Updates from AIJAC

Targeted Killings: Efficacy and Morality

August 29, 2001
Number 08/01 #11

Here are three articles dealing with the Israeli policy of militarily targeting those directly responsible for terrorist attacks. First, Michael Eisenstadt of the Washington Institute for Near East Studies asks, are such attacks effective in achieving the goal of reducing terrorism. Next is a brilliant piece by Israeli author Hillel Halkin in the Wall Street Journal on the morality of this policy. His sarcasm is scathing. Finally is a piece by American columnist Charles Krauthammer, arguing that criticism of Israel's policy is based on a particularly egregious double standard.

PEACEWATCH
THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE'S SPECIAL REPORTS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS

August 28, 2001

"PRE-EMPTIVE TARGETED KILLINGS" AS A COUNTER-TERROR TOOL: AN ASSESSMENT OF ISRAEL'S APPROACH

By Michael Eisenstadt

The killing of Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) chief Abu `Ali Mustafa by Israel on Aug. 27, and the State Department's condemnation of this act, have refocused attention on Israel's use of "targeted killings" as part of its counter-terror policy. Since the start of the "al-Aqsa intifada," Israeli forces have killed more than three dozen Palestinians allegedly involved in planning or carrying out attacks on Israeli civilians. Nearly all have been from Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and Palestinian Authority (PA)- affiliated groups such as the Fatah Tanzim. Critics of these actions claim they are ineffective, if not counterproductive. What does the record show?

How effective?

In the past, assassinations have borne mixed results as a counter- terror tool. The April 1988 killing of Yasser Arafat's military deputy Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad) in Tunis had little effect on the intifada then raging in Gaza and the West Bank, while the killing of Hamas bomb maker Yahya Ayyash ("the engineer") in January 1996 prompted the quadruple revenge bombings in February/March of that year. On the other hand, the October 1995 assassination of PIJ chief Fathi Shkaki in Malta led to the splintering of this organization, hindering PIJ operations long thereafter.

In certain circumstances, assassinations can have a significant impact: in groups in which knowledge of key operational details is limited to a few individuals; where power is not institutionalized, but rather concentrated in the hands of a small number of senior officials; or where the leader is key to keeping in check potentially fractious rivalries among subordinates. The threat of assassination, moreover, forces leaders of such groups to focus on their own security, leaving less time and fewer resources available for operations against civilians. In groups like PIJ and Hamas, there are only a few people with expertise in selecting and training bombers, planning and executing bombings, and building the bombs themselves. While killing individual experts may not have a decisive overall effect, a campaign of "pre-emptive targeted killings" can, over time, together with more traditional counter-terror measures, effect the ability of these groups to carry out operations.

The current campaign of assassinations started in November 2000; since then, nearly half of those targeted have been from Hamas, with the remainder being from the Tanzim, the PIJ, Palestinian security forces, and the PFLP (in that order). Press reports suggest that Israel's assassinations have exacted a toll on the operational capabilities of Hamas and the PIJ in particular. In the past month, several major attacks have been foiled (including an attempt to blow up a bus on 2/8, the Tel Aviv central bus station on 3/8, a Haifa disco on 17/8, and a target in Beersheva today, while on 6/8 Israeli security arrested a suicide bomber awaiting orders). Moreover, several bombings produced fewer casualties than could have been expected (notably, the PIJ suicide bombing of the cafe in Kiryat Motzkin on 12/8, which injured 21 Israelis). These (and other) failures can, in part, be attributed to Israeli luck, good intelligence, and an alert citizenry. There are, however, also signs of more than the usual poor planning, inadequate preparation, and sloppy execution that often characterize these operations. (In the attempted bus bombing, wires and a switch protruding from a bag the bomber was carrying gave him away, allowing the bus driver and several soldiers to subdue him; in the attempted Tel Aviv central bus station bombing, the woman carrying the bomb fled when confronted by security personnel; and in the Kiryat Motzkin attack, the bomber showed shocked diners his explosive belt before blowing himself up, giving them time to flee or take cover.) Israeli military officials have suggested two reasons for these failures: the assassinations may have depleted the ranks of the most experienced Palestinian planners, and caused PIJ/Hamas to rush what is usually a protracted, painstaking process that in the past took weeks, in order to prove that they remain in the fight.

What are the Criticisms?

Some critics have insisted that Israel arrest and prosecute, rather than kill, Palestinians involved in attacks on civilians. In fact, it has arrested large numbers of "wanted" Palestinians residing in PA- controlled areas thus far (more than 100, according to one Israeli press report), because it has an interest in doing so: these arrests often yield information useful in preventing additional attacks. But it is not always possible to dispatch an undercover team deep into Palestinian areas in order to snatch "wanted" men. By using snipers, explosive devices, and antitank missiles, Israel can strike at targeted individuals in the heart of any of the major Palestinian cities or towns without incurring the military risks or political costs associated with entering "Area A."

Others say that "targeted killings" deepen Palestinian hatred of Israel - - creating new legions of volunteer suicide bombers, and perpetuate the "cycle of violence." (Curiously, such concerns are rarely if ever raised in connection with Palestinian violence against Israelis.) Both claims are dubious, at best. It is not possible to assess the claim that Israeli assassinations create throngs of volunteers; reliable data on this matter is simply not available. Even if true, though, it is irrelevant if the most experienced planners and "engineers" have been killed, and as a result, new volunteers are inadequately trained and their operations poorly planned and executed, leading to a high proportion of operational failures. As for the so- called "cycle of violence," this fundamentally miscasts the conflict as a tribal feud driven by the lust for vengeance (though many individuals are certainly motivated by such emotions), rather than a conflict in which the PA, PIJ, Hamas, and others are trying to use violence to achieve political ends. (Open acknowledgment of this is found in the Palestinian insistence that the violence will not end until their demands are met.)

Finally, some Israelis have expressed concern that the assassinations have contributed to the popularity of Hamas and PIJ by creating new martyrs. While this might be true, forgoing preemption entails significant risks, as it could provide the bombers with the breathing space necessary to rebuild their capabilities.

The Least Undesirable Option

Thus far, around a dozen Palestinian civilians have been killed as a result of the three dozen or so "targeted killings." Were Israel to use massive force to snatch "wanted men," the result would undoubtedly be heavy casualties on both sides - - but especially on the Palestinian side. (Hundreds of civilians - - if not more - - died when the U.S. invaded Panama in 1989 to capture President Manuel Noriega, and when UN forces in Somalia tried in 1993 to capture members of Mohammad Farah Aideed's clan.) Alternatively, relying only on arrests and passive defensive measures would likely lead to more mass casualty attacks in Israel, and greater pressure on the Sharon government to respond more forcefully. Israel's current approach - - which employs "targeted killings" as part of a comprehensive approach to fighting terror - - has proven reasonably effective, averts escalation, and compared to other options available, entails fewer risks to innocent civilians. For this reason, as long as the PA is not fulfilling its obligation to arrest Palestinians involved in attacks on Israeli civilians, Israel will likely feel compelled to continue such activities.

Michael Eisenstadt is a senior fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

ISRAELIS MUST KILL OR BE KILLED

Hillel Halkin

Wall Street Journal, August 28, 2001

I wish someone else had volunteered to write this piece. There are things I would rather do than defend killing people. But since the people in question are trying to kill me, I have no qualms about killing them first. To anyone who thinks I should have qualms, these words are addressed. When I say that certain Palestinians who do not know my name, and have never met me, are trying to kill me, I do not mean this metaphorically. Acts of terror by Palestinians--bus bombings, discotheque bombings, café bombings--are aimed at all Jews living in Israel, of whom I am one. Statistically, the chances of my being killed by such acts are low. But if by a flip of the dice I should be, those responsible would consider themselves successful. This is the definition of Terror. It does not care whom it kills and maims as long as it kills or maims.

There is no great mystery about who the people trying to kill me are. Most belong to two organizations, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which operate freely in those parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip controlled by the Palestinian Authority. Some, like Abu Ali Mustafa of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, hit by an Israeli rocket in Ramallah on Monday, are affiliated with other groups.

These organizations have offices and political, social and religious programs, as well as publications and spokesmen that take credit for the bombings. They also have workshops in which bombs are made and transferred to operatives for detonation in Israel. Some of these are suicide bombers who blow themselves up with their victims; others use timing or remote-control devices. They have killed close to 60 Israelis since the current round of violence broke out a year ago.

True, the Palestinian Authority does not always know who these operatives are. Many are first-timers, inducted and trained secretly. It knows very well, however, who their inductors and trainers are, just as it knows who are the "engineers" who make the bombs. Why shouldn't it? Many are men with long terrorist records who have served time in Israeli and Palestinian jails; many were released from Palestinian jails when the violence began, with the full expectation that they would resume their former careers. Nearly all are known to the Palestinian intelligence services, and just in case any aren't, Israeli intelligence has supplied the Palestinians with their names.

Some are personally friendly with Palestinian Authority officials. Some, like Amin el-Hindi of Nablus or Mohammed Deif of Gaza, are Palestinian folk heroes about whom ballads are sung and worshipful stories told. None has been put out of action by the Palestinian Authority. A few have been placed under "administrative detention," which generally means that they can go on planning their bombings while looking forward to a hot meal and clean bed at the end of the day.

They are trying to kill me, so what should I do about it? Consider the alternatives:

Sounds good to me. But this is illegal, right? It violates the principle of due process? So it does. We'll have to try something else then. Here's what I propose.

Each time Israel discovers the whereabouts of a terrorist leader in Palestinian territory, it should invade the area with a large force, cordon it off while exchanging gunfire with Palestinian forces, and comb it--house-to-house and cave-to-cave--until the suspect is apprehended. Then it should indict him in court and hold a trial with the help of witnesses similarly abducted from the Palestinian territories.

If necessary it should apply physical pressure to these witnesses, since you can hardly expect Amin el-Hindi's Nablus friends to spill the beans on him voluntarily in an Israeli court. Then it should repeat this procedure several dozen times until all the guilty parties are behind bars fair-and-square. The international community will, of course, approve of this.

Let's get back to assassinations. They're ugly, they're brutal--and they're the most moral way of dealing with an ugly, brutal problem. In fact they're the opposite of Terror. Terror kills indiscriminately. Assassinations of the right people are as discriminating as you can possibly get while fighting a war.

Of course, they are not totally so. Mishaps occur. Mistakes are made. There have been cases of Israel targeting the wrong person. Innocent Palestinians in the vicinity of assassinated terrorists have been killed. There are difficult moral choices to be made. Do you fire a rocket at a past and future mass murderer who may not be targetable again for a long time if innocent people are nearby? But these are moral choices. Deciding between sending a suicide bomber to a discotheque or to a Pizzeria is not. And assassinating terrorist leaders works. It throws them off-balance. It depletes their ranks at the top where they are hardest to refill. It forces them to spend energy on precautionary measures and hinders their freedom of movement and communication. (You stay off the phone and the roads when you know a helicopter may soon have you in its gun sights.) It makes them act hurriedly and unpreparedly.

Although readers of this newspaper may be unaware of it--Palestinian bombs that never reach their target do not make American headlines--many Israeli lives have been saved as a result of inexperienced bomb-makers and their delivery men acting under pressure and even blowing themselves up in "work accidents." The assassinations deserve much of the credit for this. If you have better advice for Israel, feel free to give it. Just don't tell us it's our duty to die.

IN DEFENCE OF "ASSASSINATION"

Charles Krauthammer

Time, August 27, 2001

What if Timothy McVeigh had not been captured but had escaped to Mexico? What if Mexico had a virulently anti-American government dedicated to using any means to reclaim Texas? And what if McVeigh, under Mexican protection, was dispatching gunmen, suicide bombers and assorted terrorists to kill American civilians in U.S. border towns? What would the U.S. do? Would it exercise "restraint," stay its hand, refuse to act lest it engage in a "cycle of violence"? Hardly. This hypothetical is not as hypothetical as it seems. Just three years ago, President Clinton ordered cruise-missile attacks on bases where Osama bin Laden, the terrorist believed to be behind the bombing of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (among other outrages), was said to be hiding. The obvious objective was to try to kill him. Or if that failed, to kill enough of those around him either to slow him down or deter his operation.

Yet now that Israel is facing the same threat--a virulent terrorist campaign operating out of Yasser Arafat's Palestine and directed against innocent Israeli civilians--the wrath of the world has descended upon Israel for daring to respond by "assassinating" those who are running the terrorist operation.

Terrorist groups acting openly under Arafat's protection proudly send young men into Israel to kill and maim. One suicide bomber murders 21 innocent youths at a Tel Aviv discotheque. Another chooses a Jerusalem pizzeria densely packed with young families, killing 15 and horribly maiming dozens of others with nails embedded in the bomb for precisely that purpose.

What is Israel to do? Israel has no great desire to go hunting terrorists. (The current media convention of calling these people militants is a travesty. If the word terrorism does not apply to sending a young man to blow up 21 kids outside a disco, what possible meaning can the term have?) Israel wanted these people arrested and jailed. That is why the Israeli government gave Arafat a list of the ringleaders.

How did Arafat respond? He's let them loose. Having launched a guerrilla war last year after rejecting Israel's Camp David peace offer, he has unleashed every weapon in his arsenal: drive-by shootings, mortars, snipers and a green light to suicide bombers. There is a war going on. Why \would he deprive himself of his most murderous weapons?

Again: What is Israel to do? Arrest the terrorist leaders? Israel would have to invade Palestinian cities and kill hundreds of civilians along the way. The entire suggestion--serving terrorists with subpoenas--is ludicrous. What country in wartime tells its soldiers not to shoot back at those trying to kill them, but instead to cross enemy lines and try to apprehend them for trial? Israel has responded the only way it can, and precisely as any other country would. When, in 1986, the U.S. found Libya responsible for a terrorist bombing that killed American soldiers in a Berlin discotheque, it did not send Muammar Gaddafi a subpoena. It bombed his barracks.

The object of such attacks is twofold. If you're lucky, you get the chief perpetrator. And if you're not, you have sent a message that the enemy cannot operate with impunity, bringing a measure of deterrence to his calculation.

Israel's counterterrorism campaign has already prevented several attempted suicide bombings. Of course, it cannot stop them all. But even one mass murder pre-empted is justification enough.

Israel was severely criticized when two boys were accidentally killed in a rocket attack on a Hamas building. That indeed was tragic. But no military campaign--not the NATO bombing of Serbia in the Kosovo war, not the U.S. bombing of Baghdad in the Gulf War, not the current Israeli attacks on Palestinian terrorists--has ever been conducted without accidental deaths. There is, moreover, an ocean of difference between a targeted attack on terrorists that inadvertently harms civilians and the deliberate murder of civilians, which is the specialty of the very Palestinian terrorists Israel is targeting.

On the other hand, there is not an iota of moral difference between sending a suicide bomber into Tel Aviv and Jerusalem to kill indiscriminately large numbers of innocent civilians and sending V-1 and V-2 missiles to terrorize London and Antwerp during World War II. Would anyone argue that it would have been wrong for the Allies to "assassinate" those Nazis who were producing, targeting and launching the V-1s and V-2s?

What country would not do as Israel is doing? How did Russia, guarantor of international norms as a charter member of the Security Council, respond to the bombing of apartment buildings in Moscow, allegedly by Chechen terrorists? By practically destroying Chechnya, razing its capital and killing thousands.

In contrast, Israel's response to unrelenting terrorism has been extraordinarily restrained, as precisely targeted at the guilty as possible. The abuse Israel has suffered for this scrupulous exercise of self-defense--in a war it did not start--is yet another example of the outrageous double standard applied to it by a cynical, complicit world.