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EDITORIALS Good defences make good neighbours One of the most remarkable things about the debate over Australias announcement that it will participate in the US missile defence program is the vehemence of the feeling that characterises opposition to the plan. Unfortunately, much of the intellectual argument against the concept of missile defence as expressed in Australia seems to rely on the Cold War logic which led to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and to reflect arguments from the debate over the much more ambitious "Star Wars" plan suggested by US President Reagan in the 1980s. At a time when the main danger seemed to be a war between the superpowers, it was plausibly argued that the primary goal should be to avoid complications like missile defence systems that might cause leaders in Moscow or Washington to miscalculate the delicate balance. These arguments are today irrelevant. There is much greater danger that a rogue actor will launch a limited strike with weapons of mass destruction either due to accident, loss of local control, as escalation out of a conventional war or attack, or out of some ideological or messianic belief that war is inevitable. Such attacks doubtless sound irrational, and indeed they are. But the world must today reckon with irrationality, which is a genuine reality. For instance, it is today known that during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, Castro and other Cuban leaders actively sought a nuclear war in the hopes of destroying "imperialism," despite the costs. The more states there are armed with long-range missiles and weapons of mass destruction, the more chance that deterrence will fail due to irrationality or other unpredictable circumstances. Moreover the truth is that non-proliferation regimes are increasingly failing in the post-Cold War age, and while we should do whatever we can to strengthen them, there is no hope of doing more than slowing the inevitable. India, Pakistan and North Korea have joined the nuclear club. Iran is nearly there. Other states will react by seeking their own weapons of mass destruction, especially if they have no other way of defending themselves from the threat of attack or intimidation. For Australia, the obvious example of such a threat which comes to mind is North Korea, an impoverished Orwellian society where drug smuggling and missile sales fund an enormous military establishment. Yet, as the country is driven further into destitution, an increasingly desperate regime in Pyongyang may become ever more erratic, which given already dangerous past behaviour is a frightening prospect. Combining paranoia, poverty and nuclear potency, communist North Korea is an unpredictable menace. Mainland Australia may already be within range of North Koreas arsenal of ballistic missiles. With a range of 6,000 km, the Taepo Dong-2 ballistic missile could hit Darwin with ease. Moreover, intelligence analysts report that the North Koreans are hard at work on an extended range version of the Taepo Dong-2 that could reach Melbourne and Sydney. An American intelligence report to Congress revealed that "Once the system is assessed to be ready, a test flight could be conducted within six months of a decision to do so." In other words, the future of rogue regimes able to target Australia is already here. That North Korea considers Australia a potential target right now is probably doubtful. Whether it or another newly nuclear regime may do so in future cannot be ruled out. For instance, Iran is likely only a couple of years away from nuclear capability, and the regime there is clearly under threat and may become unstable. Pakistan already has a long-range nuclear capability and is an unstable state. It is easy to envision being taken over by a regime comparable to the Taliban, which Pakistan helped to sponsor. Opponents of missile defence often argue that such a program would constitute the catalyst for a global nuclear arms race. However, this completely inverts the effect that missile defence will have on the problem of nuclear proliferation. For example, a credible missile defence program would provide a benign non-nuclear alternative to a Japan severely shaken by the firing of North Korean ballistic missiles over its territory. Missile defence would allow the Japanese to adopt an effective strategy that would not involve trying to neutralise North Korean belligerence through nuclear deterrence, which would cause other nations to also engage in proliferation to counter Japans nuclear capabilities. Similarly, the availability of missile defence will reduce the lure of nuclear weapons for states with aggressive designs, because such defences make it harder to use WMD to intimidate. Thus, missile defence, if introduced in a careful and well-crafted manner, could actually serve to help the worlds faltering non-proliferation regimes. You also often hear that missile defence will not work. Actually, it already does, as Israels "Arrow" anti-ballistic missile system has proven. In mid-December, the Israeli Air Force successfully completed the 11th live fire test of the Arrow, intercepting an incoming missile at high altitude. With two operational batteries deployed and fully functional, the already operational and proven Arrow system shows that anti-ballistic missile systems are already technologically viable, especially against the slower medium and intermediate range missiles which rogue regimes are likely to develop in the near future. Meanwhile, international affairs are unfortunately being dominated by a clash of cultures between liberal civilisation and a violent Islamist totalitarian movement which seeks to return the world to an historically fictitious pure Islamic utopia. Moreover, the world is also peppered by rogue dictatorial regimes that are prepared to do anything, and make common cause with anyone, in order to survive. In such a troubled global environment, and in the future, as holders of nuclear weapons likely increase into the dozens, seekers of global stability would have to be mad to rely on the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) which worked when only two large nuclear powers squared off. Sooner or later, somewhere, somehow, something will go wrong, and the results will be truly horrendous unless a defensive circuit breaker were available. Australias only responsible course of action is to join the United States in the development of a missile defence program that can provide a measured response to such a threat. We may not need to build such a system in the near future, but to refuse to offer some basic cooperation with US plans and thus pass up the opportunity to have access to this technology in case we do need it would be more than irresponsible, it would be MAD indeed. Colin Rubenstein
From Justice to Democracy The capture of Saddam Hussein will certainly go down as one of the great moments of the 21st century, but as the celebrations die down in Iraq one is given cause to reflect on the fall of the Iraqi regime and the lessons the events hold for Israel. While it is true, as many on the left are quick to point out, that the United States extended some support to Saddam Husseins regime in the 1980s, as a regional balance to Ayatollah Khomeinis Iran and in hopes of moderating him, American tolerance and goodwill ended abruptly in 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait and it became clear Iraq had become a dangerous threat. Following the Gulf War, for twelve years consecutive US administrations tried to contain Hussein through sanctions, before both the Clinton and Bush administrations finally arrived at the conclusion that Hussein must be dealt with forcefully and decisively. Israel, too, must deal with a dictator who threatens its vital interests, but unlike the United States has failed to chase him into a spider-hole. As in the Iraq case, Israel viewed Yasser Arafat as a preferable alternative to Islamic fundamentalism in 1991, in the belief that "constructive engagement" would moderate Arafat and lead him to make peace with Israel. "Give him something to lose", said one State Department official in 1995, "and he wont be so fast to give it up." But as with Hussein, Israeli expectations for Arafat failed to materialise. Despite the Oslo Accords, international legitimacy, and a near-sovereign Palestinian Authority in Gaza and the West Bank, Arafat remained the same committed revolutionary ideologue he had always been. Arafat arrived in Gaza in July 1994 smuggling weapons and banned individuals in official vehicles; the first terror attacks came just weeks later. A decade on, both Palestinian and Israeli economies are in shambles, the PA is the worlds number one kleptocracy, and over a thousand Israelis have met early deaths at the hands of Palestinian terrorists. All this after Israel offered Arafat the vast majority of what he claimed to want at Camp David and Taba. Americas experience should teach Israel a valuable lesson: murderous dictators cannot be "rehabilitated" through liberal economic and political engagement. Saddams arrest and future trial will hopefully contribute to transforming Iraq, but ultimately it is the change in the nature of Iraqi politics and society which will make Iraq a contributor to regional peace and stability. This transformation is still a very large task of course, but it is on the similarly large task of democratising Palestinian political life that Israels leaders should always be focusing as they strive to create the conditions for the lasting two state solution that most Israelis continue to favour. Andrew Friedman |
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© AIJAC 2003 |