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November 2001

Terrorologist
Speaking with Rohan Gunaratna

By Daniel Mandel

Rohan Gunaratna is the sort of figure in short supply in Australia when, more than ever, we require expert advice on terrorism. This means that expert commentary has largely gone by default to pundits with sometimes dubious qualifications in this domain. We lack a Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPU), which is the institution, affiliated to St Andrews University in Fife, Scotland where the Sri Lankan-born Gunaratna is based.

Rohan Gunaratna: researcher in international terrorism

Gunaratna takes a scientific view of the phenomenon, noting carefully similarities and dissimilarities and the ideological style of politics that is the common denominator of terrorism. He is certain of American determination to fight the Al Qaeda network of terrorists, but their determination is not matched by knowledge of their foes.

"The Americans lack a deep understanding of how to fight terrorism", Gunaratna begins, "because unlike the European states the experience of America in the fight against terrorism is very limited. Therefore it will take time for America to respond decisively and in a sustained manner. If you look at the Al Qaeda organisation it is horizontally and vertically integrated. Al Qaeda has about 3,000 fighters, with the Taliban serving as their 55th Brigade."

Accordingly, Gunaratna believes that the Taliban itself needs to be neutralised, along with what he calls the "core and penultimate leadership" of Al Qaeda.

"But if you say that the Americans are ill prepared for such a war", I ask, "how do they go about this matter swiftly? How do they expedite the fight?"

"You are absolutely correct," replies Gunaratna. "If you look at the East African bombings where two American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were destroyed in 1998, since then the US has tried its best to disrupt the Al Qaeda network the world over. But the American success has been very limited. Last year Al Qaeda mounted an attack against USS Cole and this year Al Qaeda conducted attacks on multiple targets in the US. This demonstrates the difficulty of the United States [in] detecting, disrupting and degrading the Al Qaeda horizontal network in the West and in the East. So if America is going to respond to this challenge it will have to build support of a number of countries and support from those countries is very much dependent on the fact that America does not narrowly only target Al Qaeda but also the concept of terrorism in general. There are a number of terrorist groups that are not a part of Al Qaeda that have also killed thousands and thousands of people much more people than those killed in the World Trade Centre attack on September 11."

An obvious American challenge is that to assert that one is "fighting terrorism" says less than must be inferred. Terrorism is not an enemy, but a form of warfare practiced by enemies who just happen in this case to be sponsored by several of the countries whose support the US is soliciting. Surely the effort will stigmatise the very governments whose aid the US is seeking?

Gunaratna concedes the task is "extremely difficult" since, in the absence of US human intelligence, these tainted allies will be necessary in the fight against Al Qaeda. "Syria is a state sponsor of terrorism. Syria has sponsored terrorist organisations for a long time and a number of groups trained in the Syrian controlled Beka’a Valley in Lebanon. So I believe that countries like Syria cannot really be effective partners of a coalition."

But why then is the US energetically courting Damascus?

"Yes you are absolutely correct," Gunaratna replies, "and if America is successful in doing that, it will have to develop certain rules where those countries that are going to be part of the coalition will have to cease support to all terrorist groups."

That might be all very well, but what motive has Syrian dictator Bashar Assad to fall in conveniently with American plans? Gunaratna finds an analogy in Pakistan.

"If you look at the case of Pakistan, Pakistan has agreed to support the United States on two conditions. One is, of course, economic assistance for Pakistan, which Pakistan needs gravely, and the second is US assistance to resolve the Kashmir dispute, and as everyone knows Pakistan has steadfastly supported the fight in Kashmir and some of the terrorist groups operating in Kashmir have been linked to Osama bin Laden. But in the larger interests of economic assistance and America playing a role in trying to resolve the Kashmir dispute, Pakistan has agreed to assist. Also the threat of attack against Pakistan itself is one of the reasons why Pakistan has agreed to support the United States."

"So I believe that a lot of pressure can be exerted in countries in the Middle East that are supporting terrorism like Syria to pursue a different track and the number of pressure points that can be exerted can be even the threat of military attack — ‘if you don’t come and join us then you are a terrorist group, you are supporting a terrorist group, you are a terrorist sponsor.’"

But the fact remains that Pakistan is a rather exceptional case: it was the main backer of the Taliban. Additionally, the idea that terrorist sponsors would become pliable to US inducements has been problematic in practice. Throughout the 1990s, for example, numerous pundits predicted that, for precisely this reason, Syria was about to make peace with Israel, but it failed nonetheless to materialise. However, Gunaratna thinks September 11 alters the equation.

"The US Government is now willing to even strike governments that are not willing to cease its support to terrorist organisations and I think the US is under pressure to do that. But what is important for us to understand at this moment is Al Qaeda has been made the priority target group of the United States and because of that it is likely that the US will mobilise support from some of these pariah regimes and semi-pariah regimes. But a coalition will genuinely work and last only if those countries totally abandon the use of terrorism as a political weapon." In short, success is in prospect, but so are difficulties further down the road.

Hamas is one terror group with infrastructure in Australia

Into this labyrinthine world, where does Israel come in? Bearing in mind these matters suggests that the sidelining and informal "linkage" of 1990, whereby the US obtained support against Iraq by assuring Arabs that it would pressure Israel into concessions to the Palestinians, is about to be repeated.

"America is playing a very delicate game because it does not want Israel to be openly identified with the US," says Gunaratna, "but of course Israel will provide extensive intelligence support because of its very unique capability of obtaining intelligence on terrorist organisations operating both in the Middle East and some parts of Asia. But Israel will not be openly identified with the United States especially because this is one of the pre-conditions of Pakistan, that Pakistan soil, Pakistan assistance will not be forthcoming if Israeli troops are going to be inducted in the force that is going strike these targets inside Afghanistan. So it will be very similar to what you just now said about what happened in the Gulf period."

On the home front, Bush, as other leaders, has been admirably explicit in differentiating Islamists from the rest of Islam, but seeing officials of American Islamist groups meeting him days after September 11 provides little reassurance. However, Gunaratna thinks the reality is more complex.

"As you know, terrorist organisations have based terrorist support networks in Western Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand. These are liberal democracies, the conditions are very conducive for the operation of terrorist support networks that engage in propaganda fundraising, procurement, training, recruitment, shipping, all these activities. US identification with some of these Islamist organisations inside the US is directly to demonstrate to the Arab world that Muslims are not being harassed, Muslims are not being marginalised. So it is more a political gimmick."

For Australia, Gunaratna has most unsettling news. "There are seven terrorist groups that have established propaganda and fundraising infrastructures inside Australia; Hamas, Lebanese Hezbollah, Chechen Mujahadin, Tamil Tigers, Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), that has conducted suicide bombings and two groups from India, the Babber Khalsa International and the International Sikh Youth Federation. Australia, I believe, has realised the threat from these organisations and also the fact that Australian money has gone into fund acts of terrorism in many different countries in Asia and the Middle East. And right now Australia is considering legislating tough laws to proscribe these organisations. In October 1997, the US designated 29 foreign groups as terrorist. In February this year, UK government designated 21 groups as terrorist and Australia cannot and should not be an exception to this because the political and security conditions in Australia are very similar. They must develop the legislative framework to criminalise groups, so that the Australian Federal Police can act against these groups."

"By allowing these radical organisations to establish a presence in Australia, a number of migrants who are in Australia have been recruited by these organisations and have become radicalised and politicised by these organisations. This must end."

Potential 'martyrs' rally in Gaza

But it has hardly ended yet, not even in the US, where Hamas and Islamic Jihad were conspicuously absent from the list of terrorist groups on America’s new list. "These two organisations have not been included in the latest list that came out last week listing 27 groups," Gunaratna concedes, "but they are part of the list that came out in October 1998. Right now there are two lists that have designated groups and the latest list is Al Qaeda and other affiliate organisations to the Bin Laden organisation and, together with this list, there are also another set of groups designated in 1997. So there are a total of about 50 terrorist groups that are currently designated as terrorist organisations by the US Government … But this policy is counterproductive because this means many countries who are affected by these other terrorist groups are not going to give their wholehearted support to the America in the fight against terrorism."

This means that at some unspecified future date, the US will abandon this policy. "In the long run," insists Gunaratna, "it is important for America and many other countries to fight terrorism irrespective of which group is perpetrating terrorism. Terrorism, like slavery was abandoned in the last century and this century we should have laws and ethics that will ensure that terrorism will no longer be used by organisations and by groups as a method of communication."

In parting, Gunaratna offers a final word of advice. "Western publics must put pressure on their governments to detect, disrupt, degrade and destroy the terrorist support networks that are often operating as charities as front cover and sympathetic organisations. These organisations take the face of human rights and human caring organisations and they have got grants of several respectable grant-making foundations in Australia, in the West, and this must stop. And the only way this can stop is, if the public are vigilant and if the public maintain pressure."

"I also have a special message for the politicians especially of Australia, some of these terrorist organisations exercise constituent or electoral pressure and you must not succumb to this pressure. A terrorist group can come and tell you, look we will give you 10,000 or 20,000 votes in the next election. You should include this in your manifesto or you should air this in your parliament. It will be highly counterproductive for political leaders to succumb to this kind of pressure because this will damage the security, not only of your country, but international security in general."

   
 
 

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