minds while lingering factionalism and tribal rivalries have allowed Iran to perpetuate Afghanistan's instability.

Iran is clearly determined to remake its strategic environment in its favor. Iran has mobilized its technological resources to give it greater reach and has used political, economic, and military clout to encourage a tilt in its direction in its immediate neighborhood. Paradoxically, the United States, by breaking up the old order in states neighboring Iran, has given Tehran hitherto unimagined opportunities to influence the region.

False Starts

Can international diplomacy deflect Iran's newest drive for regional hegemony? It hardly seems likely. From 1991 to 1997, the European Union (EU) engaged in a "critical dialogue" with the Islamic Republic, attempting to moderate Iran's radical policies through trade. But by 1997, critical dialogue had actually achieved exactly the opposite result, infusing Iran with much needed currency while failing to alter Tehran's support for terrorism, its pursuit of WMD, and its violations of human rights. Diplomacy has had a limited effect because the EU countries have allowed their economic interests to undercut their diplomatic efforts. For example, in late 2002, in the midst of revelations regarding Iran's advanced nuclear development, the EU signaled its intention to commence new negotiations with the Islamic Republic on a sweeping trade and cooperation pact. [21]

The United States has also wavered in its application of diplomatic pressure. The May 1997 election of soft-line cleric Mohammed Khatami to the Iranian presidency˜and his subsequent, much-publicized "dialogue of civilizations" interview on CNN˜convinced many in Washington that Iran was moving toward pragmatic accommodation. Since then, U.S. policymakers, despite reiterating their continued commitment to containment of Iran, have time and again qualified Iran's membership in the "axis of evil." Most notably, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, in a February 2003 interview with the Los Angeles Times, distinguished between Iran on the one hand and North Korea and Iraq on the other˜on account of Iran's "democracy." [22]

This, too, is an illusion. The Islamic Republic in recent years has engaged in a widening governmental campaign of domestic repression˜one that includes stepped-up crackdowns on the press and the brutal persecution of regime opponents. The repression reflects a governmental effort to grapple with the groundswell of political opposition that has emerged among Iran's disaffected young population in response to the country's rising unemployment and economic stagnation.

At the same time, Iran's theocrats remain deeply antagonistic to all U.S. overtures. This was demonstrated most recently by the quiet contacts between Washington and Tehran in the aftermath of the devastating December 2003 earthquake in Bam, Iran. Despite deep support for dialogue among reformist parliamentarians, clerical hard-liners opposed to such a rapprochement ultimately cut short the contacts. [23]

If the United States wants to alter Iran's behavior, it cannot expect results from the tried-and-failed approaches of "critical dialogue," "dialogue of civilizations," and other false starts.

U.S. Options

Yet a policy that reassures allies, deters Iranian aggression, and curbs Iran's expansionism is more than feasible. It requires the United States to do four things: broaden containment to include counter-proliferation; revive Gulf defense alliances; mobilize Turkey; and woo the Iranian people.

Expanded containment. Far and away the most urgent task now facing Washington is arresting Iran's nuclear progress. Over the past year, U.S. policymakers have expressed increasingly vocal concerns over the corrosive global potential of an Iranian nuclear breakout, ranging from a nuclear arms race in the Middle East to Tehran's growing capacity for nuclear blackmail. Yet the United States could assume a more proactive role in preventing the transfer of nuclear technology transfers to Iran.

This is the concept behind the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the counter-proliferation partnership launched by President Bush in May 2003. [24] Since its inception, the PSI˜designed to prevent the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by rogue nations through more aggressive intelligence-sharing and interdiction efforts˜has already charted some notable successes vis-à-vis North Korea, including a clampdown on illicit North Korean smuggling operations by both Australia and Japan. And recent maneuvers by PSI-member nations in the Coral Sea and the Mediterranean suggest a growing role for the alliance in the Middle East, both as a mechanism to intercept illicit WMD trafficking in the Persian Gulf and as a means to target proliferation networks (such as the recently unearthed nuclear ring led by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan) now active in the region.

But the PSI is not the only tool in Washington's arsenal. In the Caucasus and Central Asia, the United States is quietly moving ahead with Caspian Guard, an initiative designed to bolster regional security through expanded maritime patrols, aerial and naval surveillance, and border protections. As part of this effort, the United States has stepped up military exercises with Azerbaijan and has committed some $10 million to strengthening the former Soviet republic's naval capability and border security. This includes beefing up Azerbaijan's communications infrastructure and helping to carry out counter-proliferation operations. [25]

Similarly, under a five-year defense accord signed with Kazakhstan in 2003, Washington has bankrolled the construction of a Kazakh military base in the Caspian coast city of Atyrau and has allocated millions to equipment and training for the Kazakh army, maritime and border-patrol forces. [26] Central to this effort is the prevention of WMD proliferation through the region, not least the transfer of technology from Russia to Iran.

The early successes of the PSI and Caspian Guard suggest that both initiatives can and should be expanded to address more comprehensively the threat from the Islamic Republic.

Reviving Gulf defense. Over the past several years, fears of a rising Tehran have begun to drive many Arab Gulf countries toward accommodation with Iran. For example, such concerns led Oman to establish a modus vivendi with the Islamic Republic through the codification of a sweeping agreement on military cooperation in 2000 (albeit one that has since been denied by Oman). [27] Kuwait subsequently followed suit, striking a similar bargain in October 2002. [28] Even Saudi Arabia, previously a strategic competitor of Iran, capitulated on a long-discussed framework accord with Tehran in late 2001, in the wake of two multi-billion-dollar Russo-Iranian defense accords. [29]

But for many of these countries, such bilateral partnerships are a product of necessity˜a function of the inadequacy of national defenses and regional alliances in addressing Iran's rising expansionism. The distrust of Iran still runs very deep. As a recent editorial in London's influential Arab-language Ash-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper emphasized, Iran now poses a threat to "Saudi Arabia, Oman, Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan, which share with Iran a land border of 5,400 kilometers and a sea border of 2,400 kilometers ∑ The Iranian nuclear danger threatens us, first and foremost, more than it threatens the Israelis and the Americans." [30]

Such worries have prompted the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), comprised of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates, to initiate a feasibility study for an alliance-wide anti-missile system. At the same time, individual countries in the Arab Gulf (most notably Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) have initiated efforts to upgrade their individual missile defense capabilities. [31] Recently uncovered nuclear contacts between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan suggest that at least one of Iran's neighbors has begun to actively contemplate the need for a strategic deterrent against the Islamic Republic. [32]

All this suggests that a U.S. strategic initiative toward the Arab Gulf may find ready customers. On the one hand, a deepening of Washington's bilateral military dialogue and defense contacts with individual Gulf nations might lessen regional dependence not only on Iran but on an increasingly volatile and unpredictable Saudi Arabia as well. [33] On the other hand, the creation of a formalized American security architecture over the region could reinvigorate Washington's regional partnerships while excluding and isolating Iran. [34] Common to all of these efforts is the need to provide Tehran's neighbors with the tools to counter its growing potential for nuclear and ballistic missile blackmail.

Talking Turkey. Ties between the United States and Turkey have been tepid since Ankara's unexpected refusal to grant basing rights to U.S. troops on the eve of the spring 2003 Iraq campaign˜a move that torpedoed U.S. plans for a northern front against Hussein's regime. Since then, however, policymakers in both countries have begun to mend fences. As part of that process, the United States should insist that Turkey do more to hedge Iranian ambitions in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Unfortunately, Turkey's historic role as a strategic competitor of Iran has been substantially eroded. Indeed, over the past two years, Ankara has steadily drifted toward a new relationship with Tehran. Much of this movement has been underpinned by energy. Turkey's growing dependence on Iran˜which could provide roughly 20 percent of total Turkish natural gas consumption by the end of the decade [35]˜has diminished Ankara's economic leverage vis-à-vis Tehran.

But politics play an important role as well. Since its assumption of power in November 2002, Turkey's Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) has gravitated toward closer ties with its Muslim neighbors under the guise of an "independent" foreign policy. Iran has been one of the chief beneficiaries of these overtures, and bilateral contacts and economic trade between Ankara and Tehran have ballooned over the past year. This political proximity has only been reinforced by common worries over Iraqi instability in the aftermath of Hussein's ouster.

Nevertheless, Ankara's deep ethnic and historical ties to the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia make it a natural counterweight to Iranian-sponsored religious radicalism in those regions. Given Turkey's deep interest in expanding trade and development in the Caspian, Turkey also remains suspicious of Iran's maneuvers there. Meanwhile, Tehran's ongoing sponsorship of terrorism, including the Kurdish variety, has put Iran and Turkey on very different sides of the war on terrorism.

These commonalities have led observers to suggest that Turkey's most constructive role might be as a force multiplier for U.S. interests in its "northern neighborhood." [36] In fact, Ankara and Tehran's divergent strategic priorities˜on everything from Central Asian Islam to Caspian energy to the future political composition of post-war Iraq˜suggest that Turkey and Iran could become competitors again. The United States should encourage such competition by creating incentives for Turkey to play its historic role.

Wooing the Iranians. One of the Bush administration's most enduring challenges in prosecuting the war on terrorism has been effectively communicating its goals and objectives to a skeptical Muslim world. Over the past two and a half years, that need has spawned an expanded public diplomacy effort. This has included media outreach on the part of top administration officials like National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.

Iran, however, has been included only belatedly in these plans. More than nine months after September 11, with U.S. officials saturating the airwaves of Arabic networks like Qatar's al-Jazeera, not one high-ranking U.S. official had granted an interview to a Persian-language television outlet. [37] (This is despite the existence of dissident channels, such as the Los Angeles-based National Iranian Television [NITV], capable of effectively carrying the U.S. message.) Even when the United States did finally overhaul its public diplomacy toward Iran with the launch of the Persian-language Radio Farda in December 2002, the station's entertainment-heavy format led critics to complain that the United States had diluted its democratic message. [38] Since then, broadcasting to Iran has continued to be funded at minimal levels, despite Congressional efforts to expand outreach. Such a lackluster effort reflects continuing confusion within the U.S. government about exactly whom to engage within Iran.

In fact, the success of public diplomacy hinges upon a clear American vision of Iran's desired direction and the sustained political will to assist Iran in reaching that goal. In that light, there should be only one answer to the question of whom to engage: the nascent democratic opposition. The United States should demonstrate its support for that opposition by expanding expatriate and government-sponsored broadcasting, using it to highlight and criticize Tehran's bankrupt clerical rule.

Regime Change

The United States has been guilty of sending mixed signals to Iran over the past few years. Most significantly, it has apologized for the Central Intelligence Agency's role in the coup of 1953˜an early case of regime change˜and it has declared its goal in Iran to be behavior modification rather than regime change. The mixing of signals simply reflects a confusion of policy˜a confusion that has become positively dangerous, both to U.S. interests and the security of Iran's neighbors.

In fact, the U.S. objective in Iran is closer to the regime change it imposed on Iraq than to the behavioral change it brought about in Libya. The Iranian regime is not one mercurial man, whose behavior can be reversed by determined action. Iran has a ruling elite with many members, a shared sense of history, and a consistency of purpose that has been tested in revolution and war. This regime will not change, which is why the ultimate objective of U.S. policy must be to change it. That should not be forgotten, even if regime change in Iran cannot be pursued by the military means used in Iraq.

Short of military intervention, the United States needs a comprehensive strategy to block Iran's nuclear progress, check Iran's adventurism in the Persian Gulf and the Caucasus, and give encouragement to the Islamic Republic's nascent domestic opposition. Through a strategy that bolsters Iran's vulnerable regional neighbors, rolls back its military advances, and assists internal political alternatives, Washington can blunt the threat now posed by Tehran˜and set the stage for the later pursuit of its ultimate objective.

Ilan Berman is vice president for policy at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, D.C., where he directs research and analysis on the Middle East and Central Asia.

[1] Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), Mar. 5, 2003.
[2] Iranian foreign minister Kamal Kharrazi, cited in Saisat-e Rouz, Feb. 18, 2003.
[3] Defense News, Jan. 12, 2004; Michael Rubin, "Iran's Burgeoning WMD Programs," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Mar.-Apr. 2002, at http://www.meib.org/articles/0203_irn1.htm.
[4] Ahmad Shirzad, Iranian member of parliament, Nov. 24, 2003, remarks before legislative session, RFE/RL (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty) Iran Report, Dec. 8, 2003.
[5] "Iran: Breaking out without Quite Breaking the Rules?" Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, May 13, 2003, at http://www.npec-web.org/pages/iranswu.htm.
[6] Ha'aretz (Tel Aviv), Nov. 18, 2003. Israeli officials have further threatened to take preemptive military action, if necessary, to prevent this from happening; Agence France-Presse, Dec. 21, 2003.
[7] The New York Times, June 18, 2003.
[8] Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 1, July 20, 2003.
[9] Agence France-Presse, Sept. 22, 2003.
[10] Middle East Newsline, Oct. 25, 2002.
[11] IRNA, Dec. 14, 2003.
[12] The Washington Post, Mar. 11, 2003.
[13] Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, Defense Intelligence Agency director, "Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States," statement for the record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Feb. 11, 2003, at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2003_hr/021103jacoby.html.
[14] M. Javad Zarif, Iran's ambassador to the United Nations, commentary in The New York Times, May 10, 2003.
[15] IRNA, Feb. 27 and Feb. 29, 2004; Ma'ariv (Tel Aviv), Feb. 29, 2004.
[16] Itar-TASS (Moscow), Apr. 29, 2003.
[17] Uch Nogta (Azerbaijan), Oct. 22, 2003.
[18] See, for example, Al-Hayat (London), Nov. 28, 2003, and Jan. 5, 2004.
[19] Ash-Sharq al-Awsat (London), Apr. 3, 2004.
[20] The New York Times, Dec. 19, 2003.
[21] Xinhua News Agency (Beijing), Dec. 12, 2002.
[22] Los Angeles Times, Feb. 16, 2003.
[23] Mohsen Armin, deputy chairman of the National Security and Foreign Relations Committee, Iranian Islamic Consultative Assembly (majles), Iranian Labour News Agency (ILNA), Jan. 4, 2004.
[24] Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Poland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States currently make up the core membership of the PSI, while over sixty other nations˜including Turkey˜have voiced their backing for the initiative.
[25] Associated Press, Jan. 3, 2004.
[26] Radio Free Europe, Oct. 8, 2003.
[27] Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 1, Apr. 10, 2000.
[28] Xinhua News Agency, Oct. 2, 2002; Reuters, Oct. 3, 2002.
[29] Middle East Newsline, Apr. 18, 2001.
[30] Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), Oct. 8, 2003.
[31] Defense News, May 23 and Dec. 1, 2003.
[32] The Washington Times, Oct. 22, 2003.
[33] For more on existing defense ties between the United States and the Gulf states, as well as the potential for their expansion, see Simon Henderson, The New Pillar: Conservative Arab Gulf States and U.S. Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2003).
[34] See, for example, Kenneth Pollack, "Securing the Gulf," Foreign Affairs, July-Aug. 2003, pp. 2-15.
[35] "Turkish Energy Policy," Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/an/policy.htm.
[36] Soner Cagaptay, "United States and Turkey in 2004: Time to Look North," Turkish Policy Quarterly, Winter 2004, at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/cagaptay/cagaptay020204.pdf.
[37] Interview with Iranian dissident, Washington, D.C., July 2002.
[38] See, for example, Jesse Helms, "What's ŒPop' in Persian?" The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 16, 2002; Jackson Diehl, "Casey Kasem or Freedom?" The Washington Post, Dec. 16, 2002.

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Iran's Terrorist 'NGO'

By NIR BOMS and REZA BULORCHI
Wall Street Journal, July 7, 2004

It's tempting to dismiss Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's latest threat that Iran will harm America "around the world" if it attacks its interests as empty bluster from Iran's mullahs. But there are signs that Iran is taking concrete steps to match its belligerent words with deeds.

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are usually associated with humanitarian relief and peaceful advocacy work. So it is not every day that an "NGO" is in charge of recruiting "suicide volunteers" to dispatch overseas to strike at "world arrogance."

Yet that reportedly was the case last month at a three-day conference sponsored by the Iranian government and its "Committee for Commemoration of Martyrs of the Global Islamic Movement," which the ruling mullahs, in a bit of transparent fakery, choose to bill as an "NGO."

According to the Tehran-based daily Sharq, the conference provided a forum for volunteers to register their names for suicide attacks. The BBC Monitoring service, quoting a number of Iranian sources, said the group's sponsors claim that over 10,000 candidates from around the world have signed up to die for the cause.

The calls to join the "Army of Martyrs" began at mosques across Iran following Friday prayers, after which registration forms were distributed by the tens of thousands at local Islamic universities to prospective male and female suicide attackers.

The London based Arabic daily al-Sharq al-Awsat reports that the "Army of Martyrs" is operated by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps [also known as the Pasdaran], and IRGC sub-agencies tasked with intelligence gathering and the planning of terrorist attacks.

At the conference, Brigadier General Sardar Salami, director of operations for the Revolutionary Guards, delivered a keynote speech titled "Suicide Operations: A Security and Military Strategy Perspective."

"As you see, the explosion of the two World Trade Center towers divided history to before and after [Sept. 11]. And with this minor incident, policy of the United States and other world and regional powers changed," Gen. Salami said according to Sharq.

In an indirect reference to Iran's nuclear weapons program, Gen. Salami reportedly added that, "the Americans now know that the Muslims with tendencies for suicide missions have acquired new technology and have technological capabilities which have caused more fear for them."

According to the quotations in Sharq, another high-ranking Revolutionary Guards commander explained the choice of terminology: "Since the Committee for Commemoration of Martyrs is an NGO, it does not need to ask for permission of the country's military institutions if it decides to carry out an operation. Their operations would be similar to those by Palestinians and have nothing to do with the regime in Iran." So the regime would be able to deny that it is sponsoring terrorism -- although not very plausibly.

In a closing speech entitled, "Suicide Operations: The Last Resort," a top Revolutionary Guards official, Hassan Abbassi, tried to rationalize Iran's support of terrorism. "If Muslims create fear in the heathen world, this fear is sacred; it is not terrorism or violence," he said according to the Sharq account.

Last month at the Technical College of Teheran, Mr. Abbassi said: "We have identified some 29 weak points for attacks in the U.S. and in the West. We intend to explode some 6,000 American atomic warheads. We have shared our intelligence with other guerrilla groups and we shall utilize them as well."

If this sounds like a fanatical rant, keep in mind the close association between the Revolutionary Guards and the Iranian government. The Iranian regime provides the organization, logistics, funding and recruitment for the "NGO." This sort of thing has a long history in Iran. In 1979, "students" calling themselves the "Followers of the Imam [Khomeini] Line," were instrumental in overthrowing the U.S.-allied shah. The "suicide bombers conference" reflects a growing pattern of incendiary behavior by Iran's current regime.

A recent report by the International Atomic Energy Agency on Iran's nuclear program chronicles deceit and denial of access to some key sites. New satellite photos reveal that Iran is hastily demolishing some facilities north of Tehran suspected of being a nuclear site before the IAEA has a chance to inspect them. The mullahs, who are encountering resistance to their plans in Iraq and in the area of nuclear weapons, are now resorting to blatant threats and the use of state-sanctioned terrorism to intimidate their enemies and try to force them into appeasement.

A strong message of support must be delivered by the U.S. and Europe to the courageous Iranians who are bent on unseating the regime and who serve as our best hope for an Iran free of torture, terror, and weapons of mass destruction. Only then will we be certain that Iran's "10,000 candidates of terror," if they in fact exist, will not have a chance to complete their training program.

Mr. Nir Boms is a senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and at the Council for Democracy and Tolerance. Mr. Reza Bulorchi is the executive director of the U.S. Alliance for Democratic Iran.
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Last Updated 12 July, 2004