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Update
from AIJAC
Disengagement
Disappointments
August
2, 2005
Number 08/05 #01
It is becoming increasingly clear that hopes that Israel's disengagement
from Gaza and part of the West Bank would lead to a change in Palestinian
behaviour on terror and responsible state-building are unlikely to be realised.
This Update documents how far from those hopes we currently appear to be.
First, Ehud
Ya'ari, top Israeli journalist with impeccable contacts on the Palestinian
side, says that expecting a serious change in the Palestinian attitude
toward terror groups today is to expect miracles. He points to a whole
series of incidents and little known facts which prove his point, not
least that Palestinian police have to wear masks to operate against the
terror groups to prevent revenge on their families, while terrorists do
not need to do anything of the sort. For this depressing but vitally important
article, CLICK HERE.
Also commenting
on how far things appear to be going astray is a Wall Street Journal
editorial. The paper boldly states that Mahmoud Abbas has failed to capitalise
on the opportunity created by Arafat's death and chastises US Secretary
of State Condoleezza Rice for indulging in diplomatic niceties, such as
praising Abbas' very limited efforts during her recent visit to Israel,
rather than putting real pressure on him to do what is needed. For their
full argument CLICK
HERE.
Finally,
this Update offers a useful A to Z dictionary of disengagement compiled
by the British Israel Communications and Research Centre (BICOM). It has
entries on all the terminology and details on all the complexities of
the whole venture. For this very useful reference, CLICK
HERE.
Masked
Policemen
Ehud Ya'ari
The Jerusalem Report, August 8, 2005 issue
Shortly after the suicide attack outside the Hasharon shopping mall in Netanyah
on July 12, Palestinian Authority Chairman Abu Mazen made a plea to Ramadan
Abdallah Shallah, the general secretary of Islamic Jihad in Damascus: Please,
he begged, please deny responsibility for the attack.
Just a few days before the bomb, Abu Mazen and Shallah had met over dinner
twice, once at the table of President Asad and the second time in the Damascus
home of Hamas leader Khaled Mashal. There had appeared to be the beginnings
of a rapprochement between the two men, even a sort of friendship. But none
of that helped. Within a few hours, Islamic Jihad took credit for the attack.
Abu Mazen's hopes of blaming the bombing on a few irresponsible individuals
with no proper organizational support were dashed. Later it turned out that
part of the suicide operation was planned inside the police station of Tul
Karm under the watchful eyes of Palestinian security officers.
Abu Mazen, under intense pressure from Western VIPs who passed through his
office that day, explicitly condemned the attack in Arabic as "terrorism."
And the reaction? Ramadan Abdallah Shallah gave public backing to the dispatchers
of the 18-year-old student-bomber, and the entire Islamic Jihad leadership
ran from studio to studio of the Arabic satellite channels justifying the
action.
Meanwhile not one Palestinian Authority personality - not the prime minister
nor any other minister nor the heads of the security apparatuses - not one
of them mustered up the courage to repeat what Abu Mazen had said, and to
call it by its simple name: terrorism. Not the official PA TV or radio nor
the newspapers dared utter it again. They did vent some criticism of Jihad,
but did not tar the suicide attack with the T-word. Abu Mazen was left alone
in the field, and quickly dropped the dreaded word himself. When Hamas launched
a series of rocket and mortar attacks on Israeli communities and clashed
with the PA, Abu Mazen delivered a televised speech on July 16 in which
he carefully avoided any reference to terrorism, denouncing the shelling
of Israeli civilians as merely "childish" and "counterproductive."
Hamas's purported reason was revenge for cease-fire "violations" by Israel.
Interior Minister Gen. Nasser Yusuf ordered his men to prevent - if necessary
by force - the firing of the rockets and mortar shells. Soldiers of the
PA National Security force opened fire on one such squad and Hamas reacted
by attacking National Security force offices and patrols. Within hours the
commanders of the two sides decided, with a nod and a wink, to prevent a
slide into an all-out, head-on confrontation. Nasser Yusuf found himself
completely isolated, like Abu Mazen before him. None of his peers in the
government nor any of the Fatah heads dared give public support for the
order he had issued. Hamas started demanding his removal. The PA refused
to oblige, but since then, everyone is acting toward Nasser Yusuf as if
his days on the job are numbered. They try not to be caught on camera by
his side and maintain a safe distance.
So dangerous did Nasser Yusuf deem the situation that he himself issued
a directive to tens of thousands of soldiers and police in the Gaza Strip
to go out on the streets wearing masks. If not, the Hamas and Islamic Jihad
people would try to take revenge against them or their families. It was
not the armed gangs who fastidiously hid their identities when they went
out into the streets of Gaza in mid-July, but the uniformed police who dressed
up as highway robbers.
That is not the way to win. In the best case, the PA will hang on to its
position, nothing more. Anyone who dreams that the PA will shake itself
out of its lethargy when it smells the scent of disengagement is going to
be sorely disappointed. Sure, they will try to push Hamas into a corner
and force it to rein in its militants. And sure, they will coordinate arrangements
with the IDF for the withdrawal and the handover of evacuated areas, and
they will even deploy forces as a buffer to ensure that the withdrawal will
not take place under fire. Essentially, however, they will not try to smash
the alternative authority that has developed alongside the PA - the association
of terror organizations that is demanding its share of the booty and wants
to operate according to its own political agenda.
That is why Abu Mazen will denounce the Jihad's terror and at the same time,
continue to sit with its leaders. He will declare the need for "one authority
and one gun," while reconciling himself to the armament of the "popular
army" of Hamas. He already agreed during his visit to Damascus to include
Hamas in the Palestinian committees overseeing the disengagement. He reneged
on his return because of the reservations of Prime Minister Abu Ala, disengagement
coordinator Muhammad Dahlan and PA National Security Adviser Jibril Rajoub.
Still, he will have to come up with some kind of formula for a partnership
with Hamas to be sponsored once again by the Egyptians.
Such cooperation in whatever form will mean a marriage between those who
see disengagement as an opportunity for reviving the diplomatic process,
such as Abu Mazen and Dahlan, and those such as the heads of Hamas who see
it as an Israeli ploy to paralyze the Palestinian drive for further withdrawals;
between those who want to see the successful implementation of the disengagement,
and those who are still striving to foil it altogether.
From the moment that clashes broke out between the PA and Hamas, it was
imperative that they should end decisively even if they had not yet spread
into a full head-on confrontation. And from the moment that the PA failed
to impose its positions on Hamas, despite the limited use of force, the
result can be considered a partial defeat. Hamas had promised its followers
that the PA would not dare arrest its cadres as it did in 1996, and indeed
no arrests were reported. If Abu Mazen has been frightened off using the
term "terrorism" and Nasser Yusuf calls on his policemen to hide behind
face masks, do not wait for miracles - not before disengagement, not during
and not after.
© The Jerusalem Report
Back to Top
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Editorial:
The Third Intifada?
Wall
Street Journal, July 28, 2005
Since
the Palestinians announced a so-called truce this February, there have
been more than 800 attacks against Israeli targets. Many more have been
foiled by Israeli security forces. Earlier this month, a suicide bomber
in Netanya killed five people and wounded 90. There have been numerous
rocket attacks, one of which killed a 22-year-old woman as she was sitting
on her porch. Over the past few weeks, Israeli security forces captured
two would-be suicide bombers, including a Palestinian woman who was on
her way to blow up an Israeli hospital where she was scheduled to receive
treatment.
This
is what passes for "relative calm" in Israel. What really brought down
the number of attacks was Israel's successful anti-terror campaign ahead
of the "truce" and the terrorists' tactical decision to lay relatively
low for now. In the meantime, they are replenishing their forces in preparation
for what is feared to be a full-blown "third Intifada," during or soon
after the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza that is due to begin on August
17.
It's
not only Israeli security experts who are worried. Palestinian leaders
openly warn that another terror war is on the horizon -- even if they
assert that it would be the fault of the Jewish state alone. "Israel's
current actions are paving the way for a third Intifada," says Mohammed
Dahlan, the Palestinian Authority's civil affairs minister, who was quoted
by the Jerusalem Post last month.
Mr.
Dahlan's warnings of more violence come just as Israel is about to hand
over to the Palestinians a big piece of real estate. To escape the impasse
during the reign of Yasser Arafat, who lost all credibility as a negotiating
partner, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon moved to withdraw from Gaza
and four settlements in the West Bank.
Arafat's
death last November and the subsequent election of the seemingly moderate
Mahmoud Abbas suddenly turned Mr. Sharon's unilateral move into a unique
opportunity to kick-start bilateral peace talks. Or so it was hoped. Washington's
support for the new Palestinian leader seemed reasonable at the time given
his peaceful pronouncements. Our own Bret Stephens reported that Mr. Abbas
set three tests for himself during an election rally in January: "We won't
allow any illegal weapons and we won't allow people to be armed unless
they are Fatah....We need clean legal institutions so we can be considered
a civilized society....We need to make the law the leader in this country
and nobody can be above the law."
The
Palestinian leader has failed on all counts. Instead of confronting the
terror organizations, he decided to bring them into the political process,
which had the effect of raising their prestige. He now even rejects that
these groups must be disarmed at all. Armed gangs continue to bring chaos
and insecurity to ordinary Palestinians. The skirmish last week between
PA security forces and Hamas members who tried to launch rocket attacks
against Israel was a one-off measure and not part of a concerted effort
to halt terrorism.
Mr. Abbas's
wavering -- alternatively blaming Israel for the violence and claiming his
security forces are incapable of confronting the terrorists -- is eerily
reminiscent of the tactics of his predecessor. Like Arafat before him, Mr.
Abbas seems to be playing the old circular game. He does nothing to rein
in the terrorists, which makes it difficult for Israel to make additional
"gestures" toward the other side -- such as removing roadblocks -- without
endangering its own security. This, in turn, is used by the Palestinians
as justification for even more terror. The Palestinians are effectively
held hostage by their own radicals who impede a political solution and,
as a result, prolong Israeli occupation.
It
is time that the U.S. and Europe put serious pressure on Mr. Abbas to
honor his commitments. Maybe the recent London bombings and the improving
Israeli-French relations (Mr. Sharon is currently visiting France for
the first time in four years) will make Europeans more amenable to a tougher
approach vis-à-vis Palestinian terrorism. One essential step is
to clearly link further international aid to concrete steps to fight terror.
If not, Mr. Abbas should be told that this time around, no one will hold
back the Israelis if they are forced to do the job he refuses to do.
Unfortunately,
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, visiting the region last weekend,
failed to convey the proper message to the Palestinians -- at least in
public. Instead of reprimanding the PA, she praised the Palestinian leadership
for taking "important steps" against terrorism. These kinds of diplomatic
niceties from an era thought to be long behind us help neither the Palestinians,
nor the Israelis, nor the Bush Administration's global fight against terror
Back
to Top
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disengagement A-Z Glossary
BICOM Research,
July 29, 2005
As the implementation of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's disengagement
plan approaches, the issue is becoming more prominent and is receiving
increasing coverage. In order to clarify some of the terms used in this
context, BICOM has compiled this A-Z glossary. We hope that you will find
it useful and we suggest that you refer back to it when necessary.
Budget of the disengagement plan
The economic costs of the disengagement plan are substantial. The evacuation
compensation package adopted by the Knesset for settlers voluntarily willing
to relocate is 3.8 billion shekels, which is approximately £462
million (see 'Evacuation Compensation Law'). More recent estimates, however,
suggest that this could rise to as high as 4.8 billion shekels. Additionally,
while some 2 billion shekels have been allocated to cover the costs of
the defence establishment, the IDF and the police, the Defence Ministry
has said that the actual cost will far exceed this mark and could reach
2.5 billion shekels. Given these figures, the budget of the disengagement
plan is currently estimated at around 7.6 billion shekels (approximately
£958 million), a considerable sum amounting to 1 percent of Israel's
Gross Domestic Product.
Cabinet vote
Israel's cabinet voted to approve the disengagement plan on 6 June
2004. The vote was 14 in favour and 7 against. A few days before the vote,
Prime Minister Sharon dismissed the two National Union ministers in his
cabinet - Tourism Minister Benny Elon and Transportation Minister Avidgor
Lieberman - who were opposed to the plan and announced that they would
resign from the government if the cabinet approved the plan.
The cabinet approved the disengagement plan, but with the reservation
that the dismantling of each settlement should be voted on separately.
Justice Minister Tzipi Livni initiated a compromise in order to convince
ministers Benjamin Netanyahu, Limor Livnat and Silvan Shalom to support
the disengagement in the cabinet vote. According to the compromise, the
disengagement plan divides the evacuation into four groups - the northern
Gaza Strip; isolated Gaza settlements (Netzarim, Kfar Darom and Morag);
Gush Katif; and the four settlements in the northern West Bank. The 'Livni
compromise' calls for the cabinet to meet after each phase to approve
the next. However, as the start date of the implementation of the disengagement
plan nears, Prime Minister Sharon and Defence Minister Shaul Mofaz are
recommending that the evacuation be carried out continuously to preserve
the momentum.
Several days after the cabinet vote, two ministers from the National Religious
Party - NRP leader and Minister of Housing Effi Eitam and Deputy Minister
in the Prime Minister's Office Yitzhak Levy - resigned from the government
due to their opposition to the disengagement plan. Minister for Labour
and Social Welfare Zevulun Orlev, also of NRP, remained in the coalition
until November 2004, when the party quit the government in protest of
disengagement.
Confidence-building
measures
Following the Sharm el-Sheikh summit (see 'Sharm el-Sheikh summit'), Israel
took a series of measures with the purpose of easing the everyday life
of the Palestinian population. These measures were implemented in parallel
to Israel's preparations for the implementation of the disengagement plan.
They were taken as part of a policy aimed at utilising the 'window of
opportunity' that was opened after the establishment of the new Palestinian
government in January 2005 and renewed cooperation between the Palestinian
Authority and Israel.
The main areas in which measures were taken included: Transfer of cities
to PA responsibility; Release of 900 Palestinian prisoners; Opening crossing
points between Israel and the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; Increasing
work permits in Israel for Palestinians; Easing restrictions over the
entrance of Palestinians into Israel; and lifting roadblocks and easing
movement within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Coordination with Palestinians
Although the disengagement plan was initially a unilateral step, political
developments and changing circumstances (mainly the death of Arafat in
November 2004 and the subsequent election of Mahmoud Abbas as PA Chairman),
changed the concept of the plan to a move which is being coordinated with
the Palestinian Authority. Israeli and Palestinian officials have met
on numerous occasions to discuss coordination of the disengagement plan.
Such coordination is aimed at ensuring a smooth withdrawal and preventing
terrorist attacks on Israeli forces and civilians during the process.
In a ground-breaking meeting in July 2005, Defence Minister Shaul Mofaz
and PA Interior Minister General Nasser Yousef agreed to hold regular
coordination meetings between the commanders on the ground. The two also
came to an agreement under which the PA will deploy armed troops as a
buffer between the Palestinian populated area of Khan Yunis and the Gush
Katif settlements at the time of disengagement. Additionally, PA troops
will be deployed to prevent looting in the evacuated settlements.
The question of the ultimate fate of the settlers' homes has yet to be
finally agreed upon. In June 2005, it was announced that Israel and the
PA had agreed to cooperate on the demolition of 1,600 houses in Gaza that
are to be evacuated. This agreement represented the first solid cooperation
between Israelis and Palestinians in Gaza after months of disputes. In
accordance with this agreement, Israel would tear down the evacuated houses
and the Palestinians would be paid to clean up the rubble, thus providing
Palestinians with employment. The Palestinians have said that they would
prefer to have the homes demolished, as the single-family dwellings would
not provide the most suitable housing for their population.
Concern remains, however, regarding coordination of post-disengagement
issues: in particular, the question of a Palestinian passage between Gaza
and the West Bank, and the issue of the Philadelphi Corridor (see 'Philadelphi
Corridor'), which have not yet been decided.
Disengagement Administration
The Disengagement Administration is in charge of implementing the disengagement
plan, mainly dealing with compensation to the evacuated settlers. It is
headed by Yonathan Bassi, a member of the national-religious camp. The
Disengagement Administration has become a focus of much antagonism and
criticism from settler groups, most of which has been directed personally
at Bassi, who has even received death threats.
The Disengagement Administration has launched a Hebrew only website (<http://sela.pmo.gov.il/pmo/hitnatkut/),
intended to promote dialogue with the settlers due to be evacuated and
to reduce bureaucracy.
Disengagement plan
PM Ariel Sharon's plan to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and from 300 square
miles of the West Bank and remove all permanent Israeli presence from
these areas. After over three years of Intifada, orchestrated by Yasser
Arafat, Israel reached the conclusion that it has no credible partner
on the Palestinian side, and therefore it must act unilaterally. The disengagement
plan is aimed at breaking the stalemate in the current situation and leading
to a better security situation. It endeavours to reduce the friction with
the Palestinian population. The plan is not intended to replace negotiations,
but can make an important contribution to the renewal of peace talks as
envisaged by the Roadmap (see 'Roadmap'). The death of Arafat in November
2004 and the subsequent election of Mahmoud Abbas as PA Chairman, changed
the concept of the plan from what was initially a unilateral move, to
a move which is being coordinated with the Palestinian Authority (see
'Coordination with Palestinians').
The disengagement plan was approved by Israel's cabinet on 6 June 2004
and by the Knesset in 25 October 2004. Implementation of the plan is due
to commence on 15 August 2005.
Egypt
Egyptian participation and cooperation is considered vital to the success
of the disengagement plan. While various elements of Egypt's participation
are still under consideration, such as the deployment of Egyptian border
guards along their respective side of the boundary, the disengagement
plan does set out some detail of Egyptian involvement. For example, it
is anticipated that Egyptian and other international experts will help
provide security training, assistance and advice to the Palestinian security
forces. Additionally, Israel and Egypt will explore the possibility of
setting up a joint industrial zone on the border of Egypt, Gaza and Israel.
The existing arrangements for international passage between Egypt and
the Gaza Strip will remain in place following disengagement. Israel is
expected to continue its military presence along the area between Egypt
and Gaza known as the Philadelphi Corridor (see 'Philadelphi Corridor')
for the time being; however, the possible military evacuation of the corridor
has been a central topic of debate among senior Israeli officials for
several months. Any future agreement on this issue would also be dependent
on an eventual agreement with Egypt. Furthermore, Israel has expressed
interest in relocating passage to the 'three borders' area to a point
south of its current location, which would require coordination with Egypt.
The Sharm el-Sheik summit in February also saw Egypt's visible efforts
to become a full partner in Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts. Egypt has
created a strategic dialogue with the Palestinian militant factions, particularly
Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and has expressed its willingness to assume some
of the security responsibility ahead of the Israeli disengagement from
Gaza.
Giora Eiland
Major General (ret.) Giora Eiland is Head of the Israeli National Security
Council (NSC) and National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister. As
head of the NSC, Major General Eiland leads the National Steering Committee,
which is responsible for the implementation of the disengagement plan.
Specifically, the steering committee is responsible for all the security
and civilian aspects of the plan's implementation, and has the participation
of the Directors-General of all the relevant ministries.
Erez crossing (also 'Erez industrial zone')
Since the start of the second intifada in 2000, at least 12 Israelis have
been killed in attacks at the Erez crossing and numerous people have been
injured. The crossing was closed in August 2004 following an incident
in which a Palestinian worker was discovered with explosives at the crossing.
In November 2004 a limited number of merchants and workers were permitted
to re-enter Israel and the industrial zone. After being closed again following
a terror attack at the Karni crossing in January 2005, in which six Israelis
were killed, the Erez crossing was reopened in February 2005 in a goodwill
gesture to enable Palestinian workers to enter Israel and the industrial
zone. In the latest incident, in June 2005, a Palestinian woman permitted
to seek medical treatment in Israel was caught at the Erez terminal with
an explosive belt, which she unsuccessfully tried to detonate. The attacks
on the crossing have not been random; rather it has become a target largely
because it has come to symbolise an area of cooperation and collaboration
between Israelis and Palestinians. Ironically, the economic consequences
of the attacks on Erez have effectively hurt Palestinians the most.
Under the terms of the disengagement plan, 'the area of the Erez industrial
zone will be transferred to the responsibility of an agreed upon Palestinian
or international party.' Under a separate arrangement, the Erez crossing
point is to be moved to a location within Israel. The Israeli Navy is
currently refurbishing its observation and radar station at the crossing
to improve border surveillance.
Evacuation Compensation Law
Under the disengagement plan, evacuated settlers are to be compensated
for the loss of their homes, land and businesses. In addition, workers
who lose their jobs as a result of the disengagement will be eligible
for unemployment benefits for up to six months. Originally, the Compensation
Law allowed everyone over the age of 21, who lived at least five consecutive
years in a settlement to be evacuated, to apply for compensation, but
the Supreme Court has ruled that settlers under 21 should also be eligible.
The Court also rejected a clause from the Compensation Law which would
have barred recipients of compensation from filing a civil lawsuit for
damages, as well as a deadline which allowed settlers 30 days to choose
the nature of the compensation plan they preferred.
The total cost of the evacuation package adopted by the Knesset is 3.8
billion shekels (approximately £462 million).
Fatah
Fatah is the secular nationalist party of PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas. The
forthcoming disengagement plan has compelled all Palestinian factions,
including Fatah, to consider their place in Palestinian politics following
the withdrawal. Hence, even prior to Yasser Arafat's death in November
2004, Fatah and Hamas began discussing relevant topics such as a ceasefire
and power sharing in Gaza.
Some Israeli analysts have suggested that Palestinian society is heading
toward a situation in which Fatah and Hamas are the two dominant parties.
Israel is particularly worried that Fatah's weakness, as compared
to Hamas's improved standing in Palestinian politics, may lead to a situation
in which Hamas takes the helm in Gaza. In the short term, Chairman Abbas
will be keen to see the smooth implementation of the disengagement plan.
To this end, he has announced that he will be relocating to Gaza for the
duration of the disengagement.
Still, on 23 July 2005, an Israeli couple from Jerusalem were murdered
by two gunmen of the Islamic Jihad and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades -
the armed wing of Fatah - as they approached the Kissufim junction in
Gaza. How or if Chairman Abbas manages to control Fatah's terror organ,
particularly during disengagement, remains to be seen.
Gaza
Coast Regional Council
The Gaza Coast Regional Council is the representative municipal body bringing
together the 21 Israeli communities of Gaza. These include the Gush Katif
area, Netzarim, Kfar Darom and the northern Gaza communities of Nisanit,
Dugit and Elei Sinai. The Council is currently headed by Itzik Elia.
Gaza security fence
A security fence along the land perimeter of the Gaza Strip was originally
constructed in the mid-1990s. Most of it was destroyed at the beginning
of the second intifada by Palestinian terrorists. It was then rebuilt
in 2001, and its improved security features have enabled the IDF to prevent
nearly all infiltration along the length of the fence.
The IDF had originally shelved plans to build an additional Gaza
security fence when estimates of its total cost (including compensation
for the land used) were seen as possibly running up to 200 million shekels
(approximately £25 million). At the end of July, however, IDF
officials revealed that Israel has begun the process of building
two new fences parallel to the existing border fence, and will
add concrete walls in certain places where Israeli towns are particularly
vulnerable to Palestinian gunfire. One fence will be made of metal and
razor wire, while the other will be equipped with sophisticated technology,
such as sensors and surveillance cameras. It is expected to be completed
by October and all the accompanying infrastructure by mid-2006.
Gaza Strip
The Gaza Strip comprises an area of some 224 square miles and is bordered
by Israel, Egypt and the Mediterranean Sea. Approximately 1.3 million
Palestinians live in Gaza. Direct negotiations leading to the determination
of the permanent status of the Gaza Strip began in September 1999 but
were derailed by the start of the second intifada.
The Israeli settlements constructed in Gaza were built on sand dunes that
were not used by the Palestinian population. Over 8,500 Israelis live
in 21 settlements in Gaza, and are to be evacuated under the plan. According
to the terms of the disengagement plan, 'the State of Israel will evacuate
the Gaza Strip, including all existing Israeli towns and villages', after
which 'there shall no longer be any permanent presence of Israeli security
forces in the areas of the Gaza Strip territory which have been evacuated.'
Prime Minister Sharon issued an order in mid-July officially closing off
Gaza to Israelis who are not residents there, in order to prevent mass
protests by anti-disengagement activists.
Once disengagement has been carried out, Israel will redeploy outside
of Gaza. In addition to guarding the land perimeter, Israel will also
control Gaza's air space and patrol the sea off the coast. The Gaza Strip
is to remain demilitarised and is not to have weaponry not allowed under
existing Israeli-Palestinian agreements. Israel will reserve the right
to re-enter Gaza should it become necessary for self defence purposes.
Gush Katif
Gush Katif is the largest settlement bloc in Gaza, with 15 individual
settlements that are home to some 1,700 families. The first settlements
in Gush Katif were founded in the early 1970s, following the Six Day War
in which Israel gained control of Gaza from Egypt. Located at the southern
end of the Gaza Strip, the settlements of Gush Katif have been the target
of numerous terror attacks.
Most of Gush Katif's residents are involved in agriculture, and the bloc
is one of the Israel's most profitable farming areas. Gush Katif farmers
export tomatoes and carnations to Europe, and also provide specially grown
insect-free vegetables, for the kosher market. Many farmers have planted
crops for this autumn's harvest in protest of the disengagement plan.
Gush Katif is to be evacuated under Stage C of the disengagement plan.
Until recently, most residents of Gush Katif have been reluctant to recognise
the Disengagement Authority or conduct negotiations with it. However,
as disengagement has drawn closer, the pace of negotiations has picked
up. In May 2005, over half of the families of Gush Katif said that they
would be willing to leave Gaza so long as the community could be relocated
en masse. Negotiations over arrangements to relocate the Gush Katif communities
to the Nitzanim area between Ashkelon and Ashdod continue.
Hamas
Many observers have determined that Hamas plans to attempt to derive political
capital from the disengagement plan. PA Chairman Abbas and other Palestinian
officials have issued stern warnings to Hamas not to attempt any activities
prior to or during the disengagement that could jeopardise the pace of
its implementation. However, events on the ground prove that Hamas remains
committed to the practice of terror - after a short period of calm, Hamas
escalated its Qassam rocket and mortar attacks on Jewish communities in
Gaza during July 2005. Moreover, around the same time, PA security forces
clashed with Hamas terrorists in Gaza, resulting in the deaths of two
Palestinians and wounding of 30 others. Reports indicate that Hamas is
in the process of recruiting new members to a militia to be formed in
Gaza after Israel's departure, having already prepared some 20,000 new
uniforms for its operatives and supporters. The militia's purpose, in
addition to the continuation of violence against Israel, would be
to deter the PA from disarming Hamas.
Israel is concerned that Hamas is escalating the violence in order to
later claim that the group's practice of terror has brought Israel's decision
to disengage, which may lead to political gains for Hamas.
Disputes between Hamas and the PA have heated up in the build up to disengagement.
Hamas has refused an offer by PA Chairman Abbas to join a national unity
government. A senior Hamas official in the Gaza Strip, Mahmoud al-Zahar,
recently threatened to continue attacks on Israel from Gaza, as well as
an outright confrontation with the Palestinian Authority, even after disengagement
is implemented 'in order to liberate the West Bank and Jerusalem'. However,
other senior Hamas officials have been quick to assuage fears of civil
war: Sheikh Hassan Yusuf, a senior Hamas leader in Ramallah, has released
a statement saying that Zahar's threat was an exaggeration of the different
stances between Hamas and the PA.
Herzliya conference
On 18 December 2003, PM Ariel Sharon spoke at the Interdisciplinary Centre's
fourth annual Herzliya conference, and articulated his vision for moving
forward toward peace with the Palestinians. This was the first official
announcement that Israel was prepared to take unilateral measures if the
Palestinians did not fulfil their commitments to the Roadmap. Until the
conference, the prime minister was on record as an opponent of unilateral
moves, and an exponent of the principle that Jewish settlements in the
disputed areas constituted a vital security presence that might only be
removed as the result of a bilateral peace agreement. In the preceding
months, however, there had been certain indications that a major new policy
initiative was in the process of being formulated. Specifically, statements
made by Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, known as a close confidant
of Sharon, had alerted observers to a possible shift in thinking at the
highest levels.
Almost immediately after Sharon's speech, the whole policy discussion
on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was refocused around the disengagement
plan.
Infrastructure in Gaza following disengagement
Israeli and Palestinian officials have agreed that evacuated settler homes
in the Gaza Strip are to be demolished following the implementation of
the disengagement plan. PA officials have confirmed that the dwellings,
built to house single families, do not suit the needs of their population.
Israeli officials, for their part, had expressed concern at the likely
impact of images showing Palestinian terrorists and their supporters triumphantly
entering settlements as the IDF withdraws. Israel has expressed the hope
that the areas where the settlements stood will be used by the PA to house
Palestinian refugees, thus enhancing the status of PA Chairman Mahmoud
Abbas. Also, according to reports in late July 2005, a spokesperson of
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) said that
the US government has agreed in principle to pay between US$ 8 and 10
million (£4.5 - 5.7 million) to buy the hothouses owned by Jewish
residents of Gaza and give them to the Palestinians in an effort to boost
their economy.
Likewise, Israel may transfer other infrastructure - including industrial,
commercial and agricultural facilities - to a third, international party
that will put them to use for the benefit of the Palestinian population
that is not involved in terror. Infrastructure relating to water, electricity,
sewage and telecommunications will remain in place. Israel will also continue
to supply electricity, water, gas and petrol to the Palestinians, in accordance
with current arrangements. Other existing arrangements, such as those
relating to water and the electro-magnetic sphere, shall remain in force.
However, Israel intends to remove 'sensitive structures', such as synagogues,
out of concern that they would be desecrated after the evacuation.
International diplomatic support
The disengagement plan was initially met with scepticism from the international
community. However, as the plan gained momentum and Sharon gained credibility,
the international mood also changed with virtually all the significant
international players lending public support and viewing the plan as a
means of re-energising the peace process.
US President George W. Bush has endorsed the plan, as have senior US officials.
British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Foreign Secretary Jack Straw have
also expressed their support of the plan, describing it as a courageous
and important step toward the resumption of bilateral peace negotiations.
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan praised PM Sharon's courage and determination
on implementing the disengagement plan. The EU, the Quartet (UN, US, EU
and Russia) and the G8 have also reaffirmed their support for the disengagement
plan, seeing it as an opportunity to revitalise the Roadmap. Support has
also come from within the Arab world, with Jordan's King Abdullah and
Egypt's Hosni Mubarak welcoming the plan as a helpful step towards peace
in the Middle East.
International economic support
International economic support has been pledged to boost the Palestinian
economy after Israel's withdrawal. At the March 2005 London Meeting on
Supporting the Palestinian Authority, representatives of the international
community promised to provide the Palestinians with financial aid. Prime
Minister Tony Blair noted at the meeting that the EU will be providing
a further US$ 330 million (£188 million), while the United States
had already pledged US$ 350 million (£200 million) in aid to the
Palestinians. In July, leaders at the G8 summit decided to double international
aid to the Palestinian Authority - amounting to US$ 2 billion per year
(approximately $600 per person).
In mid-April, James Wolfensohn, former president of the World Bank, was
appointed the Quartet Special Envoy for Disengagement, with the charge
of helping oversee the disengagement plan and aiding in coordinating revitalisation
efforts in Gaza afterwards. Wolfensohn has already visited the region
several times in an effort to push for increased international funding
to help improve the daily lives of Palestinians. He has been promoting
a number of specific projects, among them the proposed rail link between
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, to which Prime Minister Sharon is reported
to have given his agreement.
Islamic Jihad
Despite being a small organisation and of relatively marginal political
importance in Palestinian life, Palestinian Islamic Jihad is considerably
potent as a paramilitary and terror organisation. Although its leaders
made pledges earlier this year to participate in a 'period of calm' (tahdi'a),
these promises did not carry much weight in actuality, as evidenced by
the terror incidents it has subsequently carried out: since the Sharm
el-Sheikh summit in February, Islamic Jihad has engineered acts of terrorism
which have claimed the lives of 14 Israelis and injured hundreds more.
Jewish residents of Gaza
There are approximately 8,500 Jewish residents of the Gaza Strip. They
come from a wide variety of backgrounds, as evidenced in their reasons
for choosing to live in Gaza. Some view their presence in Gaza as the
fulfilment of an ideological attachment to the 'Greater Land of Israel'.
Others see Gaza as a strategic asset for Israel. Some were motivated to
take up residence in Gaza because of more affordable housing, while others
have spoken of the beautiful landscape and the love of the sea as part
of their initial attraction to moving there. Many have cited the close-knit
communities of the Gaza settlements as a crucial part of their lives,
and indeed this is why several communities have requested that the Disengagement
Authority relocate all of the families of a community together.
Judicial review
On 9 June 2005, Israel's High Court of Justice rejected 12 petitions by
opponents of the disengagement plan, ruling that the disengagement plan
is legal and does not violate the settlers' human rights, including the
right to property, freedom of vocation and human dignity of those being
evacuated under the plan. However, the court did rescind four financial
arrangements relating to compensation for the evacuees.
Karni crossing
The Karni crossing was built in 1993 to enable Palestinian merchants to
import and export goods to and from Gaza. Located near Gaza City, it has
been the site of various terror attacks; at times, terrorists have also
managed to gain entry into Israel through this crossing. In 1996, an Islamic
Jihad terrorist entered Israel through the Karni crossing and subsequently
carried out an attack in Tel Aviv, killing 13 Israelis and injuring 125.
More recently, the terrorists who carried out the double suicide attack
at the Ashdod port in March 2004 were smuggled through the Karni crossing.
Ten people were killed in the attack. In the latest attack, six Israelis
were killed and five injured in a bombing and shooting attack by Palestinian
terrorists in January 2005.
In tandem with the disengagement plan, Israel and the PA have agreed to
a series of measures to improve the daily life of Palestinians, including
the easing of Palestinian entry into Israel from Gaza and increasing the
operational hours of the Karni crossing.
Knesset vote
Israel's Knesset voted to approve the disengagement plan in October 2004.
The vote was 67 in favour, 45 against, with 7 abstentions and one member
absent.
Education Minister Limor Livnat and Finance Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
initially threatened to abstain, but voted in favour of the withdrawal
along with Ministers Silvan Shalom and Tzachi Hanegbi. Altogether 23 Likud
MKs voted in favour of the plan, while 17 voted against it. A total of
21 Labour and One Nation MKs voted in favour, as did 14 Shinui MKs, six
Yahad MKs, two United Arab List members and one National Union MK. All
eleven Shas MKs voted against the plan, on the orders of the party's spiritual
leader Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, as did six National Religious Party members,
six National Union MKs and five United Torah Judaism MKs. Three Hadash
MKs and three Balad MKs abstained, as did one One Nation MK. Minister
Uzi Landau and Deputy Industry and Trade Minister Michael Ratzon both
voted against the plan, and were promptly dismissed from the governing
coalition immediately after the vote. Prime Minister Sharon had warned
just prior to the vote that he would sack any ministers and deputies who
voted against the plan.
Likud rebels
The Likud rebels consist of those Likud party MKs (members of Knesset)
who are actively opposed to the disengagement plan and seek to undermine
it. MK Uzi Landau, who was dismissed from his position in the cabinet
in October 2004, is generally seen as the head of the group. The exact
number of Likud rebels has fluctuated, with support coming from between
ten to 18 Likud MKs at a given time. The rebels have made various attempts
to thwart the disengagement plan. Among the most prominent was a campaign
calling for a national referendum on the plan. However, the Constitution
Committee bill they were instrumental in devising was defeated by a Knesset
plenum vote in March 2005.
The Likud rebels' latest campaign against the disengagement plan was launched
in June 2005. It aims to decrease public support for the disengagement
plan in the hopes that the government will be compelled to suspend its
implementation. The campaigners have produced a booklet outlining what
they regard as the dangers of the plan, which they hope to distribute
to 1.5 million homes in Israel. Additionally, advertising space has been
purchased for anti-disengagement slogans to appear on buses throughout
Israel.
Maoz Hayam Hotel
Formerly Gush Katif's Palm Beach Hotel, this 114-room complex had become
home to 30 settler families determined to resist the implementation of
Disengagement. Among those who had taken up residence at the hotel are
Nadia Matar, formerly leader of the Women in Green organisation, and other
prominent pro-settlement activists, including Baruch Marzel, former leader
of the outlawed Kach organisation, and Itamar Ben-Gvir.
The hotel was considered one of the main centres of anti-disengagement
protests, and it was expected to be a focal area of determined resistance
during the implementation of Disengagement. The authorities believed that
elements among those at the hotel had been planning incitement and acts
of violence against the security forces. In late June 2005, a large Israeli
police force entered the Gush Katif settlement bloc and evacuated the
Maoz Hayam hotel. The evacuation proceeded without serious violence.
National Unity Government
The Knesset plenum approved the current national unity government in January
2005. It is comprised of the Likud, Labour and United Torah Judaism (UTJ)
Knesset parties. Negotiations for a new national unity government began
when Prime Minister Sharon dismissed his main coalition partner, the secular
centrist Shinui party, in December 2004 after its ministers voted against
the 2005 state budget bill.
One of the main aims in the creation of the current national unity government
was to ensure a majority in favour of the disengagement plan and for other
major policy decisions. Interestingly, MKs from the left-wing Yahad party,
while not members of the coalition, voted in favour of the national unity
government with the aim of enabling the disengagement plan to be carried
out. Additionally, at the end of March, Shinui MKs lent support to the
State Budget, after securing a monetary deal with PM Sharon, thus enabling
the budget - which established the funding for disengagement - to pass.
The Likud-Labour-UTJ coalition saw the return of the Labour party to the
government for the first time since the Likud-Labour national unity government
faltered at the end of 2002. Under the terms of coalition agreement, Labour
party chairman Shimon Peres was given the position of vice premier.
Nitzan
The town of Nitzan is located near the Nitzanim sand dunes nature reserve,
between the Israeli cities of Ashdod and Ashkelon. Some 90 families reside
in this small religious community. In order to accommodate the influx
of Gaza evacuees under the disengagement plan, approximately 450 permanent
houses are to be built under the expansion of the town - about five times
the number of houses that already exist in Nitzan. Additionally, some
400 temporary housing units will be placed at the site.
Following a petition from residents of Nitzan to the High Court of Justice,
an agreement was reached in July 2005 between the Nitzan community and
the government to maintain the religious identity of the town. It has
also been agreed that only disengagement evacuees will be offered permanent
housing in the town, rather than opening the offer to the general public.
The government has said that it will remove the temporary housing at Nitzan
within four years, and will take measures to return the site to an agricultural
area.
Nitzanim plan
The possibility of relocating families evacuated under the disengagement
plan to the Nitzanim area between Ashkelon and Ashdod picked up speed
in April 2005, when Prime Minister Ariel Sharon met with settler representatives
to discuss the idea. Following the meeting, PM Sharon set up an independent
task force to look into the Nitzanim proposal, and he also personally
visited the area. In May 2005, Israel's National Planning and Building
Council ordered the preparation of detailed plans for relocating evacuated
settlers to the Nitzanim area, which PM Sharon welcomed. In June the Israeli
cabinet okayed an agreement approving the resettlement of Gush Katif evacuees
to the area.
While the precise details of the plan are still being worked out, 426
families who are to be evacuated had already signed up for the Nitzanim
plan by mid-May 2005. It is expected that hundreds of additional families
may also join these families. Environmental groups have protested the
use of the Nitzanim area for the relocation of Gaza evacuees, as the area
contains a nature reserve with unique sand dunes and a delicate ecosystem.
Opinion polls
Throughout the development of the disengagement plan, opinion polls have
consistently shown that a majority of Israelis are in favour of disengaging
from the Gaza Strip and four settlements in the northern West Bank. At
their peak, the polls saw over 70% of adult Israelis (including Israeli
Arabs) saying they were in favour of unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza
Strip.
In early June 2005, public support dropped to its lowest point, with only
48% of Israelis in favour of disengagement and 33% opposed. The decrease
was attributed to the unease and confusion felt by the public over the
divide between the government and the settler movement regarding disengagement.
Analysts noted that uncertainty over whether disengagement would lead
to an immediately reinvigorated peace process, given the increase in Palestinian
violence in June, were also to account for decreased support for the disengagement
plan. Public opinion polls taken in early July reflected a rise in support
for the disengagement plan, showing between 54% to 62% of Israelis in
favour of the disengagement plan.
Opposition to the disengagement plan
Anti-disengagement activists have been vociferous in their condemnation
of the disengagement plan since it became a significant initiative. Their
methods of opposition have ranged from political attempts to thwart the
plan (see 'Likud rebels'), to assorted forms of protest. In June 2004
over 100,000 Israelis took part in a 'human chain' demonstration stretching
from Gaza to Jerusalem, in what was the first large-scale protest act
which the settlement movement planned as part of a planned campaign of
non-violent civil disobedience. Subsequent protests have included utilising
the colour orange (see 'Orange') in clothing and ribbons tied to vehicles,
blocking rush hour traffic on major Israeli arteries, planting fake bombs
in populated locations and camping out in front of the Knesset.
The prospect of further demonstrations and attempts to block roads is
expected to place the judicial system under some stress in the weeks ahead.
During the implementation of the disengagement plan, opposition is particularly
expected from the 'ideological settlements' (those communities whose residents
view themselves as having fulfilled an ideological or religious - rather
than strategic or defence-motivated - purpose by settling the land). For
example, in the evacuation of the four northern West Bank settlements,
officials believe that opposition will come from Sa-Nur and Homesh, both
of which are classified as 'ideological settlements'.
Orange
Orange is the representative colour of the anti-disengagement camp.
It is based on the 'flagship colour' of Gush Katif, as the settlement
bloc in the Gaza Strip is slated for evacuation under the disengagement
plan. Anti-disengagement Israelis and those wishing to express solidarity
with the protesters have taken to tying orange ribbons to their cars,
distributing orange posters around the country and flying orange-tinted Israeli
flags. Additionally, in efforts to raise support, anti-disengagement protesters
have organised orange parties and other social events. Some have donned
orange clothing, including t-shirts and the currently very fashionable
wristbands. Even anti-disengagement Israeli brides have been seen
with orange ribbons tied to their wedding dresses and bouquets.
Hence, the use of 'disengagement orange', as the particular shade is
dubbed, has been considered an extremely effective marketing campaign.
In fact, at the end of June 2005 the Arab Balad party announced that it
intended to appeal to the Haifa district court to ban the Yesha Council
(see 'Yesha Council') from using the colour as part of its campaign. Balad
has associated itself with and used the colour orange since 1999, and
thus argues that the anti-disengagement campaigners have usurped
the colour from them and caused Balad 'immeasurable damage'. However,
the orange campaign has not always been successful: in December 2004 a
group of settlers began producing orange Stars of David to sew to their
clothing. Given the memory of similar yellow stars that Jews were forced
to wear during the Holocaust, the orange stars were met with a nationwide
outcry and the star campaign was discarded.
Interestingly, the success of the orange campaign has meant
that orange clothing, often very popular during the summer in Israel,
has become a fashion faux pas for those not associated with the anti-disengagement
campaign. Numerous Israeli clothing retailers have said that clothing
in orange hues has largely remained on the shelves. Even Prime Minister
Sharon has reportedly stopped wearing one of his favourite ties, which
features shades of orange.
Palestinian Authority
The Palestinian Authority, and PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas in particular,
have stressed their desire to ensure the smooth implementation of the
disengagement plan. Hence, Chairman Abbas set up a 5,000-member security
force in June, whose mandate is to prevent any potential looting or takeover
of the settlements in Gaza once they are evacuated. However, there is
concern that Palestinian forces will have to contend with terror elements
from radical Palestinian organisations, who are seen as 'street authorities'
in certain areas, and that they may not be strong enough to cope with
these forces.
Chairman Abbas has said that the PA will permit 'peaceful and organised
celebrations' in the settlements after they are evacuated. At the same
time, he has said that he intends to prevent chaos caused by more powerful
radical groups who view Israel's disengagement as a victory.
Israel is concerned that the PA has not made sufficient efforts to dismantle
Palestinian terror organisations and their infrastructure, particularly
in the run up to disengagement. Stressing that disengagement will not
occur under fire, Israel continues to demand that the PA fulfil its obligations
to crack down on terrorism.
Philadelphi Corridor
The Philadelphi Corridor (also known as the Philadelphi Route) is located
on the border between Gaza and Egypt. It is ten kilometres in length and
is used by the IDF to patrol the boundary primarily for infiltration and
weapons smuggling. The Oslo Accords (1994) specified that the IDF would
continue to control this narrow strip of land between the area under Palestinian
control and Egypt. According to the text of the revised disengagement
plan, Israel is to maintain a military presence along the Philadelphi
Corridor to prevent the smuggling of weapons across the border. This situation
will be adjusted when the security situation and cooperation with Egypt
allows for an augmented security arrangement.
Senior Israeli and Egyptian officials have been involved in negotiations
for an agreement whereby Egyptian police officers will be deployed on
the western side of the corridor to aid in preventing weapons smuggling
into Gaza. However, it initially appeared that one of the main obstacles
to reaching such an agreement was that the terms of the 1979 peace treaty
between Israel and Egypt specify that the Egyptian Sinai peninsula is
to be a demilitarised zone. Thus, there has been much debate in the Knesset
and the IDF on how to handle this situation.
While Israel and Egypt have agreed in principle that Egypt will deploy
750 border guards opposite the Philadelphi Corridor, the finalisation
of this agreement is still in progress. Israeli officials including PM
Sharon reportedly decided in July that if an agreement is reached with
Egypt, the IDF would plan to withdraw from the Philadelphi Corridor at
the beginning of October.
Qassam rockets
Qassam rockets are crudely constructed weapons that have been used against
Israeli targets since the second intifada began at the end of September
2000. There are believed to be three types of Qassam rocket to date, which
have target ranges of up to 12 kilometres. Each one is approximately two
metres long and packed with explosives. Once launched by terrorists inside
the Gaza Strip, the unguided rockets land quickly. In addition to causing
damage to buildings, Qassam have also caused injuries and death, most
recently killing a 22-year-old Israeli resident of the Negev moshav Netiv
Hasa'ara, situated several kilometres north of the Gaza Strip. The Negev
town of Sderot and the Gaza settlements have been the primary targets
of Qassam rocket attacks.
The Hamas terror organisation has been at the forefront of developing
these homemade rockets. One of the current uncertainties is how Israel
will handle the threat of Qassam rockets, should it continue after the
implementation of the disengagement plan. The Qassam 4 is expected to
have a range of 17 km, placing even more Israeli territory under threat.
Forty-six Israeli communities located in the western Negev desert will
be within range of Qassam rocket fire following disengagement.
Referendum
On 2 May 2004, 193,000 Likud members voted 60% to 40% against the disengagement
plan. A month earlier, when PM Sharon announced he would be holding a
referendum of his party members, it was widely expected that he would
be supported by a majority of members. However, polls of party members
revealed that the main reason Likud voters did not back the plan was that
they did not believe it would improve security and they saw it as a reward
for terrorism. Despite the referendum results, which are non-binding,
Sharon continued to press ahead with the disengagement plan.
The issue of a national referendum on the disengagement plan came before
the Knesset in March 2005, after Likud 'rebels' (See 'Likud rebels') brought
a bill authorising a referendum on the plan. However, the bill was defeated
by 72 votes to 39, with 3 abstentions and 6 MKs absent from the vote.
Although the vote cleared a major hurdle on the road to disengagement,
it also confirmed the strength of the Likud 'rebels' within Likud, as
only 13 members of Likud's 40-strong Knesset bloc voted against the bill,
including PM Sharon himself. Interestingly, members of the Knesset's Shinui
faction, though officially members of the opposition, voted against the
referendum bill.
Refuseniks
In the context of disengagement, 'Refusenik' is a term used to denote
Israeli commanders, soldiers and reservists who refuse to obey orders
to evacuate settlements. The first case of refusing orders in the disengagement
process came when Corporal Avi Beiber refused to participate in an IDF
house demolition operation in Shirat HaYam in Gush Katif in June 2005.
He was eventually sentenced to 28 days in military prison.
Disobeying specific orders is considered an anathema among Israel's leadership
and within Israeli society. IDF Chief of Staff Dan Halutz has been outspoken
about his view that, despite the disengagement being an extremely sensitive
issue for all Israelis, the IDF will not tolerate soldiers and commanders
who refuse to obey orders. Halutz has approved several steps to increase
disciplinary measures against soldiers who refuse orders. Among the new
initiatives, a soldier convicted of refusing an order would no longer
be permitted to serve as a combat soldier, and 'refuseniks' would expect
to receive prison sentences. Additionally, those 'refuseniks' from hesder
yeshivas (which combine IDF service with yeshiva study) will lose the
privilege of alternating service and yeshiva study, and instead of a 14-month
army service would have to serve for the full three years of standard
IDF service.
Although some prominent rabbis opposing disengagement have urged soldiers
to refuse orders, other prominent rabbis and leading Israeli figures also
opposing disengagement have strongly encouraged soldiers to obey orders
despite personal beliefs.
Roadmap
The Roadmap peace proposal, published in April 2003, envisages an Israeli
and a Palestinian state living 'side by side in peace.' It was drawn up
by the 'Quartet' (The EU, UN, US and Russia) and it set benchmarks aimed
at bringing Israelis and Palestinians toward the ultimate goal of a comprehensive
and permanent settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (see Text of Roadmap).
The disengagement plan does not replace or contradict the Roadmap. PM
Sharon has stated that Israel is still committed to the Roadmap, which
remains the only political plan for a peaceful solution with the Palestinians.
He said if the disengagement plan is successfully implemented and coordinated
with the Palestinians, it would then be possible to return to the Roadmap,
as long as the Palestinians end terror and violence and carry out necessary
reforms.
Sderot
The Israeli development town of Sderot is located in the western Negev
desert near the Gaza Strip. It has a population of some 24,000 residents,
more than half of whom are from the former Soviet Union and many others
from Ethiopia and North Africa. Because of its close proximity to Gaza
- at a distance of less than one kilometre from the Palestinian town of
Beit Hanoun - it has been the site of a continuous barrage of Qassam rocket
attacks. In June 2004, a man and a young child from Sderot were killed
by a Qassam rocket as they walked to a shopping centre, in what were the
first casualties caused by the improvised missiles. Two children in the
town were killed by Qassam rockets in September 2004.
An early warning detection system, which emits a warning announcement
upon detecting an incoming Qassam rocket, was unveiled in Sderot, Kibbutz
Nir Am and Sapir College in October 2004. However, it remains to be precisely
determined how Israel will handle the threat of Qassam rockets should
it continue after the implementation of the disengagement plan.
Security forces carrying out evacuation
The evacuation of civilians from settlements under the disengagement plan
will be carried out by some 40,000 Israel Defence Force soldiers and 4,000
Israel Police personnel. The security forces have been preparing for disengagement
for several months, trying to envisage all the possible scenarios and
finalising operative plans for the evacuation. Psychologists will help
commanders prepare the forces and provide answers to problems that may
arise during the operation.
Settlements will be evacuated one at a time and during the day (except
on Saturday). An officer with the rank of Major or higher will try to
convince the family to leave on its own, but if it refuses he will call
the removal squad - a team of police officers backed by soldiers. Female
soldiers and officers will remove female settlers. Buses will move settlers
to collection points outside the Gaza Strip, and ambulances will be stationed
around the settlements in case of emergency. The property of the evacuees
will be loaded on defence ministry trucks and transferred. The area will
be secured by additional police personnel and soldiers to prevent anti-disengagement
activists from entering the settlements. They will also guard against
potential Palestinian terror attacks.
The Justice Ministry has said that the state will take full responsibility
for all actions undertaken by security forces during evacuations and other
confrontations with settlers and their supporters, thus shielding soldiers
and police from lawsuits by the settlers.
Sharm el-Sheikh summit
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud
Abbas, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, and King Abdullah of Jordan convened
for a summit meeting on February 8, 2005 in Sharm el-Sheikh, at the southern
tip of the Sinai Peninsula. At the summit, Prime Minister Sharon and PA
Chairman Abbas declared a cease-fire and agreed on a process of transferring
security responsibility for Palestinian areas to the PA. Israel also agreed
to a series of confidence-building measures, including the release of
hundreds of Palestinian prisoners.
Sharon told the summit participants of his determination to carry out
the disengagement plan. He added that although the plan was initiated
by a unilateral decision, if changes emerge on the Palestinian side disengagement
can become 'the new starting point for a coordinated, successful process.'
Ariel Sharon
Ariel Sharon was sworn in as Israel's 11th Prime Minister in March 2001
and was re-elected to a second term in January 2003. In the past, Sharon
was regarded as a leading proponent of the settlement enterprise. However,
since becoming prime minister, Sharon has made many public statements
in favour of the creation of a Palestinian state, acknowledging the need
to dismantle settlements. In October 2001, Sharon told Likud members that
he would agree to an independent Palestinian state if Israel's security
was guaranteed. Speaking at the third annual Herzliya conference in December
2002, Sharon spoke of the need to make compromises for true peace and
welcomed US President Bush's vision of a Palestinian state living side-by-side
with Israel. In April 2003, Sharon was interviewed in Israeli newspaper
Ha'aretz, where he expressed his willingness to make efforts to reach
peace with the Palestinians, including the potential dismantlement of
settlements.
In the fourth annual Herzliya conference in December 2003 (see 'Herzliya
conference'), Sharon outlined his new policy initiative of unilateral
disengagement. In the following months, the plan was given more detail
and gained momentum and support. Despite the difficulties he has encountered,
Sharon is determined to go ahead and implement the disengagement plan.
Smuggling tunnels
Numerous tunnels have been constructed beneath the border of Egypt and
Gaza since 1982, when the city of Rafah was divided. The tunnels are used
to smuggle weapons, goods, drugs and terrorists to and from Gaza. As other
routes for smuggling have diminished due to the sealing of the border
between Gaza and Israel, as well as to improved security along the sea
route, the establishment of smuggling tunnels has grown.
Particularly since the start of the second intifada, Palestinian terrorists
have managed to acquire an abundant supply of weapons and the ability
to upgrade their arsenal through these tunnels. Palestinian terror organisations
have pressured many of the residents of Rafah to host and permit the building
of these tunnels within their property, even though they are clearly a
safety hazard, and indeed the tunnels have been extremely profitable for
those who control access to them. While the IDF has managed to uncover
and seal off many of these tunnels, the Palestinian Authority will need
to assume increased responsibility in closing off and preventing the proliferation
of these tunnels.
West Bank settlements
Israel plans to disengage from 300 square miles of the northern West Bank,
and four Jewish communities in the area are scheduled to be dismantled
as part of the Disengagement Plan: Ganim, Kadim, Homesh and Sanur. Israel
will withdraw all permanent military installations in the area, and will
redeploy outside the evacuated area. According to the disengagement plan,
the move will provide Palestinian territorial contiguity in the northern
parts of the West Bank, it will make it easier for Palestinians to live
a normal life in the West Bank, and will facilitate economic and commercial
activity.
According to the Disengagement Administration, 30 families from Homesh
will move as a community to Kibbutz Yad Hannah, which will become a rural
cooperative community. Residents of Sa Nur, meanwhile, are stocking up
on supplies in an effort to prevent the evacuation of the settlement.
Yesha Council
The Council of Jewish Communities in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district
('Yesha' is a Hebrew acronym for Judea, Samaria and Gaza) was founded
in the late 1970's. The Council is chaired by Bentzi Lieberman and represents
all of the Jewish cities, towns and villages in the West Bank and Gaza.
The Yesha Council stands at the forefront of the opposition to the disengagement
plan.
Appendix - the 25 settlements to be evacuated under the disengagement
plan
Disengagement is set to occur in four stages. Following the completion
of each stage, Israel's cabinet will convene and agree to proceed with
the next stage. However, Defence Minister Shaul Mofaz has proposed that
disengagement be carried out continuously, rather than divided into four
phases.
In the first stage, the Gaza Strip settlements of Morag, Netzarim and
Kfar Darom (Group A) are to be evacuated. Group B includes the four communities
of the northern West Bank: Ganim, Kadim, Homesh and Sa Nur. Group C will
see the evacuation of the communities of the Gush Katif settlement bloc.
Group D will see the evacuation of the three communities of the northern
Gaza Strip: Elei Sinai, Dugit and Nisanit.
Gaza Strip - 21 settlements
Atzmona (Bnei Atzmon) - Founded in 1979, Atzmona is home to 75
families comprised of 574 individuals. Originally founded after the Yamit
settlement was evacuated in the Sinai, and was then re-established in
Gaza. Most of the residents work in agriculture. It is one of the settlements
of the Gush Katif settlement bloc.
Bedolah - Bedolah is home to 35 families numbering 217 people.
One of the settlements of Gush Katif, it was established in 1986 by a
second generation of Israeli residents of the southern Gaza Strip along
with residents of communities in the Lachish and Sharon regions. Bedolah
is a religious settlement whose residents work mostly in agriculture.
Dugit - Dugit was founded in 1990. Located in the northern section
of the Gaza Strip, it is home to about 20 families with 76 individuals.
It is a secular fishing village whose residents work in a variety of fields,
including rescue services, fish breeding, marine agriculture and tourism.
It is one of the three settlements of the northern Gaza Strip.
Elei Sinai - Another one of the three northern Gaza settlements,
Elei Sinai was established in 1983. Some 95 families, or some 450 people,
live there. Elei Sinai was founded by a group of settlers, some of whom were
evacuated from Yamit in the Sinai in accordance with the 1979 Israel-Egypt
peace treaty. Most of its residents are secular professionals.
Gadid - One of the Gush Katif settlements, Gadid was founded in
1982. Sixty families comprised of over 350 people live in Gadid. It is
a religious settlement, with a large French population, and most of its
residents work in hothouse farming.
Gan Or - Seventy families, or some 400 people, live in the Gush
Katif settlement of Gan Or. It was established in 1983 by members of Hesder
Yeshivot and the Bnei Akiva movement, and thus was founded on the principles
of Torah study and labour (Torah v'Avodah). Its residents work in professional
trades as well as hothouse farming.
Ganei Tal - Ganei Tal was established in 1979 and today has a population
of some 450 people, or 80 families. Members of the Bnei Akiva movement
founded this religious settlement in Gush Katif. All of its residents
serve in the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) through the Nahal (a framework
which combines military service in a combat unit with civilian service
in a newly founded kibbutz or moshav) and Hesder Yeshivot (a framework
which combines Torah study and IDF service). Most of the residents work
in agriculture, primarily cultivating vegetables, flowers, spices and
home and garden plants. Others work in professional trades.
Katif - Katif was founded in 1985 as one of the Gush Katif settlements.
Sixty-five families, or some 354 people, reside in this community. It
was originally founded as an IDF outpost and then became a civilian settlement
in 1997. Most of the residents of this religious community work in agriculture.
Kerem Atzmona - One of the newer settlements in Gush Katif, Kerem
Atzmona was established in 2001 and has a population of 15 families, or
about 60 people. It is located between Morag and Atzmona at the southern
end of the Gaza Strip. Kerem Atzmona is a religious settlement whose residents
work primarily in professional trades as well as in education.
Kfar Darom - Kfar Darom was established as a kibbutz in 1946. During
Israel's War of Independence, its settlers were evacuated and the kibbutz
was captured by the Egyptians. Kfar Darom was then re-established in 1970
on the site of the original kibbutz. It is a religious settlement with
a population of 65 families, totalling over 360 people. Its residents
work in vegetable agriculture, mostly cultivating insect-free vegetables
that are sold in Israel and exported throughout the world. Some of its
residents also work in professional and education capacities.
Kfar Yam - Kfar Yam was established in 1983. Only four families
live in this community. Located west of Neveh Dekalim, Kfar Yam is next
to the Shirat Hayam settlement and is considered part of an isolated cluster
of settlements in the Gush Katif settlement bloc.
Morag - Morag was first established in 1972, and has a population
of 37 families or about 200 people in total. It was originally set up
as a Nahal outpost and then became a civilian settlement in 1983. It is
a religious community whose residents work predominantly in agriculture,
farming tomatoes, worm-free vegetables and spices in hothouses. It is
one of the settlements of Gush Katif.
Netzarim - Established in 1972, Netzarim is home to some 70 families
totalling over 450 people. It was originally set up as an outpost of Hashomer
Hazair, the Socialist Zionist Youth Movement, and in 1984 became a transit
base for Katif settlers. Netzarim is comprised mostly of religious Israelis
and many are employed in the fields of agriculture, education and other
professional trades.
Netzer Hazani - Netzer Hazani was established in 1972. It is home
to 410 people, or 70 families. Netzer Hazani was the first settlement
in the Gush Katif bloc, and was first set up as an IDF outpost.
It became a civilian settlement in 1977. Most of the residents of this
religious community work in agriculture.
Neveh Dekalim - Established in 1983, Neveh Dekalim is the
largest settlement in the Gaza Strip, with more than 2,500 residents in
over 520 families. It is a religious-urban settlement and is considered
the core of the Gush Katif settlement bloc. Regional council
offices, religious and health services, a commercial centre, an industrial
area and numerous educational institutions are located in Neveh Dekalim.
Nisanit - Nisanit was established in 1984, and has a population
of over 1,200 people in more than 300 families. It began as an IDF outpost,
and in 1993 became a civilian settlement. Most of the residents in this
predominantly secular community are professionals. It is one of the three
Israeli settlements located at the northern tip of the Gaza Strip.
Pe'at Sadeh - One of the communities in the Gush Katif settlement
bloc, Pe'at Sadeh was founded in 1989. First founded as a temporary camp,
Pe'at Sadeh became a permanent settlement in 1993. It is a secular community
whose residents mostly work in agriculture. Twenty families, including
more than 110 people, live in this community.
Rafiah Yam - Rafiah Yam was established in 1984. Twenty-five families,
including 145 people, live in this predominantly secular community located
just 200 metres from the Egyptian border. While some of its residents
work in professional trades, most are employed in agriculture. It is one
of the Gush Katif settlements.
Shalev - Shalev was established in 1980. Only ten families numbering
around 40 people live in this Gush Katif community. It was first established
as an outpost and utilised as a temporary camp for the Gush Katif settlers.
It then became a permanent settlement in 1993. Most of Shalev's residents
are religious and work in agriculture, while others are employed in professional
trades.
Shirat Hayam - One of the newer Gush Katif communities, Shirat Hayam
was set up in 2000 as 'the Jewish answer to terrorism'. It is a religious
community home to 16 families or approximately 70 people. It is located
at the edge of the sea (hence its name, which means 'song of the sea')
next to Neveh Dekalim. Shirat Hayam's residents work in agriculture and
the professional trades.
Tel Katifa - Established in 1992, Tel Katifa is a religious community
whose residents work mostly in agriculture. This Gush Katif community
is home to 22 families made up of over 100 people. Tel Katifa is located
next to the beach and has a natural lake. It was founded one year prior
to the signing of the Oslo Accords.
Northern West Bank - four settlements
Ganim - Ganim was established in 1983. It is a secular community
that was founded by a group of families from northern Israel, with the
intention of founding a chain of settlements in the northern West Bank.
Forty families, or approximately 170 people, live in Ganim.
Homesh - Homesh is a mixed community with both religious and secular
residents. Israel's National Labour Party first established it as a Nahal
outpost in 1980. It became a civilian settlement in 1988, and is home
to 70 families numbering 230 people.
Kadim - Kadim is a secular community that was founded in 1981 as a
Nahal outpost. It then became a civilian settlement in 1983, to which
families from Sa Nur relocated to establish the community. It is
home to 40 families or about 170 individuals.
Sa Nur - Originally, Sa Nur was a small artists' colony, attracting
some famous immigrant artists from the former USSR. It was also originally
called Dotan and was used as a temporary training camp for settlers in
the area. Sa Nur is a mixed (religious and secular) community founded
in 1987. It was first inhabited by the settlers who set up Mevo Dotan,
as well as those who later established Ganim and Kadim. More than 100
people in some 20 families reside in Sa Nur.
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