UN Resolution 1701 Evaluated

Update from AIJAC

UN Resolution 1701 Evaluated

August 15, 2006
Number 08/06 #07

Today's Update attempts to evaluate the provisions and implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (text here), passed on Friday, by a vote of 14-1 and which seems to have put in place a shaky ceasefire in Lebanon.

The first analysis comes from the always insightful Israeli academic commentator, Dr. Barry Rubin, who argues that on the face of it the resolution looks positive, but also that the problems of implementation mean that is no real solution, He predicts that it may bring some years of peace, but another conflict is inevitable in a few years time if Iran and Hezbollah want it. He also says the deal is especially bad for Lebanon, preventing the emergence of a strong Lebanese state. For Rubin's full detailed discussion and various scenarios for the future, CLICK HERE.

Next, Israeli columnist Sever Plocker offer a different view, arguing the resolution sets up a future where the world is on Israel's side against Hezbollah. He argues that the if the resolution succeeds, Israel and Lebanon will both be much better off, but if it fails, the Israel Army can root out Hezbollah and may be allowed to do so in future. For this full argument, CLICK HERE.

Finally, an editorial at the venerable British publication, The Spectator, argues that the resolution may be a vital test of the UN's ability to be more than just a talking shop. The magazine argues that the resolution can only succeed if accompanied by "unshakeable readiness to implement the steps required to provide both Lebanon and Israel with the security they deserve" by dealing with the Hezbollah problem. For the Spectator's argument, CLICK HERE.

Analysis: Not so bad in theory

By BARRY RUBIN

Jerusalem Post, August 12, 2006

The UN Security Council cease-fire resolution is not so bad in theory, but everything will depend on how it is implemented, and there are some very big problems on that front.

There are two basic parts of the resolution. The introductory ("PP") paragraphs, which set out the framework for interpreting it, and the operational paragraphs ("OP"). Every word is carefully chosen, often fought over by American and French diplomats, and has significance.

In the opening section there are a number of points that fit the original US conception and are fair to Israel:

The war and resulting deaths are blamed on Hizbullah attacking Israel (PP-2).

The purpose of the cease-fire is defined as not only ending the current fighting but changing the situation which brought about the conflict. (PP-3)

The unconditional release of Israel's soldiers is mandatory (PP-3).

The goal is to have a long-term, permanent solution to the problem (PP-9).

Four other provisions are intended to meet Lebanese demands but are not necessarily very much inimical to Israel.

The issue of the three Lebanese prisoners is to be "settled." This does not mean they will be freed. It is a sign of the depravity of the present world that the UN has to have a resolution about the fate of three murdering terrorists - one of whom killed a father in front of his son and then shot the child dead - convicted in a properly constitute court. But again, this issue is merely to be discussed. (PP-4)

Israel's withdrawal is supposed to be at the "earliest possible" time and not immediately as the Lebanese government had demanded (PP-6).

It takes note of Lebanon's current claim to the Shaba Farms area but does not accept it. Since the claim is so weak and Syria is unlikely to support it officially, nothing is likely to happen on this issue. (PP-7)

Lebanon will send its army into the southern part of the country (which Israel also wants).

The new international force will be called UNIFIL (as Lebanon wanted), but will effectively be an entirely new institution (PP-6). Instead of a small number of observers it will be comprised of 15,000 troops.

It is understandable why the United States and Israel agreed to the above wording since, while it doesn't give them everything they want, it is reasonable given what might be expected.

But all this wording is also only a prelude to the list of things to be done, the OP section. Here, too, the shape of the resolution is not so bad except for whether - given three key problems - it will be implemented properly. The three problems are:

Hizballah, Iran, and Syria will not cooperate.

The Lebanese government will be too weak, afraid, and sympathetic to them to force implementation.

The international community is too craven, ignorant, and cowardly to act toughly. And even if it wanted to do so (see below) it needs the permission of the Lebanese government.

The question then is whether the ceasefire will work well enough to be minimally acceptable or not.

Returning to the actual text, however, a number of the original points pushed for by the United States have survived. These included the restriction only on "offensive" Israeli action (OP1). Does this mean Israel could, for example, send planes over Lebanon to hit a Hizbullah rocket launcher that is about to or has just fired? That isn't clear but it is possible.

Moreover, Israel only has to withdraw when the Lebanese army moves in and not, as the Lebanese government wanted, immediately (OP2). On the negative side, though, this means Israeli forces would probably have to leave before the large international force arrives. The longer it takes for international forces to get there, the worse this is.

There are other positive sections: Lebanon will have full sovereignty, there should be no weapons or any other authority in anyone's hands but the government (OP3). Of course, there is no mention of the fact that Hizbullah is part of the government coalition, a problem to which we will return later.

The internationally recognized border is to be respected (OP4). International aid is to be given to Lebanon for reconstruction. (It is interesting to ask why no one has ever called for international reconstruction aid for Israel.) And all this should result in a long-term solution (OP8), perhaps a hint that Lebanon should make peace with Israel.

This all brings us to the key provision: "The establishment between the [international border] and the Litani River of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL…." The question, of course, is whether this is going to happen.

A second important point is that no foreign forces - Syrian, Iranian, and Palestinian - will be in Lebanon without government consent. Equally, no arms are supposed to come into Lebanon without government authorization. As UN members, Syria and Iran are being asked to cooperate in this effort. It is a safe bet that they will not do so. Will anyone dare to report such behavior publicly, much less do anything about it?

As for disarming Hizbullah, this is said to be the government of Lebanon's job (i.e., the international force will do nothing on this issue) and presumably nothing will happen here either.

There were other things that could have been done easily - but were not. For example, there could be an international naval force to inspect ships coming to Lebanon or a unit at the airport to look at cargo planes. Instead, everything is being left in the Lebanese government's questionable hands.

But the central contradiction in the document is between OP11 and OP12. OP11 basically makes UNIFIL action dependent on the Lebanese government asking for help. In other words, only if the government asks UNIFIL to fight against terrorists in southern Lebanon or interdict arms smuggling can it act.

It should be noted that the Lebanese armed forces are a polite fiction. Just as Hizbullah is part of the government coalition, it has also deeply infiltrated the army. Half or even more of the soldiers sympathize with Hizbullah and will not do anything to - as they think of it - "protect" Israel from attack. It is not a highly disciplined military with a reliable chain of command. If a Lebanese soldier fires at Hizbullah, the entire army could split into two warring factions, something the government and politicians will want to avoid at any cost.

Yet OP12 says UNIFIL can take "all necessary action" in its area of deployment to fulfill its mission. This could be interpreted, for example, to mean that the UNIFIL units will attack terrorists south of the Litani without being explicitly asked to do so by the Lebanese government. Everything depends on who will command UNIFIL and what its rules of engagement are going to be. Will it honestly report violations or just look the other way? Will it only do what the Lebanese government expressly asks or take action to prevent cross-border attacks?

A lot will also depend on what strategy Hizbullah adapts and what Damascus and Teheran urge it to do. There is no chance of Hizbullah being destroyed, disarmed or moderated. But it can choose how high a profile it will have.

In a low-profile strategy, Hizbullah would rebuild its forces, smuggle in arms to reequip, but basically stay north of the Litani. This would minimize conflict with the ceasefire -though of course they would break its rules - and the Lebanese government and UNIFIL would almost certainly look the other way. Israel would not be happy but could or at least would live with this situation.

In a medium-profile strategy Hizbullah will send men to the south who will live anonymously among the villagers (from whom many of them are recruited any way), organizing underground, and setting up arms caches, tunnels, and other harder-to-spot fortifications. In other words, they would be preparing for the next war. This is a bolder breaking of the ceasefire provisions. Israel would demand action and some might or might not be taken.

Under a high-profile strategy, Hizbullah would send units to the south that would function as such, push to see if the Lebanese army and UNIFIL would react. It might even try cross-border raids and rocket firings, probably under the deniable cover of newly created front groups. If there were no tough response, they would escalate further. Israel might then take military action and the whole ceasefire could collapse.

Thus, the ceasefire agreement is not necessarily a disaster for Israel though it certainly isn't a solution either. It may provide some years of peace.

For Lebanon, though, it is a political disaster. Certainly, the terms are not going to let a strong Lebanese government emerge or stymie Syrian and Iranian ambitions. It will permit an end to the current war and reconstruction, but only until Hizbullah, Damascus, and Teheran decide they want to fight on Lebanese territory again.

Us and the world against Hizbullah

If UN Resolution 1701 is fulfilled, including the swift return of our abducted soldiers, the strategic benefits for Israel and free Lebanon will become clearly evident

Sever Plocker

Yediot Ahronot, August 13, 2006

World opinion views us as a people with a hard heart. This wariness has deep and justified roots, but often blinds us.

UN Security Council resolution 1701, as agreed upon over the weekend, is a political achievement unlike any other, for Israel as a Jewish state; perhaps one of the most prominent achievements in its history. It can be summed up in one sentence: Israel and the world against Hizbullah .

The exact phrasing of the resolution is less important than the fact that it adopts the Israeli approach regarding the war: This resolution has no mention of condemnation for our military operations in Lebanon (the aggressor mentioned is Hizbullah) and it fully acknowledges our right to a crushing military response.

Nasrallah's provocation

Let’s compare the situation of Israel and Hizbullah today to their situation on July 12th, after the Hizbullah launched a surprise cross-border attack on Israel. It appeared, at the time as though Nasrallah was holding all the cards, that his control over southern Lebanon was undisputed, and that he would be crowned the Mideast’s next sheriff.

And today? Nasrallah’s provocation brought the IDF deep into southern Lebanon, Hizbullah has suffered continued blows of the type he could never imagine, and the Security Council has unanimously decided to dispatch 15,000 UN troops to the “Land of Hizbullah.”

Partners to this decision included the Lebanese government and the Arab League. Gone are the days of unilateral Israeli concessions, today there is an Arab-global ‘give and take’ process.

And by the way, Nasrallah didn’t fulfill any of his terrible threats.

Nasrallah paid a heavy toll

Could we have arrived at a similar result without the war? No, absolutely not. If Israel hadn’t responded the way it did, the remaining UN forces would have fled Lebanon, and we would have found ourselves entrenched in humiliating negotiations with Nasrallah, who would have rejoiced at holding the title of Israel’s conqueror.

Nasrallah and his people paid a heavy toll. He knows it. A bitter taste of defeat was apparent in his two latest speeches. The entire Arab and Moslem world knows this: Today it’s an open and versatile media world.

It’s true, our north has been damaged and we have sustained many casualties. It’s true, Hizbullah somehow survived. It’s true, the Olmert -Peretz cabinet made many mistakes, some unforgivable. It’s true; there are several drawbacks in resolution 1701.

However, if this resolution is fulfilled as outlined in the text, including the swift return of our abducted soldiers, its strategic benefits for Israel and free Lebanon will become clearly evident. To enable fulfillment of the resolution, we must let the army win. Now.

Israel not an empire

It is high time we root out the ‘legend’ that the IDF as an army is unable to defeat what is mistakenly termed Hizbullah’s “guerilla forces.” It can and it has. Our military history shows that military groups such as the Hizbullah, are almost always at a disadvantage in the battlefield and at an advantage in the political arena.

This usually occurs in empires, when they raise their hands in victory because of the political leadership’s failures, internal rotting and fatigued public opinion. Israel is not an empire, and shouldn’t act like one.

Certain media outlets in Israel have gone into a spin, they have jumped from one extreme to another, between ousting and surrender. The public, in general, has remained stable and supportive. It is not fazed by Nasrallah and his victory speeches. Many Arab leaders – including Yasser Arafat upon leaving the Mukataa Compound in Ramallah, celebrated their victory over Israel. Where are they today?

The war in Lebanon is not over yet. A people fighting an enemy that questions its right to exists does not disarm because of embarrassment and fear. Had the founders of the state held this opinion, they would not have declared its establishment.

Security first

The Spectator, August 12, 2006

The United Nations is good at passing resolutions. It is, sadly, a little less effective at displaying resolve. As The Spectator went to press, Security Council discussions on the French-inspired resolution designed to deal with the conflict in Lebanon and Israel were dragging on. But whatever form of words the UN settles upon, the actions required by the international community seem to be implicitly understood by the French, the Americans and the British government. What will count in the days ahead is an unshakeable readiness to implement the steps required to provide both Lebanon and Israel with the security they deserve. And that will require the determination to tackle the root cause of instability in the region — the terrorist threat from Islamist groups such as Hezbollah and their sponsors in Tehran and Damascus.

The resolution wisely avoided making glib rhetorical concessions to those who have been demanding an immediate and unconditional ceasefire. For there to be progress towards agreement, Israel needs a security guarantee which makes good the failures of the past. Lebanon, meanwhile, requires appropriate international support if it is to recapture the hope felt during last year’s Cedar Revolution.

When Israel last withdrew from southern Lebanon, six years ago, the United Nations resolved that terrorist militias should be disarmed, not only to safeguard Israelis but also to help Lebanon develop a more stable and democratic political culture. The world appeared to realise that if Hezbollah were allowed to maintain and indeed expand its armed presence, then Israel’s security would be under constant threat, and Lebanon’s political development would be disastrously compromised by a force owing allegiance to the Islamist regime in Iran. But while UN Resolution 1559 seemed to recognise all this, the international community failed to act upon its own deliberations. Hezbollah was allowed to grow, sustained by Syria, armed by Iran, threatening democratic Israel and holding hostage Lebanese democracy.

The international community has an opportunity now to atone for those past sins of omission. If Israeli forces are to withdraw from Lebanon, then there has to be a secure zone, purged of Hezbollah forces, from the Litani river to the Israeli–Lebanese border. The Lebanese government has declared its willingness to deploy its own forces in such a zone, but the Lebanese army will be incapable of dealing with the Hezbollah threat without the support of a suitably robust international force. That force must be deployed under rules of engagement that are sufficiently clear and muscular to make possible the disarmament of Hezbollah. It must be in a position to seal the Lebanese border and control those passes and transport routes through which Syria and Iran could renew supplies to the terrorists.

The effective containment of Hezbollah is, it must be emphasised, not only the least that Israel deserves. It is also a minimum precondition for Lebanon’s secure political development. The basic requirement for any functioning state is an effective monopoly of the use of force. No national government can govern effectively, or build secure relationships with its neighbours, if its territory is a playground for a terrorist army that takes its orders, and secures its weapons, from other powers.

The world welcomed the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon because the withdrawal of Syrian forces appeared to allow a breathing space for Lebanese democracy, and the emergence of another, plural and modern, state in the Middle East promised a brighter future for the whole region. But this promise could never, and will never, be fulfilled while Iran continues to exercise de facto control over Lebanese territory and uses its military muscle to promote a totalitarian Islamist ideology. It should never be forgotten that the promotion of Islamic fundamentalism and the destruction of Israel are Hezbollah’s governing principles. There is indeed a vital role for the international community in providing long-term structural support to Lebanon to help repair its damaged infrastructure and weakened political culture. But that support will bear fruit only if the threat posed by an Iranian-armed Hezbollah is dealt with once and for all.

It is also in the broader interests of regional stability, and indeed the West’s security, that this conflict ends with the removal of the Hezbollah threat. While that threat persists it will be impossible for any Israeli leader to take whatever actions may be necessary to revive steps towards peace with the Palestinians. Hezbollah’s rocket assaults on Israel have already led to a huge internal displacement of Israeli civilians — a grim consequence of war that will have a significant impact on the future of Israeli politics when the present conflict ends.

More than that, any settlement of this conflict that allows Hezbollah plausibly to proclaim that it has successfully ‘resisted’ Israeli ‘aggression’ will be no sort of settlement at all. Israel is the victim of aggression here and, whatever some elements in the Tory party may say, her response has not been ‘disproportionate’. To allow Hezbollah to claim any sort of victory would hearten Islamists everywhere and send another signal that the West lacked the resolve to deal with terrorism. Iran would conclude that the international community did not have the staying power required to prevent Tehran fulfilling its nuclear ambitions.

Perhaps it is a sober assessment of those factors which has led the French — not always the most robust actors in the Middle Eastern drama — to sponsor a UN resolution that displays a sound grasp of the need to make good some of the failures of the past. In this country, the debate about the Lebanese conflict has become a subset of the interminable argument about Tony Blair’s political longevity. But much more is at stake in this conflict than the fate of one politician. This is a time for clear-sighted action, not self-indulgent rhetoric: a test, if ever there was one, of the UN’s capacity to be more than a talking-shop.