Victory Through Moderation/Understanding Abbas

Update from AIJAC

Victory Through Moderation/Understanding Abbas

July 11, 2003
Number 07/03 #05

Updates leads today with a piece by Amnon Rubinstein, a former Israeli Minister from the left of centre Meretz party. He says that while it is not true that Israel has won the current mini-war militarily, it has won in other senses. It has defeated Arafat's plans, but more importantly, has maintained its democratic moderation in face of extreme provocation, he argues, HERE.

Next, top Israeli Journalist Yossi Klein Halevi looks at the settlement issue. He says that while Israel should be willing to trade settlements for peace, no-one should be the under the illusion this will not be a painful and traumatic sacrifice, a genuine concession. To read his argument from USAToday, CLICK HERE

Finally, the Wall Street Journal has a good editorial about the power struggle that caused Palestinian PM Mahmoud Abbas to threaten to resign this week. To read its argument that Abbas, whose power derives from international support, is valuable only in so far as he can deliver, but that current disagreements may actually strengthen his hand, CLICK HERE .

Israel's victory was retaining its moderation in midst of war

By Amnon Rubinstein

Ha'aretz, July 10, 2003

No, we did not win the war of terror that the Palestinians declared against us. They did not surrender and we are not celebrating our victory over them. On the contrary - the fears of a renewed outbreak of terrorism are as great as the chances of ending the conflict are small. But there is a partial respite, and Israel has always known how to get stronger during respites.

No, we did not win. But Yasser Arafat lost. Before he launched the war, he was a recognized international leader. Today, he is leading the opposition to the agreements that he signed. Granted, he is worshiped on the Palestinian street, but the Arab world is full of dictators who impoverished their people.

No, we did not win, but Arafat failed in his double plan: to break our spirit so that he could impose a South Lebanon-style withdrawal on us, and to bring about the internationalization of the conflict and the dispatch of foreign troops to our borders.

Arafat received no help in his war from the Arab states. Jordan and Egypt recalled their ambassadors from Israel, but did not bother to come to his assistance. Israel's status was damaged in European public opinion, but the European Union did not propose sending troops here. In the United States, Arafat is irrelevant, and Russia is not helping him either.

No, we did not win, but Israeli society - to the surprise of many - proved wondrously resilient. Israel's achievement in this war is unique. In a situation of indiscriminate terror against civilians and intolerably difficult military service in the territories, the state allowed its citizens to leave the country. Even veteran democracies have forbidden their citizens to leave their borders during war or to take their currency out of the state. In Israel, both civilians and reservists can escape from the danger for the price of a plane ticket. Yet despite this, people did not flee the country and call-ups of the reserves were not impaired. No other state has ever experienced this phenomenon: hell at home and the door wide open, but nobody uses it.

Israeli society passed another test, no less important. Despite the terrorism, despite the help that a few Israeli Arabs gave the terrorists, despite the venomous provocations of Arab Knesset members, no ethnic riots erupted here, as they did in Northern Ireland and the former Yugoslavia. Nor did shocking acts occur like those in France - where, although there were no terror acts, Arab passersby were murdered a few years ago and their bodies were either thrown into the Seine or thrown from trains. Granted, there was also a grave incident here, in which police killed Israeli Arabs during the October 2000 riots, but this was different in essence from ethnic riots, and an inquiry commission was set up to investigate it.

Moreover, although violence and terror usually lead to a right-wing radicalization, in Israel the opposite took place. In Belgium, Austria, France and Holland, right-wing parties became stronger because of their objection to Muslim immigrants, although these states did not suffer from terrorism. In Israel, however, in the midst of acts of murder and anti-Semitic Arab incitement, the Herut Party of Michael Kleiner and Baruch Marzel did not manage to cross the low electoral threshold of 1.5 percent, while the National Union-Yisrael Beiteinu Party, which expected a big success, lost a seat. The public voted en masse for the Likud, but only after the prime minister announced his support for "painful concessions" and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The Likud adjusted itself to a public opinion that had become more moderate.

In what democratic state could such a process take place during war? This is why one could say that in the deepest sense of the word, Israel did win - because during three years of ongoing nightmare, it demonstrated both resilience and political moderation.

Israeli settlements a necessary but significant sacrifice

By Yossi Klein Halevi

USAToday, July 7, 2003

In 1982, Israel's defense minister, Ariel Sharon, sent bulldozers into Yamit, an Israeli town of whitewashed houses located at a point where the Sinai Desert meets the Mediterranean Sea. Within hours, a thriving community of 5,000 people was reduced to rubble.

That self-inflicted wound was the price Israel paid as part of its peace treaty with Egypt. The devastation, though, wasn't just physical. Lives were uprooted and often shattered. Many former settlers divorced under the strain of relocation. Others never overcame their bitterness and sense of betrayal.

Israelis are recalling that precedent now as we face the prospect of uprooting settlements in the West Bank as part of any Mideast peace agreement with the Palestinians. And, ironically, again it is Sharon, this time as prime minister, who may be presiding over the destruction of Israeli communities ó on land the international community believes should be a future Palestinian state.

For the Palestinians, dismantling most settlements is a prerequisite for establishing a viable state. While a necessary concession, giving up the settlements this time and voluntarily abandoning the claim to our historic heartland will fundamentally alter Israeli society and deeply wound the Jewish people. The enormity of this sacrifice is not appreciated by world opinion.

More than 200,000 Israelis live in the territories. And while no one imagines removing them all, even a partial uprooting will traumatize Israeli society for decades. That's why the difficulty of this concession will require recognition of the international community and a reciprocal Palestinian response.

Unlike Sinai, which few Israelis considered part of the nation's historic patrimony, the West Bank ó the biblical Judea and Samaria ó is the birthplace of the Jewish people. And Jews carried its memory with them through centuries of exile and longing. For many Israelis, a Jewish state without Judea and Samaria is a body without a soul.

Even worse is a Jewish state that willingly cedes that land. No nation has ever done what Israel may be about to do to itself: voluntarily withdraw from its heartland and destroy its own communities. The mutual recriminations that will result from that process could devastate the nation.

Where Yamit was barely a decade old before being dismantled, many settlements in the West Bank are entering their fourth decade of existence ó a long time in the life of this young country. And those settlements have produced a native generation of Judeans and Samarians, whose attachment to the territories isn't just ideological but instinctive.

The very word "settlements," which implies transient and artificial communities, is misleading. In fact, the settlements are thriving towns and villages, whose residents see their presence in Judea and Samaria as historically just, even miraculous.

What makes the prospect of withdrawal particularly cruel is that few Israelis believe it will lead to genuine Arab recognition of Israel's right to exist. The anti-Jewish hatred in the Arab world ó encouraged even by such pro-Western regimes as Egypt and Saudi Arabia ó has so deeply penetrated all levels of society that reconciliation, at least for now, seems inconceivable. Many Israelis suspect the formula of "land for peace" is a deception: After the land is handed over, there will still be no peace for Israel.

One settler I spoke to recently said, "If we knew there would be peace in exchange for withdrawal, it would at least make the sacrifice understandable. But we won't even have that consolation."

Still, most Israelis are so desperate to ease this pathological conflict they are ready to try again to negotiate a deal. Israelis realize, too, that, for the sake of Israel's future as a Jewish and a democratic state, we must end our entwinement with Palestinians, even at the price of separating from cherished land.

Most Israelis would probably acknowledge that we acted recklessly by indiscriminately settling the territories. But the blame hardly belongs to Israel alone. Those Israelis who opposed settlements were undermined by the decades-long absence of a Palestinian negotiating partner. Instead, Palestinian leaders declared they would use any territories evacuated by Israel as a base from which to destroy the Jewish state.

Israel's annexationists weren't bolstered just by rejection from the Palestinians but by Israeli security needs. Without the West Bank, Israel is barely eight miles wide at its narrowest point; a surprise attack, like the 1973 Yom Kippur War, could sever the country in minutes. By ceding its claim to Judea and Samaria, Israel will have more than earned the right for a reciprocal gesture from the Palestinians: ceding the call for the return of Palestinian refugees to pre-1967 Israel, which Israelis rightly see as a Palestinian attempt to demographically destroy the Jewish state.

The international community needs to unequivocally support Israel in that demand. One major flaw of the "road map" now being promoted for Mideast peace is that it ignores the need for a Palestinian concession on the "right of return."

Finally, the international community needs to acknowledge the risks Israel will be taking and the price it will be paying in dismantling settlements. That acknowledgment won't ease the trauma of uprooting. But it will at least reassure Israelis that their sacrifice won't be dismissed as self-evident, leaving them exposed to new Palestinian demands.

Yossi Klein Halevi is the Israel correspondent for The New Republic.

Understanding Abbas

Wall Street Journal, July 10, 2003

When speaking of prospects for peace in the Middle East, we are often reminded of the famous quip of the late Israeli foreign minister Abba Eban -- "The Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity." Sadly history has shown this to be true, and it will take a much more enlightened Palestinian leadership to ensure that the latest peace plan doesn't fail for the same reason.

Certainly there seems to be a serious opportunity for peace here. The hawkish Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has accepted the idea of a two-state solution, and the Israeli public seems prepared to trust him. The long-standing barrier to peace, Yasser Arafat, has been sidelined by the mediators, at least in theory. The new Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas has renounced violence and has expressed a desire for peace. In addition, and crucial to any peace plan, the current U.S. President George W. Bush, a leader Israel trusts, appears determined to do all he can to help. Finally, the three largest Palestinian terrorist groups have announced a unilateral cease-fire.

Sounds promising? Well not quite. We saw Islamic Jihad's definition of a cease-fire on Monday night, when it claimed responsibility for killing an Israeli grandmother and injuring three of her grandchildren. It's hardly surprising that a group whose aim is to destroy Israel would violate its own cease-fire when the opportunity arose for a particularly gruesome killing.

However a more severe blow to peace was struck when Mr. Abbas cancelled a planned meeting with Mr. Sharon slated to take place yesterday. The official reason given by his office was that Israel had not agreed to release imprisoned Hamas and Islamic Jihad murderers.

After Monday night's terrorist attack it seems absurd to speak of releasing members of groups who remain committed to annihilating Israelis. We're confused about how releasing them would help Mr. Abbas in combating terrorism in the Palestinian controlled areas. It was surprising to hear U.S. officials pressuring Israel to release more prisoners, especially since releasing terrorists is not a requirement under the peace plan. Israel had freed some hundred prisoners as a gesture of good will, but understandably refused to set free anyone guilty of terrorist attacks.

There may well be another reason for Mr. Abbas canceling the meeting with Mr. Sharon. It's possible that Mr. Abbas's behavior could strangely enough reflect positive developments in the dynamics of the Palestinian Authority.

Mr. Abbas was only appointed prime minister following intense American pressure, once the international community realized peace would never be achieved with Arafat at the helm. Naturally Arafat has not taken this too well, and he has sought constantly to undermine Mr. Abbas. Their most recent clash came on Monday night at the meeting of the Central Committee of Fatah -- the ruling political movement they co-founded. At the meeting, Arafat and his supporters accused Mr. Abbas of being weak and giving in too easily to Israel.

In response to these accusations, Mr. Abbas resigned from Fatah, cancelled his meeting with Mr. Sharon, and reportedly offered Arafat his resignation as prime minister. Mr. Abbas probably believes that at the moment, due to his international standing and the credibility he has given the PA, they can't afford to let him go. It is possible, although by no means certain, that Fatah will ask Mr. Abbas to return, and even concede more power to him for negotiating with Israel.

What he does if that happens we can only guess. While anything that removes power from Arafat would be welcome, Mr. Abbas should remember that until he produces real results on the ground, he only commands international favor because he isn't Arafat.