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Update
from AIJAC
Likud rebuffs
Sharon again / Hezbollah and the Palestinians
August
23, 2004
Number 08/04 #08
Today's Update
concentrates on the implications of Sharon's failure to get the approval
of his Likud party at its convention last week to negotiate a national
unity coalition with Labor in order to push forward with disengagement.
First, BICOM
has a good general analysis of the motivations and options for Sharon
now. It says elections are unlikely in the short term, at least. For this
full discussion, CLICK HERE
Next, academic
expert Emanuele Ottolenghi argues that it was the Likud party that was
most hurt by the vote and a split may now be likely. He predicts Sharon
will continue to successfully press on with his disengagement planes.
For his analysis, CLICK HERE.
Finally,
we include a summary of the latest evidence of a substantial role for
Hezbollah in Palestinian terror groups. It comes from a research centre
led by Gen. Yaakov Amidror who recently visited Australia. For this important
information, CLICK HERE
The
Likud convention and the disengagement plan
BICOM Weekend
Brief 21-22 August, 2004
Ariel Sharon is considering the future of his plan to disengage from settlements
in Gaza and some of the West Bank , after his proposal to establish a national
unity government was defeated by the Likud Central Committee last week [1]
.Sharon asked the body to back the negotiations which are being held with
current coalition partners Shinui, with the religious parties and with the
main opposition Labour party to widen his minority government coalition.
In a hard-contested vote, the party failed to back its leader, defeating
his proposal by five votes. Moreover, in an act of direct opposition to
Sharon , a proposal that specifically ruled out negotiations with the Labour
Party received the vote of nearly 60% of Central Committee members who voted,
and was carried by 834 votes to 612 [2] . The proposal was tabled by a group
of Likud MKs dubbed the 'rebels', lead by Minister without Portfolio Uzi
Landau, who are determined to block the disengagement plan. Sharon suffered
a similar defeat in May of this year when he asked the Central Committee
to ratify his disengagement plan.
Without the backing of his party, Sharon must now weigh the three principal
options open to him if he is to implement his plan - continuing to rule
with a minority coalition, as he has for the past three months; continuing
to pursue a wider government coalition, but without the support of at least
11 of his Likud faction; or calling new elections in the hope that the new
Knesset would provide him with a better platform.
One option might be for Sharon to press on with the current minority government
in the hope that Labour would help pass the various pieces of legislation
that would be needed for disengagement. Sharon would be relying on the assumption
that it would be difficult for the Labour Party not to support provisions
for compensating settlers to leave Gaza and the West Bank [3] . However,
following the Likud vote, Labour leader Shimon Peres said that he was unwilling
to allow the current parliamentary deadlock to continue, and called publicly
for new elections [4] . "We cannot entrust the fate of Israel to the hands
of 800-900 people, when we see that a majority of the country unequivocally
support disengagement. [5] " However, it is unlikely that Labour could muster
the 90 votes needed to call for new elections when the Knesset reconvenes
in October.
Alternatively, Sharon may now conclude that his divided party will not support
his attempts to withdraw from Gaza . Writing in the Guardian last week,
Emanuele Ottolenghi said that this latest clash with the Likud could bring
about a significant realignment of Israeli politics [6] , with Ariel Sharon
returning to his political roots in the 'hawkish but pragmatic tradition
of Israel 's Labour movement [7] '. In order to do that, he may be willing
to accept the division of the party that he helped create, and leave behind
those he sees as out of step with him and with voters who back his efforts
to quit Gaza. He could then create an new government that would combine
Shinui, Labour and the centre of Likud, and would appeal to the 60% of the
Israeli population that favours withdrawal not only from Gaza but from the
West Bank settlements. However, this analysis is strongly opposed by the
US Council of Foreign Relations' Henry Siegman, writing in the International
Herald Tribune . He considers that 'the difference between Sharon and his
rightist Israeli critics is largely in the packaging, not in the substance
of their positions, [8] ' with the principal disagreement being over Sharon's
willingness to declare a Palestinian state at this stage.
However, even if Sharon were to opt for a broader coalition, there is growing
opposition within the Labour party for such a move. Haim Ramon, one of the
few Labour MKs who still openly support negotiations, was not optimistic
at the prospects of concluding negotiations with Likud. Speaking on Galei
Zahal army radio on Sunday, he said "either we will complete the negotiations
within two or three days, or we won't complete them at all." And even if
Sharon managed to broker a deal with Labour and Shinui, he would still face
the hurdle of getting enough of his parliamentary faction to support the
deal. Although a majority of MKs supported Sharon's proposal at the Likud
convention last week - 24 in favour and 11 against - MKs will be wary of
ignoring the Central Committee's wish, knowing that within a few months,
they will need to be elected by that same convention if they wish to continue
representing the party at the next elections.
Political analysts have suggested that the coalition negotiations are only
a screen, and that Sharon would prefer to create a situation where elections
are called without him being seen to be the cause of them. The Prime Minister
could trigger elections in the spring of 2005 by ensuring that the budget
is defeated. In that case parliament must be dissolved, leaving the way
open for Sharon to find new partners after an election [9] . The Labour
Party also ostensibly supports early elections - Shimon Peres said that
"the opinion of the Labour Party today is to call for new elections and
allow the people to decide [10] ."
But new elections also carry risks. Israel 's president is obliged to see
if the existing Knesset can form an alternative government before he orders
it dissolved. The natural candidate to try and form a new government is
Sharon 's party rival Finance Minister Binyamin Netanyahu , who might be
able to form a coalition with Likud, the right-wing and the religious parties.
If Netanyahu fails, there is no guarantee that Sharon would be able to maintain
the Likud's strong standing with its current 40 seats, nor that the next
Likud Knesset faction would be any more sympathetic to his point of view.
In fact, it is more likely that Sharon 's supporters would lose ground,
and his opponents, supported by the powerful Central Committee, would take
control of the party. [11] The message from Likud voters last week was that
they prefer the status quo to Sharon's disengagement plan. [12]
What, then are Ariel Sharon's options? He may be able to persuade the Likud
Central Committee that a government of Likud, Labour, United Torah Judaism
and Shas would find it more difficult to implement his disengagement plan.
But Shas is yet to commit itself to supporting the disengagement plan, and
the Labour Party's Central Committee will be in no rush to join such a government.
It is more likely that Sharon will try and work around the Central Committee's
vote, using the parliamentary recess over the summer to deflect pressure.
In the meantime, he shows no signs of halting the plans for disengagement
[13] . 'The Prime Minister is continuing with the disengagement,' said a
statement from his office. 'He will try to build a stable coalition government.'
There were further signs that he would press ahead early this week with
news that the Administration for Assistance to Gaza Strip Residents began
officially operating on Sunday [14] . The new body has been established
to arrange compensation for residents of the Gaza Strip and northern West
Bank who will be evacuated under the pullout plan. Despite the Likud Central
Committee's rejection of his plan, it appears that Ariel Sharon remains
determined to implement the disengagement plan.
[1] Conal Urqhart, ' Sharon loses crucial party vote', The Guardian
,19/8/04
[2] 'PM aides say Sharon to soldier on despite Likud drubbing', Haaretz
,19/8/04
[3] 'Labour urges early Israeli poll', BBC Online ,20/8/04
[4] Gwen Ackerman, ' Israel 's Peres urges election, pressures Sharon ',
Reuters ,19/8/04
[5] 'Labour urges early Israeli poll', BBC Online ,20/8/04
[6] Emanuele Ottolenghi , ' Sharon will sweep away his enemies', The Guardian
,20/8/04
[7] ibid.
[8] Henry Siegman, ' Sharon betrays Israel 's founders', International Herald
Tribune ,20/8/04
[9] Ian MacKinnon, ' Sharon shrugs off party revolt over coalition', The
Times ,20/8/04
[10] Gwen Ackerman, ' Israel 's Peres urges election, pressures Sharon ',
Reuters ,19/8/04
[11] Yossi Verter, 'Surreal? No, all too real', Haaretz ,20/8/04
[12] Uzi Benziman, 'No peace at a discount', Haaretz ,22/8/04
[13] Ian MacKinnon, ' Sharon shrugs off party revolt over coalition', The
Times ,20/8/04
[14] Aluf Benn, 'Government opens office to arrange settler compensation',
Haaretz ,22/8/04
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Sharon
will sweep away his enemies
His party
has committed political suicide by defying the Israeli leader
Emanuele
Ottolenghi
The Guardian, August 20, 2004
Ariel Sharon may have lost Wednesday's vote on Likud's central committee
over whether Labour should join Israel's ruling coalition. Ultimately though,
either the rebels bow to the prime minister's stronger will, or the rightwing
Likud party will lose power and also lose the settlements in the occupied
territories that Sharon's opponents are trying so hard to preserve. Likud
might even lose Sharon himself.
Settlements and Sharon have been entwined for decades. But no more. As his
showdown with his party proves, Sharon is serious about disengaging from
Gaza and part of the West Bank. Now, for the third time in three years,
his party has rebuffed him on a major policy issue. For Sharon, the party
is becoming a nuisance, not an asset. If the rebels keep winning, Likud
may break up; and the pressure for Sharon to create a new alliance with
the centre - or even a new party - may become unstoppable.
Abroad, Sharon is considered a hardline ideologue of Greater Israel. The
reality is different. Although Sharon is the architect of settlements and
of the Likud party - which he helped establish in 1973 - his background
is not in the old Israeli revisionist right, as are those of a number of
the key rebels.
In fact, Sharon's roots lie with the revisionists' old ideological enemies:
the hawkish but pragmatic tradition of Israel's Labour movement. His commitment
to settlements, as well as to Likud, was always about security: a means
to achieve a thriving Israel, safe in a hostile Middle East for generations
to come. His quest for secure borders certainly does not match Palestinian
aspirations; but he is not driven by a dogmatic and uncompromising attachment
to the land.
In 1982, as minister of defence, Sharon ordered the bulldozers to level
Yamit, the last Israeli settlement in Sinai, to fulfil Israel's obligations
under the Camp David accords with Egypt. It took him time to become persuaded
of the agreement's enduring nature. But once he embraced it, no amount of
pressure from the settlers, who had formerly seen him as their staunchest
ally, could budge him. It is the same with his commitment to disengagement
and national unity: Sharon has made up his mind. A Likud standing in the
way might soon become an impediment to be removed, not a force to be reckoned
with.
And so Likud's central committee may come to regret having defeated and
humiliated Sharon yet again. After all, this is not a clash within a nation
divided. Sharon has the solid backing of the public. The rebels thrive on
the illusion that the sharp reduction in terror attacks plays in their favour.
They are wrong: the public, including most Likud voters, supports
Sharon precisely because he wants out of Gaza. Over 60% support disengagement
and a national unity government that includes Labour; 61% feel secure in
their daily lives and approve of Sharon's security policies. But a reduction
of terror is not enough: Israelis want a political horizon, not a dead-end.
That involves the "painful concessions" Sharon has evoked since his election.
Sharon, for his part, has learned two lessons in his long political career:
never fight a war with a nation divided and Labour in opposition, or without
American support. Today, he has a nation largely united behind him, and
firm US backing. He is not going to let Likud's hardliners undermine either
by preventing Labour from joining him.
The Likud party loves self-inflicted pain: Wednesday's vote was an act of
political suicide. But Sharon is not Likud and Likud is not Sharon. Before
the year's end, expect a showdown. Either Sharon will have relegated his
opponents to irrelevance, or he will have relegated Likud to history. The
Likud rebels' opposition to his disengagement plan is a rearguard
battle of a defeated ideology against the political realism of a rightwing
leader who understands the difference between ideological dreams and what
can be achieved in the current political reality.
Sharon's defeat may give his opponents an ephemeral victory but, ultimately,
Israel's choices today are not between a two-state solution and the vision
of a Greater Israel. They are between Sharon's plan and Yossi Beilin's Geneva
accords, which would take Israel back to its 1967 borders and, from Likud's
perspective, open the way to the large-scale return of Palestinian refugees.
In 1998, Israel's nationalist right punished Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's
double "sin" of withdrawing from most of the West Bank town of Hebron and
signing the Wye River agreements with Yasser Arafat by toppling him - only
to get a Labour government. Today's rebels face a similar choice: neutralising
Sharon's plan will only bring Israel's defeated left back to power. Theirs
is the fate of ideologues: they might rule the central committee, but they
have lost the people. Sharon knows that. That's why his defeat is only temporary.
·Dr Emanuele Ottolenghi teaches Israeli politics at Oxford University
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Iranian Money and Hezbollah in the Palestinian Territories
Intelligence
and Terrorism Information Center
at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S)
Special Information Bulletin
August 2004
Iranian money and Hezbollah are behind terrorism in the Palestinian
Authority-administered territories: high-ranking Fatah/Al-Aqsa Martyrs'
Brigades members and Arafat himself publicly announce the receipt of funds
from Iran and Hezbollah. In the meantime, in Nablus, another group of
Fatah/Tanzim terrorists directed by Hezbollah to perpetrate suicide bombing
attacks was exposed.
Overview
1. Shortly
after the death of Ghaleb Awaleh on July 19, 2004, Hassan Nasrallah publicly
admitted for the first time that there was a faction in his organization
active in providing operational support for Palestinian operatives ( Al-Manar
TV, July 19, 2004). His announcement was met with scathing criticism
within Lebanon.
2. Afterwards, local Fatah/Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades leaders publicly
admitted that they had received support from Iran and Hezbollah, including
financial support . The first instance was at the memorial service for
Ghaleb Awaleh held in the Sheikh Radwan suburb of Gaza, organized by the
Popular Resistance Committees (PRC). Spokesmen of the various organizations
praised Hezbollah's support of the Palestinians. Prominent were the remarks
of the Fatah/Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades representative, who said that 'he
[Ghaleb Awaleh] was one of the few who had supported the Palestinian cause
and the jihad [holy war] of the Palestinian people throughout the intifada'
(the Palestinian Islamic Jihad Internet site).
3. Other high-ranking Fatah/Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades operatives have
also made public the support they receive from Iran and Hezbollah. Prominent
among them was 'Abu Mujahid,' a nickname for a local senior operative
in Nablus Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades. He gave an interview given to 'Ali
Waqid of Ynet on August 3, 2004, saying critically:-
a.
'We do not hide the fact that some active operatives of our organization
are financed and encouraged by interested parties, from senior Palestinians
who finance operations to inflame the situation to operatives who are
financed by Hezbollah and Iran.'
b. 'Both work to promote their own personal interests and those of their
supporters, interests contrary to the good of the Palestinian people .
But the Brigades, the real activists, are part of Fatah and are not an
armed band working for one group or another.'
4. In another
interview, Zakaria Zubeidi , the commander of Fatah/Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades
in Jenin, was asked: 'It is claimed that Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades receive
money from Hezbollah. What is your opinion?' He replied: 'That rumor is
untrue, but for the sake of the argument, let us say that the Brigades
receive support from Hezbollah. What's wrong with that ?Hezbollah is an
Arab movement . It didn't come from the moon. It is not Israeli or Jewish.'
The interviewer then said: 'But this week didn't a Brigades commander
in Nablus [e.g., Abu Mujahid] say you received financial support from
Hezbollah?' Zubeidi replied: 'We are in favor of every Arab element supporting
the Palestinian people ' (www.Arab.48.com,
August 4, 2004).
5. In addition, there were other expressions about external support:-
a.
Arafat, meeting with activists from the Israeli Peace Block, spoke about
Iranian support of various terrorist elements in the PA-administered territories
in relation to a cease fire. A statement from the Peace Block (as reported
by Al-Khaleej of the UAE) quoted Arafat's ( spurious ) claim that 'the
Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades are not a part of Fatah.' Rather, he said, 'there
are some operatives in the Brigades who claim that I [Arafat] am their
commander, but they receive money from Iran through an officer named Munir
al-Maqdah who left the organization [Fatah] in Lebanon several years ago
' (Al-Khaleej, UAE, Internet site, August 9, 2004).
b. Arafat was joined by Jibril al-Rajoub, his adviser for national security.
In an interview with Al-Haqa'iq on August 13, 2004, he noted that Hamas
and the PIJ had executed a number of activities attributed to Al-Aqsa
Martyrs' Brigades. That had been done, he added, as a service to Syria
and Iran and served the programs of [Israeli Prime Minister Ariel] Sharon.
6. On July
27, 2004, Israeli security forces arrested Khaled Bassal Suliman Shashtari,
a Fatah/Tanzim operative from Nablus, who, directed by Hezbollah , was
planning to perpetrate a suicide bombing attack against Israeli soldiers
at a road block.
7. The Fatah/Tanzim group to which Shashtari and his brother belonged
had failed in a previous attempt to send a suicide bomber with an explosive
belt to attack Israel : On July 17, 2004, Israeli security forces arrested
the potential suicide bomber and his guide, and safely detonated the belt.
It had been hidden in a truck and was supposed to reach the intended suicide
bomber the following day.
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