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September 2003

Do Fence Us In
Peace through separation

By Gerald Steinberg

According to public opinion polls, over 70% of Israelis consistently support completion of the "fence" to separate the Palestinian population in the West Bank regions of Judea and Samaria from Israeli territory. Although the majority also supports the Roadmap, and the latest attempt to end Palestinian violence through negotiation, Israelis also have learned to be realistic. The past three years of terror have taught us that without fundamental and widespread changes in Palestinian attitudes, the current ceasefire will end in another round of violence, perhaps even more deadly than Arafat’s post-Oslo terror campaign. The failure of the Palestinian Authority to implement the most basic requirements of the Roadmap, beginning with dismantling terrorist groups and collecting explosives and weapons, led directly to the recent terror wave that has killed many Israelis. While a negotiated peace agreement would be better for all, the chances of this happening before a new generation of Palestinians grows up without hate is close to zero.

The fence Israel had to have

Taking these factors into consideration, and realising that the status quo is unstable, Israelis recognise that physical separation - in other words, a border – provides the most realistic option for reducing the vulnerability to attack. Israelis have learned that pledges of peace, when they are heard, are ephemeral, but the construction of a fence has a very visible and immediate impact. On this basis, construction of the separation barrier, with electronic sensors, concrete walls, and patrol roads, began in June 2002 following escalating terror attacks. The northern portion, 128 kilometres long, and extending to Kfar Saba and around the Palestinian city of Kalkilya, has already been completed, as well as portions surrounding Jerusalem.

As the barrier goes up across the "seam line" between the two populations, the sense of increased security is immediate. Army statistics demonstrate a sharp decline in infiltration and terror attacks where the barrier has been completed, and as in the case of Lebanon, around Gaza, and along the long border with Jordan, a security fence and intensive IDF monitoring of movements on the other side are highly effective measures in keeping out terrorists. The construction of a barrier to keep out Palestinian bombers is clearly Israel’s best defence against another and more deadly round of violence. The Palestinian from Hebron who murdered over 20 Israelis in the Jerusalem bus atrocity was able to go through the sections where the fence has yet to be built.

Support for immediate separation is also propelled by recognition of the demographic threat to the Jewish and democratic nature of Israeli society. As Prime Minister Sharon acknowledged, the majority population in a single political entity between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River will soon be Palestinian, and the Jewish population would become a minority in another Arab and Islamic state, thereby reversing the accomplishments of the Zionist movement and the reestablishment of Jewish self-determination. If the efforts to negotiate a two-state solution are again blocked by the Palestinians (precisely to trap Israel in this scenario), the alternative is separation through unilateral action and creation of a de facto border.

Taking these issues into account, the Palestinian campaign (through the U.S and the UN) is unlikely to stop construction. The desperate effort to stop this sensible alternative to terrorism is reflected in the use of the language of demonisation. Examples of this absurd but vitriolic press campaign include constant references to the "apartheid wall" (as if closing a border to separate two hostile populations has any resemblance to the situation in South Africa) and the "Berlin wall" (as if Israeli defence forces stationed along the wall are there to keep Israelis from escaping to Jenin and Ramallah, like Soviet troops during the Cold War). As for charges that Israeli is using the construction of the separation barrier to "steal land", as anyone who has bothered to look can see, the fence generally follows natural terrain barriers (hills and valleys) in uninhabited areas or runs parallel to major highways.

In Israel, the debate on the route for the third stage, covering the line between the middle of the country and the northern outskirts of Jerusalem, will be decided soon. The supporters of a "minimalist" option want to keep the fence close to the "green line" (the 1949 armistice lines) and to Barak’s proposed map at the Camp David summit three years ago. This route would include the consensus settlements along the "green line" (not a pre-1967 border, as is often erroneously claimed), as well as the Etzion Bloc south of Jerusalem and perhaps Ariel, while many isolated settlements further to the East would be excluded. In contrast, the "maximalists" advocate a route that is at least twice as long, in order to incorporate many of these isolated settlements. But the maximalist fence would also include 110,000 Palestinians, (20 times more than the minimalist alternative) and would aggravate the demographic threat to the Jewish state, rather than the reverse. This would also add to the friction with the US government, but, in contrast, the exclusion of many settlements could trigger demonstrations and violent confrontations against the policies of the Sharon government.

Thus, the decision on the route of the middle section of the separation fence will be difficult, and leave some people upset, but the alternative - delaying construction and leaving Israel vulnerable to terror - is far worse. Israelis recognise that completion of a barrier between the two populations is vitally necessary for our security and survival as a Jewish state.

Professor Gerald Steinberg is Director of the Program on Conflict Management and Negotiation at Bar Ilan University.

 

   
 
 

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