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Update
from AIJAC
Darfur Understood/
Iraqis Press Ahead
August
6, 2004
Number 08/04 #03
Today's Update
concentrates on explaining some of the sources of the ethnic cleansing
and humanitarian crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan.
First, academic
specialist in Sudan Yehudit Ronen explains just who the players in Darfur
are and what their motivations have been. Furthermore, she notes that
without strong outside pressure, the Sudanese government has absolutely
no motivation to do anything about the Darfur problem. For this indispensable
backgrounder, CLICK HERE
Next, Israeli
political scientist Shlomo Avineri explains the ethnic cleansing in the
Darfur in the context of exclusionist Arab nationalism which affects not
only Sudan, but also Arab relations with Israel, the Kurds, Christian
and Berber minorities, and others. (Note: This article was previously
linked to in a previous Update. However I decided, on reflection, that
given the importance of the issues it raised, it deserves inclusion in
its own right. Those who have already read it obviously do not need to
read it again.) For Professor Avineri's valuable discussion, CLICK
HERE.
Finally,
French-Iranian journalist and author Amir Taheri looks at the rush within
Iraq, by Iraqis, toward democratic institutions, even without help or
urging from the US or UN. Taheri makes the case for a lot of optimism
about democratisation in Iraq based on the attitudes of most Iraqis. For
his view, CLICK HERE.
THE
TRAGEDY IN DARFUR: WHO IS GOING TO STOP IT?
Yehudit Ronen
Tel Aviv Notes, No. 108
August 1, 2004
Just as Sudan breathed a sigh of relief at what seemed to be an end, or
at least a tangible lull, in the country's decades-long civil war in the
south, another armed conflict began to ravage the western region of Darfur.
This other war has increasingly dragged the state and its society into a
maelstrom of havoc, causing catastrophic human losses. The humanitarian
disaster in Darfur has reached such frightful proportions that international
media staff, human rights and relief organizations, western governments
and United Nations authorities have portrayed it as "similar in character,
if not in scale, to the Rwanda genocide of 1994," as "the world's greatest
humanitarian crisis," and as "the most vicious ethnic cleansing you've never
heard of."
Darfur is a large (roughly the size of France) but poor region that borders
Chad and is inhabited by various ethnic groups, all of them Muslims. The
overwhelming majority of the population is of black African origin rather
than Arab. The most prominent groups are Zaghawa cattle and camel nomads
and Fur, Massalit and other farmers. In early 2003, rebels from among these
non-Arab Darfurians, calling themselves the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army
(SLM/A), took up arms against the Khartoum government, demanding that it
put an end to Darfur's chronic political marginalization, racial discrimination,
economic deprivation and backwardness. The SLM/A also demanded that the
Arab-Muslim elite in Khartoum, which has governed Sudan since independence
in 1956, halt the unceasingly raids of the nomadic Arab Baqqara militias
-- the Janjaweed -- on the non-Arab Darfurian farmers. Violent struggles
over land and water resources have long ravaged the region but have intensified
in recent years because the growing chaos in the war-plagued country has
been aggravated by local circumstances, including accelerated desertification
and the consequent loss of large grazing areas.
Against this backdrop, the Sudanese army, worn out by decades of fighting
against rebels in the south and still preoccupied with the suppression of
other insurgencies and the protection of oil installations across Sudan's
2.5 million square kilometers, delegated to the Baqqara militias the mission
of crushing the SLM/A rebels, now reinforced by another Darfurian rebel
group -- the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Throughout 2003 and the
first half of 2004, escalating violence produced a fearsome toll of civilian
casualties and human atrocities. As reported by non-Sudanese eye-witnesses,
the Janjaweed, working hand-in-glove with the Sudanese army and government,
have bombarded and massacred the civilian population and engaged in an orgy
of rape, looting, and destruction of food stocks. The result has been ethnic
cleansing of the area. More than one million non-Arab Darfurians have been
driven from their homes. Many escaped to Chad while others are trapped in
special camps, living on the very edge of survival, hostage to hunger, disease
and Janjaweed abuses.
There is not a single domestic nongovernmental factor that can potentially
influence the Sudanese government to disarm the Janjaweed, stop the atrocities
and enable the transfer of relief aid to Darfur. Since 'Umar Hassan Ahmad
al-Bashir gained power in a military coup d'etat on 30 June 1989, he has
controlled the country with an iron-fist, using the declared state of emergency
to paralyze any political activity not fully in tune with the regime. Bashir
relies only on the army, whose top echelon was drastically purged and then
filled with devoted loyalists, and he pays no attention to any other voices
in Sudan.
In stark contrast, the list of outside powers that could exert pressure
on Bashir appears quite comprehensive and includes the United States, the
European Union and European member states, the UN, the African Union and
African member states, and Sudan's immediate neighbors -- Egypt and Libya.
However, all of these powers have differing degrees of influence on Sudan
and differing degrees of motivation to resort to punitive measures against
it.
The US administration, for example, is preoccupied with Iraq and engaged
in a hotly contested election campaign. This reduces Washington's margin
of independent maneuver and limits it to internationally-coordinated measures,
such the recent United Nations resolution for which the United States could
secure approval only by agreeing to remove any reference to sanctions. The
EU's capacity to act is also constrained by its member states, some of which
(especially France) have major political and economic interests in Sudan,
particularly in Sudanese oil, which was first discovered in the early 1980s.
In fact, other foreign oil firms - including Talisman of Canada, the China
National Petroleum Corporation and the Qatari Gulf Petroleum Company --
are also deeply involved in Sudan's oil industry and its related infrastructures
and would be adversely affected by the imposition of sanctions on Sudan,
and especially on its oil industry. And while Egypt and Libya, as neighboring
states, could give real force to any possible international sanctions regime,
any erosion of Bashir's political standing might pave the way for the revival
of Hassan Abdallah al-Turabi's Islamist influence, which was strongly detested
and feared by the leadership of both those countries. Consequently, Egypt
and Libya prefer to see Bashir's regime remain in power, despite its dysfunction
and extremely cruel handling of Sudan's internal disputes. Egypt is also
worried about any further aggravation of Sudan's political chaos. That could
strengthen separatist tendencies within the country, possibly leading to
its territorial disintegration and the disruption of the long-agreed flow
of Nile waters to Egypt.
Whatever the position of each of the outside actors, it is clear that only
a combination of their activities could generate powerful pressure on Khartoum
through international sanctions and/or some other extraordinary measures,
such as a blockade on Port Sudan, which is the location of the state's oil
export terminals and its sole maritime outlet and economic lifeline. But
the conflicting interests and circumstances of members of the so-called
'international community' make the practical implementation of such measures
rather improbable. Nevertheless, even the mere threat of their adoption
might make possible the desperately needed injections of humanitarian aid.
Dr. Yehudit Ronen is a Senior Research Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center
for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv Univeristy, specializing
in the History and Politics of Sudan.
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Darfur - exposing Arab goals for what they are
SHLOMO
AVINERI
THE JERUSALEM
POST, Aug. 2, 2004
The EU and the UN have finally decided to take the first timid steps to
try to put an end to what it happening in Darfur in the Sudan.
The recent report by Human Rights Watch on Darfur corroborates the worst
suspicions of those who have followed developments in western Sudan. There
have been killings on a massive scale, expulsions, the systematic torching
of villages and - last and not least - the use of rape as a weapon of
intimidation and humiliation against the province's black population.
These are not just the depredations of unruly Arab militias. They are
the instruments of the Arab-dominated government in Khartoum in its war
against the black, non-Arab population of the province.
This is, of course, not the first time Sudan has been involved in violence
against its non-Arab population. For decades the Sudanese government has
been trying to suppress an insurrection of black tribes, mainly the Dingas,
in the South. In that case Khartoum was trying to impose Islamic law on
the Southerners, who are mainly Christians and animists.
In Darfur, those oppressed by the Sudan government are themselves Muslims.
But in both cases, the Khartoum government has been engaged in oppressing
and brutalizing black, non-Arab population groups.
International public opinion - obviously slow to react, as in the case
of Rwanda, to a horror in a far away land, where the victims are blacks
and the details appear murky - has, however, overlooked the wider context
in which these actions have occurred.
One of the characteristics of Arab nationalism - epitomized in the official
ideology of the Arab League - has been to view the region as exclusively
Arab. Obviously, the majority of the population in the arc stretching
from Morocco to Kuwait are culturally and linguistically Arab.
Yet by calling it "the Arab region," Arab nationalist discourse states
not only a demographic fact but also presents a normative entitlement:
In the book of mainstream Arab nationalism, there is only one legitimate
nation-bearing people in the area - the Arabs.
This exclusivist, hegemonic aspect determines much of Arab politics.
Hence there is no Arab voice accepting the rights of the Kurds in northern
Iraq for self-determination; hence the difficulties of Algeria in accepting
the Berbers - and their language - as a legitimate political component
of the country; hence the violent opposition to the attempts of the Christian
Maronites to mold a slightly different identity for Lebanon; hence the
angry response in Egypt when the issue of the Christian Coptic is raised.
The Egyptian riposte has consistently been that there are no minorities
in Egypt.
It is in this context that the deep unwillingness to accept the legitimacy
of Israel has to be understood.
If any nation in Central or Eastern Europe were to maintain that it has
the monopoly of being a Staats-Nation (to use a historically discredited
German term), nobody would accept it - and international opinion would,
justly, brand it as racist and chauvinistic.
This, however, is at the core of the belief system of Arab nationalism.
The violence in Sudan - as well as the current violence in Iraq, aimed,
among others, also against Kurdish autonomy - is just a more violent expression
of the same pernicious thread running though dominant Arab political thinking.
No wonder the Arab League, so vociferous on other issues, has been silent.
What is happening in Darfur is much worse than what Slobodan Milosevic
tried to do to the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Nobody wants to see the
international community involved in another humanitarian war in Africa.
But the issue in Darfur is not just a need for more or quicker humanitarian
aid. It is the consequence of a deep, far-reaching version of ethnocentric
Arab nationalism, and it has to be robustly confronted, intellectually
and politically, for what it is.
The writer is professor of political science at the Hebrew University
of Jerusalem.
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IRAQ:
BUILDING DEMOCRACY
By AMIR
TAHERI
New York Post, August 4, 2004
YOU don't
see much about it in the media, but what is happening on the
Iraqi political scene these days may well be more important than images
of car bombs and kidnappings that have dominated the headlines for the
past few months.
The first noteworthy event is the formation of an Iraqi electoral college,
to be known as the national congress. Under the plan, around 1,000 prominent
citizens from all walks of life, all ethnic communities and all regions
will come together to elect a 100-member body that will act as an interim
parliament for the newly liberated country.
Contrary to the wishes of many Iraqis, the 1,000 members of the electoral
college will not be directly elected by the citizens. But since there
is no central authority to impose its choices on the people, it is certain
that those who will end up as members will enjoy some genuine popular
support.
In other words, the members will "emerge" from their respective constituencies.
All this is modeled on the Afghan tradition of Loya Jirga (High Assembly),
the gathering of senior tribal, religious, business, cultural and political
leaders, convened at crucial moments of the nation's history to decide
the way ahead.
The 100-member interim parliament to emerge from the congress will tackle
several important issues. It will prepare the final draft of a new constitution
that would have been approved by the congress, and will establish the
modalities of submitting it to a referendum. It will also finalize the
rules under which elections for a full parliament are to be held.
Those who follow the political, as opposed to the media, side of the Iraq
story these days are impressed by the moderation and maturity shown by
almost all segments of Iraqi society. Intellectuals, merchants, tribal
chiefs, clerics, politicians, trade unionists and leaders of numerous
non-governmental groups are coming together to develop a culture of debate,
compromise and consensus in an atmosphere of openness never known in Iraq
before.
The interim government has helped foster that atmosphere by lifting the
ban imposed by the now defunct coalition authority on a few publications,
including Muqtada al-Sadr's weekly mouthpiece. It has also made it known
that ordinary members of the banned Ba'ath Party will be allowed to play
a role in building a new pluralist system.
The interim government decided to start the process of creating the congress
after it became clear that the United Nations, which was supposed to organize
and lead the entire exercise, is unwilling or unable to do so.
The U.N.'s excuse is that its staff needs protection against terrorism.
But it does not want that protection to come either from the U.S.-led
Coalition forces or from forces controlled by the interim Iraqi government.
And since no other country has offered troops for the proposed 4,000-man
U.N. protection unit, the whole exercise is in abeyance.
It is clear that many key members of the United Nations - notably Russia,
Germany, China and France - are playing for time until after the U.S.
presidential election. Having opposed President Bush's policy toward Iraq
from the start, they are reluctant to come in and help make it a success.
All that should change after the American elections. If Bush is re-elected,
his opponents would know that they can't afford to moan and sulk for four
more years. If John Kerry wins, the powers that had opposed Bush could
claim a role in Iraq without having to eat humble pie.
The Iraqis, however, have wisely decided not to wait for the United Nations
(which they neither like nor trust). They have decided to go ahead with
the elections plans, effectively rendering the U.N. role academic, at
least at this juncture.
It is important that the interim government stick to the timetable for
ending the transition. Iraq urgently needs elections to bestow legitimacy
not only on its developing government structures but also (especially)
on the pluralist system it needs for its survival as a nation-state.
The Iraqi political leaders are aware of the unique opportunity that a
combination of factors has provided for them to build a modern nation-state
based on unity in diversity. Despite the ongoing terrorist campaign, the
interim government must not be tempted into reviving the institutions
that turned Iraq into a republic of fear. Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi's
attempts at portraying himself as a law-and-order man with an iron fist
may be profitable in tactical terms, but would be counter productive from
a longer-term point of view.
The terrorists in Iraq, like anywhere else in the world, use violence
precisely because they lack popular support. If they had such support,
nothing would prevent them from organizing mass demonstrations, creating
political parties and associations and contesting the forthcoming elections.
But because they know they can never win in any free election, these practitioners
of terror and violence are doing all they can to prevent elections. They
are also trying to provoke the interim government into becoming like them,
that is to say killing people at random solely to instill fear.
The aim of the terrorists is to establish moral equivalence between themselves
and the new Iraqi political leadership. They want to create a situation
in which they can say: Look, we are both the same, we both kill! And then
they could claim further that they are killing on behalf of an abstract
ideal, say pan-Arabism or pan-Islamism, while the new Iraqi leadership
is killing "for the Americans."
The new Iraqi leadership, which includes all shades of the political spectrum
except the terrorists, should not fall into that trap.
To be sure, Iraq (like any nation) needs an intelligence service and a
counterterrorism force, an army and a police force. But, if perceived
solely as means of using violence against adversaries, all that would
be ineffective in terms of proper political power.
Saddam Hussein created the most awesome machinery of fear and violence
ever seen in Arab history. He killed more people than any Arab ruler.
But his huge army, multiple guards, numerous secret services and readiness
to kill without account led him only into that spider's hole near Takrit.
Iraq's new leaders must never forget that spider's hole - the final destination
of a regime that lied, cheated, bullied, tortured, burned, plundered and
killed for 35 years.
Much of the credit for liberating Iraq has justly gone to the U.S.-led
Coalition. But the central role in that liberation belonged to the people
of Iraq, who decided not to fight for Saddam Hussein.
Anyone dreaming of creating a new dictatorship in Iraq should remember
that. The experience of those countries that have defeated terrorism teaches
us one vital lesson: It is only by mobilizing popular support that a government
can crush its terrorist adversaries.
Iraq is no exception. Only by giving power to the people will the interim
government succeed in defeating those who dream of either reviving the
Saddamite republic of fear or creating a Talibanist regime in Baghdad.
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