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Updates from AIJAC International Observers in Israel
July 24,
2001 Here are two pieces which set out why the idea of placing international observers between Israel and Palestinians, as supported by the G-8 nations in their meeting in Genoa on the weekend, is a bad one. The first is an editorial from Ha'aretz, Israel's most dovish mainstream paper. The second is a rather US-oriented perspective from a private thinktank called the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), which often puts out some pretty sensible analysis of American defence and foreign policy. WHAT’S THE USE OF OBSERVERS? Editorial, Ha’aretz, July 23, 2001 Experience with deploying international forces in the Arab-Israeli conflict shows that their chances of succeeding in their mission depends fundamentally on the desire of the two sides to implement the agreements. There have been two proven cases of successful deployment of international forces in the region–the one being the United Nations Disengagement Observers Force or UNDOF, deployed along the border between Syria and Israel following the disengagement of forces agreement in 1974; and the other, the Multinational Force and Observers or MFO (in which the UN did not anticipate and to which many of its members were opposed), who were deployed as part of the peace agreement with Egypt. The success of these two international forces stemmed from the fact that both cases involve safeguarding and overseeing agreements signed by sovereign states with regular armies. Their missions did not involve observing sporadic and ongoing fighting. Both sides had a clear interest to maintain the agreements drawn up between them and prevent violations and hostile activities. In both cases, buffer zones between the two armies were established as part of the agreements. In addition, the sides undertook intensive steps to quell any provocations that third parties sought to create. On the other hand, the overall performance of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) can be defined as an ongoing failure. This international force–deployed by the UN in 1978, following Operation Litani [carried out by Israel against Palestine Liberation Organization targets in southern Lebanon] and without Israel's consent–has not fulfilled any significant role in the region and its presence is, at best, controversial. UNIFIL failed to establish any form of authority over the complex and ever-changing balance of forces in southern Lebanon. The UN Emergency Force (UNEF) set up following the Sinai War in 1956 also ended in failure, after Egypt requested its withdrawal and sealed the Straits of Tiran in 1967. The Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH), set up following the massacre of worshiping Palestinians by Baruch Goldstein in 1994, is not a source of problems, but has not managed to prevent acts of violence. In spite of its presence, Hebron has remained the most contentious and violent city. The international monitoring committee, set up in Lebanon following Israel's "Grapes of Wrath" operation in 1996 cannot account for any major successes either, aside from the fact that it became a committee for the lodging of complaints and the superficial investigation thereof. It is no surprise then that in the conclusions presented by the Mitchell Committee and in the report of CIA Director George Tenet, there are no recommendations calling for the establishment of an international force or a body of observers, certainly not without the two sides desiring their presence, or at least agreeing to it. Without full cooperation of both sides, international observers have no real chance of succeeding in their mission. Furthermore, for them to succeed, there is a need for a clear agreement between the two sides and a vital interest to honestly implement the deal. In addition, both sides must be ready to impose the agreement on all elements on their respective grounds–the regular and semi-irregular ones, organizations, groups and individuals. It is, therefore, difficult to pin much hope on the deployment of international observers in the areas of friction. The two sides–the Israeli and the Palestinian–will not benefit from a third party presence in an area that has yet to undergo any stabilization process. If its presence does not help to alleviate and stabilize the situation, it could even make it more complicated. JINSA report July 23, 2001 NO NEGOTIATIONS UNDER FIRE The State Department probably thinks it is helping Israel by moving heaven and earth to shore up the phony cease-fire and kick-start frozen negotiations, even as the shooting continues. They probably think that anything that makes the two sides talk will keep them from shooting too much. They are wrong. By accepting the principle of "third party monitors" (read Americans, probably the CIA) and hinting strongly that negotiations should resume BEFORE the violence stops, the State Department is encouraging Palestinian violence and likely hastening the day that Israel has to make a serious move to destroy both Yasser Arafat and the PA. As recently as last month, Secretary Powell said that stopping the violence didn't require discussion; Arafat had only to stop it. Likely true, but why should he have stopped? Barak's breathtaking offer from last summer is off the table. If Arafat came to talk now he could only find less than he had previously rejected. Since he couldn't afford that, he had two choices - to use violence to wear Israel down and produce a new offer borne of weakness, not strength; or to use violence to induce the State Department to pressure Israel into a new and better offer. The first didn't work. The war Arafat started in October created an unusually broad and tenacious political consensus in Israel. If Israel's strategic goal includes "secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force," the promise of UN Resolution 242, Israelis from left to centre to right now agree that Arafat is not the right partner and negotiations with him, particularly under fire, are not the mechanism. The second is percolating. The State Department, with far less patience than the Israeli public, can't pressure Arafat to stop the violence and won't let Israel make him pay. Even as the Secretary said publicly that Israel was right to insist that the violence stop before negotiations could resume, none of the pressures Israel tried to affect Palestinian behavior were deemed acceptable to the "striped pants crowd." Withholding tax money, building houses on disputed territory, keeping Palestinians from working in Israel, demolishing buildings used to hide gunfighters, blowing up military headquarters and targeting terrorists Arafat refused to arrest were all publicly and nastily called "counterproductive." This leaves Israel in a tight spot. Israelis have spent the better part of ten months taking heavy civilian casualties: mortars, suicide bombers, snipers and the incitement spewing from Palestinian leaders that ensures that another generation of Palestinians will hate Jews and be ready to kill them at every opportunity. But Israel's government nonetheless continues to walk a fine line between punishing terrorism and leaving the door open for the day the Palestinians realize that violence will not benefit their cause. One important reason for Israeli restraint is that on the fundamental point no negotiations under fire the US has stood firmly with Israel, and it would be wrong for our government to abandon an ally and a principled position out of frustration. If we split on this, the Israeli government will soon have to choose between what the US says it wants and Israel's sovereign obligation to protect its citizens and its homeland. Israel could find itself taking action against the Palestinian Authority over our objection. The choice for Israel would be ugly, and the State Department would do well for all of us not to force it. If you
are interested in receiving "JINSA Reports" by e-mail, please contact
us at: 1717 K Street N.W., Suite 800 Washington, D.C. 20006, phone (202)
833-0020 fax (202) 296-6452 |
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Copyright
© AIJAC 2001 |
