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Aftershock For a small country like Israel, the cost of occupying southern Lebanon has been significant. More than 850 soldiers in the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) have been killed since the summer of 1982, and more than 3,800 have been wounded. Financially, the occupation has been a burden on Israel’s defence budget. But even with these costs, most Israelis once considered the IDF’s ongoing presence in Lebanon to be an imposed reality; any alternative, they thought, would be worse than the status quo. The spring 1999 Israeli election campaign brought the Lebanese imbroglio to the limelight. The three leading prime ministerial candidates—Ehud Barak, Benjamin Netanyahu, and Yitzhak Mordechai— pledged, each in his own way, to "bring the boys home." Barak, who subsequently won, went even further, committing himself to a deadline of July 2000 for completing the withdrawal from Lebanon. Barak’s deadline reflected his conviction that a comprehensive peace agreement with Syria, as the only possible guarantor of peace in Lebanon, could be drafted within several months, thereafter allowing an Israeli troop withdrawal to take place. His view was based on the common wisdom that Syria is behind the violence in southern Lebanon and that the Lebanese regime is too feeble to enter into a separate agreement with Israel. With or without a Syrian agreement, Barak’s government remained determined to fulfil its election pledge and end the occupation of Lebanon by July 2000. On March 10, 2000, the IDF submitted a plan called "Morning Twilight," which assumes unilateral withdrawal without an agreement with Syria. Yet, apart from providing security along the border, Israel will have to take precautions and implement measures to prevent southern Lebanon from reverting to its status prior to the Israeli invasion in 1982: a no man’s land and a safe haven for terrorist organizations from which attacks against Israel were launched. THREATS AND CHALLENGES Following its withdrawal from southern Lebanon, Israel could face a wide array of threats and challenges. In addition to the immediate threat of terrorist activity, the IDF’s primary concern is the significant reduction in Israel’s ability to conduct counter-guerrilla operations against Lebanese militias. Some senior IDF commanders have expressed doubts about Israel’s ability to provide the maximum level of personal security to the civilians of the Galilee if the IDF deploys along the international border. Their main argument is that during the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, the IDF failed to prevent Hezbollah both from launching rockets at the Galilee and from operating in proximity to the border; with the elimination of the security zone, Hezbollah would be able to conduct these operations more easily. Israel’s Intelligence Capabilities in Lebanon Nothing is more essential to an effective counter-guerrilla operation than accurate, detailed, continuous, and timely intelligence. Inside information about the structure, organization, leadership, tactics, and operational capabilities of a guerrilla organization is the raw material for planning and executing successful operations against it. The quest for inside information is extremely complicated and sensitive; it involves recruiting informers and agents and planting them as deep as possible inside the organization’s command echelon. Additional valuable information can be gleaned from signals intelligence (SIGINT) units specialising in wire tapping and intercepting hostile communications. Observation and surveillance of the environment in which the guerrillas conduct their training and daily activities also provide crucial information. Hezbollah is one of the most secretive and complex guerrilla movements in existence. But despite the difficulties, Israel’s intelligence services have been successful in detecting Hezbollah’s main training bases, headquarters, and logistics. In some cases, early warning of Hezbollah attacks supplied by the Intelligence Branch enabled IDF and South Lebanon Army (SLA) forces to preempt and repel the attackers; in others, information about guerrilla whereabouts allowed for the planning and execution of counter guerrilla operations. A withdrawal from the security zone will greatly reduce Israel’s intelligence gathering capabilities. It will lead to the dissolution of the SLA and deny Israel its most valuable source of information in Lebanon. Cross-Border Incursions The decade prior to Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon is remembered as a horrific period in the lives of many residents of the Galilee. It started in May 1970 with a brutal attack by Palestinian terrorists who crossed the Lebanese border on an Israeli school bus, killing twelve children from Motive Avivim. Two more bloody cross-border incidents in 1974 shocked Israelis even further when Palestinian terrorists killed eighteen people in Kiryat Shmona, then murdered twenty-one school children in Ma’alot. These events and others exposed the vulnerability of the border cities and villages to cross-border infiltration and were the main triggers for the decision by the Israeli government to establish the security zone. The zone has proven to be a success in preventing infiltration. Since the establishment of the security zone in 1985, only nine guerrilla squads have succeeded in reaching the border; of those nine, two were successful in crossing. For its part, Hezbollah’s attitude toward infiltration into Israel has been enigmatic. Despite its hostile approach toward Israel and its support of terrorist attacks carried out in Israel by the Palestinian groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah has never been involved in any attempt to cross the border. This does not mean that the organization lacks the capability of doing so; on the contrary, Hezbollah guerrillas have penetrated the security zone and ambushed IDF troops only a short distance from the fence. How loyal Hezbollah will be to its noninfiltration strategy when the IDF is out of Lebanon is a subject for speculation, but, without an Israeli presence there, the IDF will need to strengthen its defence deployment significantly along Israel’s side of the border. A murderous attack in the style of the "terrorist spectacular" of the 1970s would have a devastating effect on the morale of Israeli residents in the North. It would be a realisation of the Israelis’ greatest fear: that their personal security had regressed to the reality of the pre-1982 period. The Katyusha Risk Factor Despite the IDF’s tactical and technological sophistication in its operations in southern Lebanon, it has been unable to produce an absolute remedy to one of the most frustrating military threats: katyusha attacks. "Katyusha" is the generic name for a family of rockets with a top range of 12.7 miles and a warhead loaded with up to forty-one pounds of explosives. The katyusha is a rocket (i.e., it is unguided), and therefore lacks pin-point accuracy. For this reason, attacking large targets like the cities of Kiryat Shmona, Nahariya, or Ma’alot ensures a higher probability of causing damage than does attacking small villages or outposts. Because of the topography of southern Lebanon, however, Hezbollah guerrillas have been unable to position forward observers to look into Israeli territory and adjust their fire. As a result, scores of rockets fall in open, uninhabited areas causing minimal damage. An Israeli withdrawal from the security zone would change this situation; it would allow Hezbollah to improve its fire accuracy by positioning forward observers in vantage points along the border.
Despite the grave implications that rocket attacks have on the welfare, economy, and morale of Israel’s northern residents, the Israeli defence establishment has never treated the katyusha threat with the same awe and seriousness as it did the Iraqi Scud missile attacks launched on Israel in the 1991 Gulf War. Two explanations can be offered concerning the disparity of threat perception. First, short- and intermediate-range, surface-to-surface missiles, such as the Scud, are capable of carrying chemical and biological warheads and can inflict massive destruction in terms of human life. Second, the al-Hussein missiles were aimed and launched at Israel’s largest population centres and their suburbs in Tel Aviv and Haifa, where Israel’s economic and industrial complexes are located." Nevertheless, the above perception could be changed by the introduction of two developments in the field of rocket weaponry. First, 122 mm rockets armed with chemical warheads have been developed and are being produced by Arab countries like Syria and Iraq. If acquired by Hezbollah, these weapons could be installed and launched by the organization’s own personnel. The second development may be the introduction of the Iranian developed Fajr-3, a 240mm rocket with an extended range of up to twenty-five miles. According to some reports, Hezbollah has already been supplied with scores of these long-range rockets, airlifted from Iran through the Damascus airport. The deployment of long-range rockets is likely to transform the nature of the katyusha threat. By doubling its reach, Hezbollah in Lebanon will be able to add to the "katyusha club" 107 additional Israeli cities and villages. The total population of Zone C is almost 950,000 people, including the city of Haifa and its suburbs. The Gulf of Haifa is Israel’s biggest industrial complex, housing Israel’s steel and petrochemical industries, oil refineries, Israel’s largest harbour, Haifa airport, and many other strategic and economic targets. Any attempt to disrupt the economic activity of the region would be unbearable, perceived by Israel as a serious escalation likely to invite harsh countermeasures. Conventional Threats The above possibilities, disturbing as they may be, share one thing in common: they are all local, low-intensity threats, by no means a threat to Israel’s national security. But unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon combined with a failure to reach a peace agreement with Syria and Lebanon could also, according to the assessment of the IDF Intelligence Branch, bring about Syrian-sponsored anti-Israeli aggression that might end up in a major clash between Israel and Syria. If such escalation occurs, war could break out, and Israel could face a degree of adversity it has not faced since 1973, involving simultaneous attacks on the Golan and from the Bekaa Valley. Forces in Lebanon would be best utilised to attrite and suppress Israeli targets by means of heavy artillery bombardments. The effect of Lebanese artillery attacks on the North could be detrimental to the mobilisation and organization of Israeli forces. Silencing Lebanese fire would be difficult, and the Lebanese army could provide effective support in a Syrian military campaign if utilised effectively—despite the Lebanese Army’s weaknesses. Operational Responses The IDF will have to adopt a broad range of tools and mechanisms, at considerable expense, to minimise the threats discussed above. 1. Early Warning and Deterrence Surveillance systems are usually located in outposts along the border where the terrain allows observation deep into Lebanese territory. In places where topography denies visibility north of the border, the handiest solutions are aerial platforms such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles or alternatively aerostats (hot-air balloons) mounted with sophisticated high-resolution video equipment. These devices can provide a detailed picture of human movement north of the border without infringing upon Lebanese territory. Another class of surveillance systems is designed to assist in the war against katyushas. The American "Firefinder" family of artillery-locating radar can detect the precise location of active enemy artillery and rocket systems to permit rapid counter-fire engagement and to determine the proximity of enemy artillery to civilians. Using this kind of radar, Israel would be able to identify rapidly and precisely the LAF areas or villages used to stage anti-Israel artillery strikes, and then to demand vigorous Lebanese action in these locations.. But an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon will demand an increase in the IDF’s fire finding capabilities. This will entail the procurement of more radar systems and, from the year 2002, an upgrade of the existing TPQ-37 to the more technologically advanced TPQ-47. 2. Counter-Mobility Obstacles Counter-mobility obstacles are natural or man-made features intended to obstruct, delay, divert, or channel advancing military forces. The current array of obstacles along the Israeli-Lebanese border consists of a sensitive electrified fence, minefields, and several layers of barbed wire. Outposts and observation points are located every few miles on the high ground, and armed patrols assigned to specific sectors of the border attend to any suspicious movement. Although Israel’s defence system has been modified over the years, it is still penetrable. Without the depth provided by the security zone, Israel will have to upgrade its defences further to minimise the chances of infiltration, especially in the vicinity of border populations. 3. Protection A unilateral Israeli pullout will require a major investment of capital to enhance the level of protection afforded the civilian population of the North from hostile artillery fire. Although population centres in Zone A have been subjected for years to katyusha attacks, there is still a shortage of 430 bomb shelters and security rooms in towns along the northern border. If the eighty-one cities and villages in Zone A are not fully prepared for an attack, one can infer that the readiness of the sixty-four population centres of Zone B—not to mention that of the one hundred seven in Zone C—is less than satisfactory. A widescale program to provide shelter facilities to so many localities at once will cost millions of dollars and will inevitably extend over several years. 4. Counter-Guerrilla Air Warfare The Israeli Air Force (IAF) is likely to become the main deterrent against the Lebanese government if cross-border aggression persists after an Israeli pullout. But [it is important] to appreciate the limitations of air power exposed during recent air campaigns against Iraq and Serbia. Among the problems that emerged were the limited effectiveness of air power in an urban environment, collateral damage to civilian targets, the inability to operate in adverse weather conditions, and the vulnerability of aerial platforms — particularly attack helicopters. But the biggest limitation on Israel’s counter-guerrilla air war in Lebanon following a withdrawal and the loss of the SLA is likely to be the scarcity of high-quality enemy targets because of the IDF’s reduced intelligence capability. Lacking suitable targets, the IAF will have to resort to punitive pinpoint air raids against Lebanon’s economic infrastructure. But Israel is likely to face negative political repercussions in the international arena as a result, as well as possible escalation with Syria. 5. Cross-Border Incursions of IDF Commando Units Continuous attacks on Israel by Hezbollah will require an offensive response beyond traditional air strikes. Elite IDF units could land in almost any part of Lebanon and carry out retaliatory raids. These raids, however, are extremely risky and require careful planning and accurate intelligence. As mentioned before, the loss of the support of the local population of southern Lebanon is likely to deny the IDF the intelligence that it requires to launch ground counter-guerrilla operations. Further, Israeli cross-border commando raids will be much more difficult to execute after a withdrawal because of the presence of the Lebanese Army in southern Lebanon, which is better equipped than Hezbollah to resist the infiltration of Israeli commandos. 6. The Tactical High Energy Laser The scores of katyusha barrages that showered northern Israel in April 1996 were a source of great frustration for Israel’s military brass because they proved that modern technology has still not produced a counter for an anachronistic weapon system which saw its heyday in World War II. But the aftermath of Operation Grapes of Wrath brought about a positive development that could be viewed as an important landmark in US. Israeli strategic and technological cooperation. On April 28, 1996, Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres and US Secretary of Defence William Perry agreed on a joint US-Israeli project to develop a high-energy laser that would be able to intercept rockets in flight. The principle of the Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) is that once the target has been located, a focused laser beam is directed at the approaching rocket and destroys it. If successful, the project will provide a tactical solution to rocket attacks and will be able to engage multiple targets at the relatively low cost of a few thousand dollars per round. Furthermore, the THEL is designed to intercept rockets long before they hit the ground. In such cases, rockets launched from southern Lebanon are likely to explode above Lebanese territory, possibly causing damage and casualties to civilians there. This would invite pressure on the Lebanese army to take severe measures against the perpetrators. But the THEL project has faced some serious obstacles, both technological and financial. The primary technological problem is that the laser beam loses its focus—and hence its effectiveness—at long range. To operate at longer ranges, the system requires truly massive amounts of energy. Promising as it is, THEL has not yet reached maturity, and more problems may yet arise. But even with the assumption that THEL will eventually become operational and that within the next few years two to three systems will be deployed along Israel’s northern border, katyusha rockets will not become obsolete. The THEL system is designed to protect an area the size of a small city, and it would therefore not cover most of the population centres in the Galilee. Furthermore, the radar is not designed for around-the-clock operation. It has to be activated either after a katyusha alert is received or after the first volley hits the ground. This would allow guerrillas in Lebanon to launch sporadic rocket attacks when the system is not operating. CONCLUSIONS Unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon without a peace agreement constitutes a huge political risk for Barak and a serious strategic gamble for Israel. With Syria raging over yet another missed opportunity to recover the Golan, coupled with a reinvigorated Iranian effort to support Hezbollah in undermining Israel’s security, it will only be a matter of time before one of the anti-Israeli players in Lebanon succeeded in carrying out a bloody terrorist attack against Israel Furthermore, contrary to the common wisdom, unilateral withdrawal is an irreversible move. Israel will not be able to reoccupy the security zone, because the dissolution of the SLA and the betrayal felt by the southern Lebanese population will deny Israel the local cooperation that would be so crucial to reoccupation. Israel’s only military option would be to retaliate by means of intensive air strikes and artillery fire. Cross-border incursions of IDF commando units may also be applied at high risk and with limited results. But the lessons of the wars in Kosovo and Iraq show the limitations of air power against camouflaged ground forces, let alone against small guerrilla units intermingled with a hospitable civilian population, as in Lebanon. Israel is likely to find itself adopting a strategy of punitive air attacks against Lebanese, and maybe even Syrian, infrastructure. If such a strategy proves successful in deterring Syria from allowing or encouraging attacks on Israel, then a delicate balance may be achieved along Israel’s northern border. With the IDF deployed along the international line, Hezbollah and its allies will engage mostly in border clashes with the IDF but will refrain from attacking civilian targets. If all fails and life in northern Israel becomes unbearable while a Syrian-Israeli agreement remains elusive, though, Barak will have to look for a more drastic solution. In 1982, when Israel was overwhelmed by a wave of terrorism, Barak was head of the IDF Planning Branch. On the eve of the Lebanon invasion, he sent then-Defence Minister Ariel Sharon a secret memorandum presenting a unique solution to Israel’s Lebanon problem. Contrary to the IDF’s operational plan to invade forty kilometres into Lebanese territory, the Barak plan proposed to shift the focus of the war plan from Lebanon to an Israeli initiated attack on Syria. If a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon fails to stop katyusha and other attacks from north of the border, frustrating Barak’s ambition to achieve peace in the region, the Prime Minister might ultimately find occasion to implement his 1982 plan after all.
Gal Luft is a Lieutenant Colonel in the Israeli Defence Forces reserve, who previously served as a battalion commander in Lebanon. He is currently a Research Associate at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. The above is excerpted from a new Washington Institute book, The Last Arab-Israel Battlefield: Implications of an Israeli Withdrawal from Lebanon, edited by Patrick Clawson and Michael Eisenstadt. Republished by permission of the publishers. |
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Copyright
© AIJAC 2000 |
